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Abstract
This thesis is a dialectical study of fiction by Martin Amis, Don DeLillo and
Salman Rushdie. It situates novels by these three writers in relation to a
Western Marxist theoretical understanding of the postmodern and the
culture of postmodernity, particularly as developed in the writings of
Fredric Jameson. While the thesis is intended to demonstrate how such
theoretical accounts help illuminate interpretation of contemporary,
postmodern fiction, it also suggests how that fiction might provide a
critique, or expose the limitations, of those theoretical or conceptual
models themselves.
The thesis traces, in selected examples of Amis's, DeLillo's and
Rushdie's fiction, elements of dialectical conflict. It describes the means by
which the texts enact simultaneously a form of ideological complicity with
what Jameson (borrowing from the economist Ernst Mandel) calls 'late
capitalism' and a measure of social and cultural critique. It is with this
identification of both the ideological and critical features of postmodern
fiction that the thesis is principally concerned.
Chapter 1 charts a Western Marxist model of transition from
modernism to postmodernism both through the theoretical writings of
Georg Luk&cs, Theodor Adorno and Fredric Jameson and through brief
studies of examples of modernist and late-modernist fiction. It concludes
with an acknowledgement of the difficulties Western Marxist aesthetics
have had in identifying any critical potential in postmodern culture.
Nonetheless, the literary studies which succeed chapter one offer lengthy
discussions of postmodern fiction which carry out Jameson's insistence
that a properly Marxian analysis must attempt to identify both the
affirmative and the critical moments of cultural commodities. This is a
step which, though acknowledging its significance, Western Marxist critics
have thus far been reluctant to take.
Chapters two to four, which address the work of Amis, DeLillo and
Rushdie, focus particularly on issues such as the loss of a cultural
(semi)autonomy in the postmodern and the effect this has had on notions
of aesthetic critical distance. While they attempt to reassert the continuing
worth and validity of that Western Marxist tradition of cultural critique,
these studies also imply some necessary revision of its treatment of
postmodernity's cultural products. This latter point is addressed in the
final chapter.
Acknowledgements
Thanks are due, primarily, to my supervisor in the English Literature
department of Edinburgh University, Randall Stevenson. Without his advice
and generously tempered criticism, this thesis would never have been
completed. I would also like to thank the staff of those libraries in which
much of the research involved was carried out: Edinburgh University Library,
Edinburgh Central Library, the Andersonian Library, and the National Library
of Scotland.
Friends and colleagues at the Departments of English in both Strathclyde and
Edinburgh Universities, and at the Scottish Universities' International Summer
School have contributed much-needed, much-appreciated encouragement and
advice. Particular debts are owed to the following: David Goldie, Andrew
Noble, Vassiliki Kolocotroni and Andrea Heilmann. Thanks, too, to Lisa Wild.
And, of course, thanks to Nicola Slater, who has been a source of continuing
inspiration and motivation.
This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Kenneth and Nancy - and to my son,
Thomas.





The Broken Promise: Ideology and the Ageing of the New p.14
Georg Lukacs and the Reification of Consciousness p. 16
Lukacs and the Novel p.23
Realism, Modernism, Totality and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury p.27
Caddy and Faulkner's promesse du bonheur in The Sound and the Fury p.37
Adorno and the Culture Industry p.43
John Dos Passos's USA p.51
Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus p.59
Adorno: The Ageing of the New p.67
Postmodernism and the Avant-Garde p.71
Jameson's Postmodernism p.79
Chapter Two
Martin Amis: Of Murderers and their Prose Styles p.86
Money. The Self-Made Man p.88
London Fields: Realism and Relief p. 100
Time's Arrow: The Art of Justification p.117
Conclusion: Escape from Amelior p. 132
Chapter Three:
Don DeLillo: Some American Environments p.146
A Portrait of the Postmodern: Goods and Simulacra p. 146
Postmodern Forms: Pastiche and Electronic Reproduction p.159
Here and Now: Self-Conscious Postmodernism p.171
DeLillo: From Modernism to Postmodernism p,192
Chapter Four:
Salman Rushdie: No Place Like Home p.203
Aijaz Ahmad on Rushdie and the Postmodern p.205
Rushdie and Orientalism p.215
An Incompetent Puppeteer: The Artifice of Authority in Rushdie p.220
Narrative Authority in The Satanic Verses p.224
The Satanic Verses and the New p.236
Imagining Utopia: The Land of Oz p.248
Postscript: You Must Remember This p.258
Chapter Five




My inclination here and throughout is to insist on an approach which would try to
work out the affirmative and the critical moments of the postmodern, or, for that
matter, the avantgarde, rather than either celebrating it uncritically or condemning it
in toto. If such an approach were to be called dialectical, it would neither be the
Hegelian dialectic with its move toward sublation and telos, nor would it be the
Adornean negative dialectic at a standstill. But, clearly, I do not believe that a
cultural criticism indebted to the tradition of Western Marxism is bankrupt or
obsolete today any more than I ivould concede to the false dichotomy between
postmodern cynicism and the strong defense of modernist seriousness. Neither
postmodern pastiche nor the neoconservative restoration ofhigh culture has won the
day, and only time zvill tell who the true cynics are.
Andreas Huyssat, After the Great Divide
The following work shares the same critical impulse described above by
Andreas Huyssen. Though indebted to a large extent to Adornean analyses
of the culture industry and of the fate of commodified art, it is nonetheless
motivated by a belief that such theoretical accounts remain incomplete,
inadequate both in terms of their theoretical self-understanding and their
ability to grasp the complexities of those cultural texts to which they are
applied. Unlike Huyssen, though, I am less interested in the postmodern than
in postmodern fiction. Subsequent chapters will look closely at examples of
that fiction - novels by Martin Amis (Money, London Fields, Time's Arroiv, The
Information); Don DeLillo (White Noise, Libra, Mao IT); and Salman Rushdie
(.Midnight's Children, The Satanic Verses, The Moor's Last Sigh) — in the attempt
to identify the coexistence in these texts of precisely those affirmative and
critical moments to which Huyssen refers.
In both Amis and DeLillo I shall be looking at the texts' interplay of
"high"'and "low" culture — a frequently cited feature in theoretical discussions
of the postmodern ~ and at the ways in which this cultural situation is
portrayed as an agent in our formation as individual and social subjects. In
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the chapter on Rushdie, I will be concentrating more on the attempt in the
postmodern to envisage and to represent a Utopian impulse, an attempt
which of course is problematized by that lack of faith in grand narratives by
which Jean-Frangois Lyotard has so infamously defined the postmodern
condition.1
The opening chapter, though, offers a largely theoretical account of the
relationship of postmodernism to modernism. It establishes a set of critical
and theoretical parameters to which I return in the final, brief chapter which
readdresses Fredric Jameson's theoretical writings on the postmodern in light
of the literary analyses of chapters two to four. The terms modernism and
postmodernism have been subject to countless definitions and interpretations.
It is not, therefore, my intention to attempt a survey of the various theoretical
models of transition from modernism to postmodernism. Instead, I trace in
Chapter One the development of the account which I find by far the most
convincing: namely, that of the cultural critique ofWestern Marxism, mainly
as it has developed through the writings of Georg Lukacs, Theodor Adorno
and Fredric Jameson.2
For the most part, the writings of Western Marxists on postmodern
culture have been theoretical; neither Jameson nor Terry Eagleton are noted
for their studies of individual postmodern literary texts. Like Huyssen, they
write on the cultural phenomenon of postmodernism, developing a
historicized concept of 'the postmodern'. Conversely, the focus of this thesis,
1 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 1984), p.xxiv: 'Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity
toward metanarratives.'
2Although a number of works by each of these authors will be cited, a reading of the
following three texts would convey something of the development I'm describing:
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 2nd edn., trans.
Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin, 1967; repr. 1992);
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt, eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf
Tiedemann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984);
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991).
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is on the writings of the three novelists cited above. While the literary studies
to follow will be consistently and principally informed by that Western
Marxist analysis of the cultural sphere of postmodernism, they will also
engage — albeit sometimes implicitly -- with the major literary-critical
categorisations of postmodern fiction's stylistic characteristics offered in the
work of two of the most influential critics of postmodern fiction: Linda
Hutcheon and Brian McHale.3 The following few pages summarise what I see
as the limitations and contradictions of these literary-critical models,
reinforcing the need for that historicized theoretical understanding of a
cultural situation that we find in Western Marxist critical theory. A number
of the issues raised in the context of this discussion of Hutcheon and McHale
will therefore return in the studies of postmodern fiction to follow, though
with rather different interpretative results.
Hutcheon has of course categorised postmodern fiction as almost a
genre unto itself: historiographic metafiction. As her term suggests, Hutcheon
emphatically does not agree with those who identify postmodern texts with a
loss of history: 'Despite its detractors,' she writes,
the postmodern is not ahistorical or dehistoricized, though it
does question our (perhaps unacknowledged) assumptions
about what constitutes historical knowledge.4
The canon of Hutcheon's postmodern fiction is, as Brian McHale notes5,
particularly circumscribed by her definition of such fiction as 'coextensive with
the category "historiographic metafiction".'6 Novels such as Robert Coover's
3See Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics ofPostmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge,
1988);
Linda Hutcheon, The Politics ofPostmodernism (London: Routledge, 1989);
Brian McHale, Postmodernist Fiction (London: Methuen, 1987; repr. Routledge, 1989);
Brian McHaie, Constructing Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1992).
4Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism, p.xii.




The Public Burning, E.L. Doctorow's Ragtime, and Salman Rushdie's Midnight's
Children are quite obviously grist to Hutcheon's mill, focussing as they do on
the instability and ideological construction of historical knowledge.
Hutcheon insists on the role which historiographic metafiction plays as an
intervention in our understanding of social relations through discourse. It is
in this explicit engagement with the status of historical knowledge that
Hutcheon situates the distinction between her form of postmodern fiction and
the more radically self-reflexive texts of American "surfiction" which she
identifies as late modernist.7 Postmodern fiction (or historiographic
metafiction), she suggests, involves a self-conscious and simultaneous
absorption and subversion of realist narrative conventions. Avoiding the
outright rejection of such conventions to be found in what Hutcheon calls late
modernist texts, postmodern fiction thus attempts to engage us in a process of
self-critical rereading:
In challenging the seamless quality of the history/fiction (or
world/art) join implied by realist narrative, postmodern fiction
does not, however, disconnect itself from history or the world.
It foregrounds and thus contests the conventionality and
unacknowledged ideology of the assumption of seamlessness
and asks its readers to question the process by which we
represent our selves and our world to ourselves and to become
aware of the means by which we make sense of and construct
order out of experience in our particular culture. We cannot
avoid representation. We can try to avoid fixing our notion of it
and assuming it to be transhistorical and transcultural. We can
also study how representation legitimises and privileges certain
kinds of knowledge -- including certain kinds of historical
knowledge.8
Much of what Hutcheon argues seems to me correct and will be echoed
throughout the literary studies to follow. For example, an appreciation of the
extent to which Midnight's Children both internalises and critiques the
7"Surfiction" is a term associated with Raymond Federman and cited by McHale in
Postmodernist Fiction, p.4.
8Hutcheon, The Politics ofPostmodernism, pp.53-54.
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nineteenth-century 'historical novel' (whose contours were described by
Lukacs9) is invaluable to any reading of Rushdie's novel. However, for the
purposes of this thesis, Hutcheon's categorisation is inadequate in two
principal (and related) respects: firstly, the identification of postmodern
fiction as 'historiographic metafiction' is too exclusive ~ it would seem
unhelpful to allow Don DeLillo's Libra into this canon while disqualifying the
same author's White Noise (a variation on the campus novel); and secondly,
Hutcheon insists on postmodern fiction's interrogation of history and
historical discourses, without ever offering a historicized analysis of the forms
that interrogation might take. In other words, while asserting that
postmodern fiction 'contests the conventionality and unacknowledged
ideology' of realist forms of historical representation, Hutcheon neglects to
study in any depth the ideology of that very critique beyond acknowledging
the often contradictory stance which postmodern cultural texts adopt in
relation to the societies in which they are produced.10
In what might superficially appear a far more exclusively formalist
model of postmodernist fiction, Brian McHale asserts more explicitly than
Hutcheon ever does (despite entitling a chapter 'Historicizing the
Postmodern') the possibility of a mimetic relation of the forms of
postmodernist fiction to advanced, late capitalist societies:11
Postmodernist fiction at its most mimetic holds the mirror up to
everyday life in advanced industrial societies, where reality is
pervaded by the "miniature escape fantasies" of television and
the movies. The plural ontology of television-dominated
9Georg Lukacs, The Historical Novel, trans. Hannah & Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin, 1962).
10See Hutcheon, A Poetics ofPostmodernism, pp.201-221. The critique which Jameson offers in
Postmodernism (pp.22-25) of Hutcheon's analysis of Ragtime is, in this respect, instructive, and
is summarised in the next chapter.
11McHale avoids the phrase 'postmodern' when dealing with fiction and instead stresses the
suffix of 'postmodernist' to underline the extent to which it is a response to modernist
concerns and techniques. When summarizing McHale's argument, I shall follow his usage
even though it is not my usual practice.
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everyday life appears, for instance, in Robert Coover's "The
Babysitter" (from Pricksongs and Descants, 1969) and Walter
Abish's "Ardor/Awe/Atrocity" (from In the Future Perfect, 1977);
here the ubiquitous television set, a world within the world,
further destabilizes an already fluid and unstable fictional
reality.12
Whilst Hutcheon describes postmodern fiction as an identifiable genre of
writing which can be contextualised by comparing it to other forms of
contemporaneous discourse (such as the sceptical historiography of Hayden
White), McHale is here attempting to ground his postmodernist fiction in a
particular social and historical experience. It is, then, perhaps not surprising
that, despite McHale's own general reluctance to pursue questions of the
cultural and social significance of postmodernist texts, his categories have
been found at times useful for more materialist-inclined critics.
McHale's central thesis is that the difference between modernist and
postmodernist texts is most easily grasped as a difference in their dominant.13
'I will formulate it as a general thesis about modernist fiction,' he writes,
the dominant of modernist fiction is epistemological. That is,
modernist fiction deploys strategies which engage and
foreground questions such as those mentioned by Dick Higgins
in my epigraph: "How can I interpret this world of which I am a
part? And what am I in it?" Other typical modernist questions
might be added: What is there to be known?; Who knows it?;
How do they know it, and with what degree of certainty?14
Novels such as Ford Madox Ford's The Good Soldier, which relies to a large
extent on the convention of the unreliable narrator, or Kafka's The Trial, whose
depiction of the individual's persecution withholds any apparent motive for
the Court's actions, would clearly fit in well with McHale's categorisation.
12McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, p.128.
i3McHale borrows this term from Roman Jakobson, citing Jakobson's 'The Dominant', in
Ladislav Matejka & Krystyna Pomorska, eds., Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and
Structuralist Views (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT, 1971), pp.105-110. See McHale,
Postmodernist Fiction, pp.6-11.
14McHale, Postmodernist Fiction, p.9.
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He subsequently argues that 'the dominant of postmodernist fiction is
ontologicaY:
That is, postmodernist fiction deploys strategies which engage
and foreground questions like the ones Dick Higgins calls "post-
cognitive": "Which world is this? What is to be done in it?
Which of my selves is to do it?" Other typical postmodernist
questions bear either on the ontology of the literary text itself or
on the ontology of the world it projects, for instance: What is a
world?; What kinds of world are there, how are they
constituted, and how do they differ?15
Again it is not difficult to provide suitable examples for McHale's thesis:
David Lynch's film Blue Velvet and Alasdair Gray's Lanark are two which
spring readily to mind. The coexistence of different worlds in these texts is
not something to be resolved according to the conventions of narrative
(un)reliability or by recourse to characters' construction of fantasy worlds.
Instead, it is evocative of an ontological instability to which both readers and
characters are subject.
David Harvey, in The Condition of Postmodernity, uses elements of
McHale's argument to show the mimetic relation of postmodernist fiction's
ontological concerns to a cultural and social condition of postmodernity:
Our postmodern ontological landscape, suggests McHale, 'is
unprecedented in human history — at least in the degree of its
pluralism.' Spaces of very different worlds seem to collapse
upon each other, much as the world's commodities are
assembled in the supermarket and all manner of subcultures get
juxtaposed in the contemporary city. Disruptive spatiality
triumphs over the coherence of perspective and narrative in
postmodern fiction, in exactly the same way that imported beers
coexist with local brews, local employment collapses under the
weight of foreign competition, and all the divergent spaces of
the world are assembled nightly as a collage of images upon the
television screen.16
15Ibid, p.10.
16David Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins ofCultural Change
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989; repr. 1990), pp.301-302.
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Harvey is clearly engaging here with what Terry Eagleton has called
'Lyotard's jet-setters', those typically postmodern subjects who take full
advantage of contemporary cultural eclecticism: 'one listens to reggae,
watches a western, eats McDonald's food for lunch and local cuisine for
dinner',17 etc. Missing from Lyotard's formulation, of course, is an
acknowledgement of how this eclecticism might be experienced in terms of
labour relations and employment practices: the globalisation of consumption
has also entailed the globalisation of production, accompanied by a widening
of the gap between the rich and poor of western, late capitalist economies
since the end of the 1960s.18 Harvey's exploitation of McHale's thesis is, in
one sense, little more than an extension of the latter's own identification of the
mimetic function of postmodernist fiction. McHale, after all, writes the
following on Jameson's definition of postmodernism as late capitalism's
cultural logic:
I do not see that this higher-level, motivating metanarrative is
incompatible with the story I have chosen to tell; but I have
preferred to remain at a lower level of narrative motivation, in
hopes that any loss in scope and explanatory power will have
been compensated for by a closer, finer-grained engagement
with the mechanisms of postmodernist texts themselves.19
17Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard, 'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?', trans. Regis
Durand, in Thomas Docherty, ed., Postmodernism: A Reader (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester,
1993), p.42.
18 The source of the following statistics is Historical Statistics of the United States, Economic
Reports to the President, Harrison and Bluestone, 1988 (see Harvey, p.193).
A rising tide of social inequality engulfed the United States in the Reagan
years, reaching a post-war high in 1986; by then the poorest fifth of the
population, which had gradually improved its share of national income to a
high point of nearly 7 per cent in the early 1970s, found itself with only 4.6
per cent. Between 1979 and 1986, the number of poor families with children
increased by 35 per cent, and in some large metropolitan areas, such as New
York, Chicago, Baltimore, and New Orleans, more than half the children
were living in families with incomes below the poverty line. (Harvey,
pp.330-331).
19McHale, Constructing Postmodernism, pp.8-9.
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In another sense, though, the stress which Harvey places on this
mimetic function raises the issue of the historical periodization of the
postmodern. Here McHale has muddied the waters somewhat by suggesting
that both Jameson and Harvey posit a model of the development from
modernism to postmodernism
according to which modernism and postmodernism are not
period styles at all, one of them current and the other outdated,
but more like alternative stylistic options between which
contemporary writers are free to choose without that choice
necessarily identifying them as either "avant-garde" or "arriere-
garde".20
Although it is true that Jameson does not define postmodernism as a period
style, McHale's interpretation seems difficult to comprehend in light of
Jameson's forthright repudiation of such practices:
.. . what follows is not to be read as stylistic description, as the
account of one cultural style or movement among others. I have
rather meant to offer a periodizing hypothesis, and that at a
moment in which the very conception of historical periodization
has come to seem most problematical indeed.21
Instead, McHale seems to be rehearsing the revision which he later offers of
his own Postmodernist Fiction. He now suspects, he writes in Constructing
Postmodernism, that the earlier book had offered a misleading account
whereby 'a modernist poetics of fiction gave way to a postmodernist poetics.'
'What is missing from Postmodernist Fiction, he adds,
is the counter-story according to which modernism and
postmodernism are not successive stages in some inevitable
evolution from less advanced to more advanced aesthetic forms,
but rather alternative contemporary practices, equally
"advanced" or "progressive," equally available, between which
writers are free to choose.22
20Ibid, p.9.
21Jameson, Postmodernism, p.3.
22McHale, Constructing Postmodernism, p.207.
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Contrary to McHale's argument, there is in fact little common ground
to be shared here by his thesis and the theoretical constructs of Jameson and
Harvey.23 Postmodern cultural texts are, for Jameson, necessarily
engagements with something like Harvey's 'condition of postmodernity', the
cultural and socio-economic formations of late capitalism. Furthermore, it is
in the 'force field' of a postmodern condition that all western, contemporary
cultural production takes place. The distinction between modernism and
postmodernism is not, therefore, defined by Jameson in primarily stylistic
terms, but with reference to the role of the whole sphere of culture in distinct
moments of capitalist history. '[E]ven if all the constitutive features of
postmodernism were identical with and continuous to those of an older
modernism,' he writes,
23In Constructing Postmodernism (p.301), McHale cites Jameson's identification of Claude
Simon's 'alternation between a Faulknerian evocation of perception and a neo-novelistic
practice of textualization' (Postmodernism, p.135). However, Jameson prefaces this point by
defining Simon's relationship to both the Faulknerian style and the nouveau roman in terms
which identify it as a postmodern stance:
I will suggest, therefore, that his relationship to both is pastiche, a bravura
imitation so exact as to include the well-nigh undetectable reproduction of
stylistic authenticity itself, of a thoroughgoing commitment of the authorial
subject to the phenomenological preconditions of the stylistic practices in
question. This is, then, in the largest sense what is postmodern about Simon:
the evident emptiness of that subject beyond all phenomenology, its capacity
to embrace another style as though it were another world. (Jameson,
Postmodernism, p. 133).
This is a point which McHale concedes in 'Postmodernism, or The Anxiety of Master
Narratives', p.24: 'Thus the fiction of Claude Simon can be seen as postmodernist, according
to Jameson's account, for the way it pastiches both Faulknerian modernism and the poetics of
the nouveau roman.'
Harvey's position is rather more complicated. Although his history of the
development from modernism to postmodernism is less linear than that of Jameson, he does
not allow for the free, individual agency which McHale presupposes. Instead, he suggests
that rather than hold fast to a notion of postmodernism superseding modernism it would be
more useful to think of stages in the development of the cultural history of capitalism. 'Put
more concretely,' he writes,
the degree of Fordism and modernism, or of flexibility and postmodernism,
is bound to vary from time to time and from place to place, depending on
which configuration is profitable and which is not. (Harvey, p.344).
Thus it is possible, he suggsts, that the social and cultural features of modernism might, in
certain circumstances, be found useful economically and reemployed. Both terms, though,
remain crucially tied to a metanarrative of historical development — in this case, that of the
capitalist mode of production.
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the two phenomena would still remain utterly distinct in their
meaning and social function, owing to the very different
positioning of postmodernism in the economic system of late
capital and, beyond that, to the transformation of the very
sphere of culture in contemporary society.24
The continuation of a modernist poetics and/or aesthetic would not, for
Jameson, constitute anything like a continuation of modernism proper. This
is not to say that all contemporary cultural production is postmodern, but that
the postmodern is 'the force field in which very different kinds of cultural
impulses . . . must make their way.'25 In a more recent book (The Seeds of
Time), Jameson describes the postmodern, as it relates to architecture, as 'the
situation or dilemma to which the individual architects and their specific and
unique projects all have to respond in some way or other.'26 By extension, it
would be fair to say that, although the cultural dominant of postmodernism
does not determine the form a novelist's writing may take, it provides the
parameters to which that writing is a response and by which its 'meaning and
social function' are necessarily informed. Thus the novels of Saul Bellow
cannot helpfully be described as postmodern; but they can be seen as engaged
in a meaningful response to precisely the social and aesthetic situation which
Jameson and Harvey describe as the postmodern, a response in which the
novels' reliance on ostensibly realist narrative conventions plays a significant
part.
Postmodernism, then, for Jameson, is not a period style but is to
be grasped as a cultural dominant through a process of historical
periodization. This, as Jameson acknowledges, involves the adoption of
what Jean-Frangois Lyotard would call a metanarrative, a Marxist
understanding of the historical development of the capitalist mode of
24Jameson, Postmodernism, p.5.
25Ibid, p.6.
26Fredric Jameson, The Seeds ofTime (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), p.xv.
12
production. Breaking what McHale calls the 'Prime Directive' implicit in
Lyotard's definition of the postmodern condition — 'incredulity toward
metanarratives'27 -- Jameson attempts to offer an explanation for that very
condition, a historicized account of the cultural logic by which such
incredulity is asserted. Many of the assumptions with which this thesis is
permeated can be traced to a shared faith in the necessity and validity of such
historical periodization. It is, moreover, with the intention of identifying
postmodern culture's own historicized self-understanding that the following
literary studies are undertaken.
The novels to be studied share many of the stylistic and thematic
features described by both Hutcheon and McHale; they are, though, also
situated quite firmly within, and posited as responses to, the condition of
postmodernity that Jameson and Harvey theorise. Siding with Jameson, this
thesis will rely on a Western Marxist understanding of cultural development
in the twentieth century in the hope that such a framework, an insistence on
the inescapability of historical context, will help facilitate productive analyses
of the texts studied and suggest something of the complexity and versatility
with which the fiction of postmodernity sustains itself. After all, as Harvey
writes:
Postmodernism has come of age in the midst of this climate of
voodoo economics, of political image construction and
deployment, and of new social class formation. That there is
some connection between this postmodernist burst and the
image-making of Ronald Reagan, the attempt to deconstruct
traditional institutions of working-class power (the trade unions
and the political parties of the left), the masking of the social
effects of the economic politics of privilege, ought to be evident
enough. . . . The street scenes of impoverishment,
disempowerment, graffiti and decay become grist for the
cultural producers' mill, not, as Deutsche and Ryan point out, in
27Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 1984), p.xxiv.
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the muckraking reformist style of the late nineteenth century,
but as a quaint and swirling backdrop (as in Blade Runner) upon
which no social commentary is to be made. 'Once the poor
become aestheticized, poverty itself moves out of our field of
social vision', except as a passive depiction of otherness,
alienation and contingency within the human condition. When
'poverty and homelessness are served up for aesthetic pleasure',
then ethics is indeed submerged by aesthetics, inviting, thereby,
the bitter harvest, of charismatic politics and ideological
extremism.
If there is a meta-theory with which to embrace all these
gyrations of postmodern thinking and cultural production, then




The Broken Promise: Ideology and the Ageing of the New
The principal issue for twentieth-century Marxist aesthetics has been that of
cultural or aesthetic autonomy. It is precisely the nature of the relation
between various aspects of what we shall see Georg Luk&cs call the social
'totality' (such as the distinct but interdependent spheres of the aesthetic and
the economic) that has been the main focus of analysis and interpretation.
That this should be so ought to come as little surprise. The aesthetic in itself
necessarily occupies an ambiguous and ambivalent position in Marxist
thought. As will be shown throughout the course of what follows, Marxist
aesthetics in the twentieth century have been preoccupied with the precarious
nature and very survival of art and of the aesthetic in the face of the ever
more stringent demands of a market economy. On the one hand, then, we
shall witness a deep unease with regard to an aesthetic sphere whose claim to
autonomy is clearly at odds with perceived Marxist orthodoxy concerning the
ultimately determining role of the economic; equally, though, that autonomy
is to be prized as it offers a window onto the non-existent, the possible vision
of a possible alternative. To affirm this, however, is to do little more than to
paraphrase ploddingly the opening sentences of Theodor Adorno's Aesthetic
Theory:
Today it goes without saying that nothing concerning art goes
without saying, much less without thinking. Everything about
art has become problematic: its inner life, its relation to society,
even its right to exist.29
29TheodorW. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt, eds. Gretel Adomo and Rolf
Tiedemann (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p.l.
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The following argument will posit three precise stages in the
development of aesthetic modernism to postmodernism. These will be shown
to relate dialectically — both to each other as distinct but related historico-
cultural moments, and to the historical situations which engender them.
From aesthetic high modernism, then, represented by Faulkner's The Sound
and the Fury, we shall move to a later modernism of the 1930s and 40s,
preoccupied by its inability to sustain the modernist claim to autonomy and
acting out the disintegration of those very assumptions on which modernism
itself was based; finally, we turn to postmodernism to analyse the form of its
relation to late capitalism and to its modernist progenitors. Of crucial
significance to such an argument, of course, is the establishment of a relation
between aesthetic form and historical or social forces. For that reason, it is
necessary to begin with a consideration of the early work of Georg Lukacs,
whose The Theory of the Novel and History and Class Consciousness represent an
important breakthrough in the study of formal and historical development in
art and philosophy.
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Georg Lukacs and the Reification of Consciousness
The key category in History and Class Consciousness is that of reification, for it
is with the essay 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' that
Lukacs first attempts to demonstrate what was later to be taken as the
cornerstone of cultural critique by members of the Frankfurt School such as
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, and by contemporary Marxist literary critics
like Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton: namely, that
the problem of commodities must not be considered in isolation
or even regarded as the central problem in economics, but as the
central, structural problem of capitalist society in all its
aspects.30
For the Marx of Capital, of course, this was already self-evident. In the
opening chapter of volume one, 'The Commodity',Marx writes of the magical
fetishism of commodities using the analogy of religion: 'There,' he writes,
the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures
endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both
with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world
of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the
fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon
as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore
inseparable from the production of commodities.31
That the commodity does not appear as the product of actual labour allows it
to transcend (in ideology) the mundane world of class and labour relations -
i.e. to transcend history.32 In effect, though, this process is dialectical; for if
the economic commodity has escaped its moment of historical particularity,
30Georg Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', in History and Class
Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 2nd edn., trans. Rodney Livingstone (London:
Merlin, 1971; repr. 1990), p.83.
31Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1976; repr
Penguin, 1990), p.165.
32See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, trans. Samuel Moore
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967; repr. 1985), p.79: 'The history of all hitherto existing society
is the history of class struggles.'
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then the relations of production too that have gone into its making have also
been wiped clean of their historical markings and appear — now reified or
fetishized themselves — as autonomous, independent, natural:
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists ...
simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social
characteristics of men's own labour as objective characteristics of
the products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural
properties of these things.33
For Lukacs, this signals that the essence of the commodity structure can best
be understood in terms of the reification of human relations. Thus, we find in
Lukacs an emphasis on the expression of that structure in human
consciousness at least equal to that on economic formations:
Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and
reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the
structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more
fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man.34
Lukacs writes that Marxist thought must combat this fetishism or reification
by insisting on the inter-relation of consciousness and the economic.
However, the reification of consciousness is also wonderfully ideologically
efficient, for one of its principal effects is the incapacity of bourgeois
consciousness to comprehend that structural inter-relatedness of which its
reified form is a feature and consequence; in other words, reified
consciousness is unable to grasp itself as reified consciousness and can only
think of itself as a given, as natural.
It is precisely this argument that Lukacs applies in part two of
'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' — 'The Antinomies of
Bourgeois Thought' — to German idealistic philosophy (and particularly to the
philosophy of Kant): 'Modern critical philosophy,' he writes, 'springs from the
33Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp.164-165.
34Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', p.93.
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reified structure of consciousness.'35 Kantian philosophy, to Lukacs,
represents the most advanced form of bourgeois thought. As Jay Bernstein, in
an important book on Luk&cs called The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukacs,
Marxism and the Dialectics ofForm, writes:
In [History and Class Consciousness] Luk&cs identifies Kant's
critical philosophy as the philosophy of our age, as the theory
which most completely articulates our experience of ourselves
and the world now. Kant's philosophy, for Luk&cs, is the
philosophy of the bourgeois world; it philosophically
consecrates the world of capital. Thus, from a Marxist point of
view, the Kantian system harbours the essential antinomies
(contradictions) of bourgeois thought. The antinomies of Kant's
philosophy are the antinomies of bourgeois thought.36
Thus the very form of Kant's philosophy is said by Luk&cs to express and to
give ideological justification to the commodified world of capital. It is worth
paying close attention to how this argument is made.
It is, for Lukacs, Kant's refusal to extend his critique of ethical facts
beyond those to be found in the individual consciousness which epitomises
the limits beyond which his thought cannot go. This, he writes, has 'a number
of consequences.' First of all, the constructedness of these facts is veiled by a
mystificatory appearance of naturalness; in Kant they were 'transformed,'
writes Lukacs, 'into something merely there and could not be conceived of as
having been "created".'37 Secondly, the external world of suffering and
exchange is itself depicted as immune to ethical activity (an activity which is
the province only of the free-thinking individual): 'in nature and in the
"external world" laws still operate with inexorable necessity, while freedom
35Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', pp.110-111.
36J.M. Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukdcs, Marxism and the Dialectics ofForm,
(Brighton, Harvester, 1984), pp.xiii-xiv.
37Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', p.124.
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and the autonomy that is supposed to result from the discovery of the ethical
world are reduced to a mere point of view from which to judge internal events.'38
That the 'inexorable necessity' with which the world continues its
uninterrupted business is, in Kant's formulation, a particular effect of
subjective reason is neatly noted in Bernstein's summary of Kant on causality:
Oversimplifying, Kant's thesis is that the world's appearance of
being a causally determined domain is to be explained by the
imposition of the category of causality on it by human beings in
their cognitive activities. Thus, the objective world's being
causally constituted is, in part at least, a result or product of
human activity. Because the objective, spatially and temporally
extended world confronting human beings is causally
constituted, then human freedom and spontaneity can gain no
purchase on it; human freedom remains exiled within human
subjectivity, unable to determine or shape the objective world in
terms appropriate to it. For Kant our spontaneity, freedom and
rationality are what define us as human beings; yet, in the
simplest expression of those powers in the act of knowing we
construct a world in which there is no room for freedom or
reason. What 'is' is determined by relations of cause and effect;
human rationality hence becomes an 'ought' forever
transcending the objective world.39
This then, for Lukacs, is the essential antinomy to be found in Kant's
philosophy: 'The 'eternal, iron' regularity of the processes of nature and the
purely inward freedom of individual moral practice,' he writes, 'appear at the
end of the Critique of Practical Reason as wholly irreconcilable and at the same
time as the unalterable foundations of human existence.'40 The
contradictoriness is not a flaw however; rather, it is an expression of what
Adorno would call the work's 'truth content', its own formal disclosure of the
essential untruth of society and of itself. Thus Lukacs attributes Kant's
'greatness' to the fact that he
38Ibid.
39Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel, p.xvii.
40Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', p.134.
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made no attempt to conceal the intractability of the problem by
means of an arbitrary dogmatic resolution of any sort, but that
he bluntly elaborated the contradiction and presented it in an
undiluted form.41
The inability of Kantian philosophy, for Luk&cs exemplary of bourgeois
thought as a whole, to construct a meaningful set of dialectical relations
between individual consciousness and dominant social forces is a mark both
of its honesty and of its saturation by the structure of reification.
It would be wrong, however, to limit Luk^cs's discussion of modern,
bourgeois philosophy and reification to the formal contradictions found in the
former as an expression of the latter's structure. It is necessary also to look at
the construction of the sphere of philosophy itself in capitalist society. In
'What is Orthodox Marxism?', the opening essay in History and Class
Consciousness, Lukacs writes of the emergence of avowedly autonomous
disciplines and spheres of study.42 This too he identifies as an expression of
reification and of the fetishistic commodity structure:
41Ibid.
42Jiirgen Habermas associates this aspect of Lukacs's thought with the influence on a
strand of Western Marxism of Max Weber's writings on rationalization [Jtirgen
Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence
(Cambridge: Polity, 1990; repr. 1992), p.75]. Weber, writes Habermas,
described as "rational" the process of disenchantment which led in
Europe to a disintegration of religious world views that issued in a
secular culture. With the modern empirical sciences, autonomous arts,
and theories of morality and law grounded on principles, cultural
spheres of value took shape which made possible learning processes in
accord with the respective inner logics of theoretical, aesthetic, and
moral-practical problems (The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, p.l).
The influence of Weber's writings on rationalization runs through the early Lukacs of
History and Class Consciousness and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, most
notably Adomo and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment.
The extent to which this narrative has now, in Western Marxist circles, become
something of a truism is attested by Terry Eagleton's half-parodic summary in The
Ideology of the Aesthetic:
Let us tell, in crude and tabular form, a Weberian kind of story. Imagine a
society sometime in the indeterminate past, before the rise of capitalism,
perhaps even before the Fall, certainly before the dissociation of sensibility,
when the three great questions of philosophy - what can we know? what
ought we to do? what do we find attractive? - were not as yet fully
distinguishable from one another. A society, that is to say, where the three
mighty regions of the cognitive, the ethico-political and the libidinal-aesthetic
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The fetishistic character of economic forms, the reification of all
human relations, the constant expansion and extension of the
division of labour which subjects the process of production to an
abstract, rational analysis, without regard to the human
potentialities and abilities of the immediate producers, all these
things transform the phenomena of society and with them the
way in which they are perceived. In this way arise the 'isolated'
facts, 'isolated' complexes of facts, separate, specialist disciplines
(economics, law, etc.).43
Bourgeois philosophy is another of these specialist disciplines, whose
autonomy in capitalist society is an ideological effect of the reification of
consciousness.
Lukacs's important insight is that capitalist society necessarily
encourages the perception of its various elements (such as economics, law,
philosophy, art, etc.) as isolated, independent and not meaningfully related.
It is not Lukacs's intention to substitute for such autonomy the uniform
reflection throughout the social totality of some form of social essence; rather,
he suggests a theory of semi-autonomy:
The apparent independence and autonomy which [the various
elements of the social totality] possess in the capitalist system of
production is an illusion only in so far as they are involved in a
dynamic dialectical relationship with one another and can be
thought of as the dynamic dialectical aspects of an equally
dynamic and dialectical whole.44
He goes on to add that 'the objective forms of all social phenomena change
constantly in the course of their ceaseless dialectical interactions with each
other.'45 It is not enough, then, to analyse the formal features of, say, Kantian
philosophy or modernist artworks with reference only to the texts themselves;
were still to a large extent intermeshed. [Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the
Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990; repr. 1994), p.366].
See also, for an extended treatment of these themes: J.M. Bernstein, The Fate ofArt: Aesthetic
Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Cambridge: Polity, 1993).
43Lukacs, 'What is Orthodox Marxism?', in History and Class Consciousness, p.6.
44Lukacs, 'What is Orthodox Marxism?', pp.12-13.
45Ibid, p.13.
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rather, it is necessary also to trace the specific features of the construction of
the spheres of philosophy and of aesthetics themselves in which these texts
are produced and take their place. What we might infer from these two essays
by Lukacs is that the contradictions (or 'antinomies') of capitalist society are
reflected both in the relation of philosophy and art to other social spheres and
in the formal characteristics of individual philosophical systems or, as we
shall see, works of art. The 'antinomies of bourgeois thought', exemplified so
fully in Kant, are a further reflection, then, of the ideological lie of
transcendence in which philosophy as an institution (or as a separate, specialist
discipline) is forced to indulge itself in capitalist societies. It is only with an
appreciation of how this might be reduplicated in the aesthetic or cultural
sphere — or so at least goes the following argument ~ that we can come to a
proper understanding of the significance of modernist artworks and,
consequently, of their relation to contemporary postmodernist texts.
23
Lukacs and the Novel
Lukacs's The Theory of the Novel, according to Jay Bernstein, proposes that 'the
novel is essentially antinomic, an impossible or contradictory practice.'46
Bernstein's thesis is that, though preceding History and Class Consciousness and
generally regarded as a mish-mash of neo-Kantian and Hegelian idealism, The
Theory of the Novel is in fact Marxist. A brief summary of the case Bernstein
makes should illuminate to some degree the analysis of modernism that is to
follow, and — it is hoped — will also make it easier to see Theodor Adorno,
rather than the later Luk&cs, as the true heir to these two seminal texts of
Western Marxism.
In a passage also cited by Bernstein, Lukacs asserts the following:
A totality that can be accepted is no longer given to the forms of
art: therefore they must either narrow down and volatilise
whatever has to be given form to the point where they can
encompass it, or else they must show polemically the
impossibility of achieving their necessary object and the inner
nullity of their own means. And in this case they carry the
fragmentary nature of the world's structure into the world of
forms.47
The novel here, as a genre, is defined in terms of its historical function. That
function, as Lukacs understands it, is to subject a disordered world to the
order of artistic form; moreover, it does this while acknowledging the
intrinsic deceit upon which such an act -- the aesthetic act — is based. While it
may be argued that Lukacs's definition applies to some degree to all artistic
forms, Lukacs writes that the novel may be distinguished as the conscious
descendent of epic literature in modern times: 'The novel,' he writes, 'is the
46Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel, p.91.
47Lukacs, The Theory of the Novel, pp.38-39.
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epic of a world abandoned by God.'48 The distinction becomes clearer: 'The
epic gives form to a totality of life that is rounded from within; the novel
seeks, by giving form, to uncover and construct the concealed totality of
life.'49 The epic, in creating the semblance of totality through artistic form, is
also, for Luk&cs, carrying out its mimetic function. In the novel, however,
these two artistic duties have become contradictory:
The epic and the novel, these two major forms of great epic
literature, differ from one another not by their authors'
fundamental intentions but by the given historico-philosophical
realities with which the authors were confronted. The novel is
the epic of an age in which the extensive totality of life has
become a problem, yet which still thinks of itself in terms of
totality.50
Thus, as Bernstein argues, Luk&cs's novel 'is to modern society what the epic
was to the integrated world of the Greeks. The difference between epic and
novel is analogous and internally related to the differences between the societies
of which they are a part' [emphasis added].51 The absence of an integrated
society means that the novel, for Luk&cs, becomes a constant dialectic of
'form-giving and mimesis'; thus the novel is continually denying, for mimetic
reasons, the validity of a form-giving aestheticization which nonetheless
remains its own raison d'etre. This is the antinomy of bourgeois art, a form of
contradiction which, as Bernstein notes, modernism inherits from realism
'now exacerbated and deepened rather than diminished.'52
The exacerbation of this inner-contradiction is, suggests Bernstein,
largely a product of modernist literature's more highly developed social




51Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel, p.46.
52Ibid, p.229.
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for example, that the expanding commercialisation in 'the conditions of
production, distribution and consumption of literature' were illustrative of its
increasing social autonomy in the nineteenth century, as literature became
associated with 'non-practicality, uselessness, amusement, pleasure', etc.53
This, of course, runs counter to that strand of literary-historical analysis —
whose advocates have included Andreas Huyssen54 and John Carey55 ~
which argues that modernism could be characterised as precisely a reaction to
literature's gradual loss of autonomy during the nineteenth century, its
developing usefulness as a mass-market commodity. As the discussion to
follow of Adorno on the "culture industry" will make clear, I am much more
persuaded by this latter argument. However, Bernstein seems to me correct
to point to modernism's eschewal of both realist conventions and the
'sustained employment of experiential discourse'56 as a marker of its assertion
of social autonomy.
In this sense, then, the modernist novel can be seen to enact, in an
almost exaggerated form, those antinomies with which Lukacs identifies the
genre as a whole, reasserting its distance from social actuality while offering
visions of aesthetic beauty which claim an essential truth more valid than the
reality that is lived. Adorno's defence of modernist writing as capturing a
historical truth of both a social and an aesthetic situation seems ironically
consistent with the thought of the early Lukacs while taking the form of an
explicit response to the latter's The Meaning of Contemporary Realism: 'Art,' he
writes, 'is the negative knowledge of the actual world.'57 It is with an
53Ibid, p.242.
54Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture and Postmodernism
(London: Macmillan, 1988).
55John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary
Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 (London: Faber, 1992).
56Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel, p.241.
57Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reconciliation under Duress', trans. Rodney Livingstone, in Aesthetics
and Politics, Ernst Bloch et al (London: Verso, 1977; repr. 1990), p.160.
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appreciation of how these complexities might contribute to the significance of
the modernist novel that we shall now look at one of its foremost examples,
William Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury, in the attempt to extend this
analysis of modernist literature and to show how such an analysis might add
to our understanding of an individual work.
27
Realism, Modernism, Totality and Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury
The whole is the false.
T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia
The suggestion that Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury ought to be interpreted
as a modernist novel is hardly original. However, it is useful to ponder the
sorts of dialectical relations that such an association suggests between the
novel and that which modernism appears to disavow; namely, certain aspects
of literary realism.
It is necessary then to look briefly at realism — its claims and
assumptions. For Lukacs, that great partisan of bourgeois realism (and one
of modernism's most hostile critics), realism can achieve 'a comprehensive
description of the totality of society'.58 Likewise, for Erich Auerbach -- author
of Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature — modern
contemporaneous realism (which covers the work of writers such as Stendhal,
Balzac and Flaubert) developed first in France because of the political and
cultural unity which followed the Revolution. 'French reality,' writes
Auerbach, 'in all its multifariousness, could be comprehended as a whole.'59
The chief characteristic of realism is, then, for these critics, its capacity for
representing authoritatively the totality and wholeness of lived experience.
Thus Fredric Jameson, in an essay called 'Beyond the Cave: Demystifying the
Ideology of Modernism', writes that in the work of Lukacs and Auerbach
'realism is shown to have epistemological truth, as a privileged mode of
knowing the world we live in and the lives we lead in it.'60
58Georg Lukacs, 'Critical Realism and Socialist Realism', in TheMeaning ofContemporary
Realism, trans. John and Necke Mander (London: Merlin, 1963; repr. 1972), p.96.
59Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation ofReality in Western Literature, trans.Willard R.
Trask (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968; repr. 1974), p.473.
60Fredric Jameson, 'Beyond the Cave: Demystifying the Ideology of Modernism', in
ContemporaryMarxist Literary Criticism, ed. Francis Mulhern (London: Longman, 1992), p.174.
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In what way then is modernism different? First we shall look at the
descriptions and critiques of modernism offered by Auerbach and Luk6cs,
while bearing in mind that Luk&cs in particular is writing from a consciously
pro-realist position. Distinguishing the modernists from their realist
predecessors, Auerbach writes of
those modern writers who prefer the exploitation of random,
everyday events, contained within a few hours and days, to the
complete and chronological representation of a total exterior
continuum — they... are guided by the consideration that it is a
hopeless venture to try to be really complete within the total
exterior continuum and yet to make what is essential stand out..
.. [T]hey hesitate to impose upon life, which is their subject, an
order which it does not possess in itself.61
Instead, claims Auerbach, these writers
have invented their own methods ~ or at least have
experimented in the direction — of making the reality which
they adopt as their subject appear in changing lights and
changing strata, or of abandoning the specific angle of
observation of either a seemingly objective or purely subjective
representation in favor of a more varied perspective.62
It is clear how relevant this is in the case of Faulkner's The Sound and the Fury.
There we have four narrative perspectives, reflecting an unwillingness on the
part of Faulkner to provide that surface representation of totality that we have
seen both Luk&cs and Auerbach associate with the realist novel. It is on the
implications of such a refusal that Lukacs concentrates. For him, this
unwillingness to offer a representation of objective events, the portrayal of an
objectively knowable reality, is effectively a 'negation of outward reality', a
negation which, he claims, 'is present in almost all modernist literature.'63
Totality and wholeness thus appear to give way to fragmentation and
disjunction. It is this fragmentation and the neglect of 'objective' experience
61Auerbach, Mimesis, p.548.
62Auerbach, Mimesis, p.545.
63Georg Luk^cs, "The Ideology ofModernism', in TheMeaning ofContemporary Realism, p.25.
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in favour of the subjective (and often perspectively unstable) refraction of
sensations or experiences - to which we, as readers, are offered no avowedly
direct access — that Lukacs condemns as an outright dismissal of the objective
world and, therefore, of historical reality itself. The difference between
Auerbach and Luk£cs is significant: for Auerbach, modernism negates the
very essence of realism; for Luk&cs, it is reality itself which is negated. For the
latter in particular a key factor here is the use of stream of consciousness
narration.
Lukacs claims that modernism attempts to represent the objective
world only as it can be absorbed by the alienated individual subject. Stream
of consciousness narration is, then, the paradigmatic example of such a
process. There the narrative offers a representation of the thoughts of a
particular character without the mediating presence of a narrator or narrative
authority, save that inevitably indicated in the narrative's status as written
representation (about which I shall say more with regard to The Sound and the
Fury later). Lukacs, then, associates the 'attenuation of reality' with Joyce's
stream of consciousness in Ulysses and claims that this neglect of reality
is carried ad absurdum where the stream of consciousness is that
of an abnormal subject or of an idiot — consider the first part of
Faulkner's Sound and Fury or, a still more extreme case, Beckett's
Mo/Zoy.64
While Lukacs admits to some measure of critique in modernist writing
-- 'the obsession with psychopathology in modernist literature,' he writes,
expresses 'a desire to escape from the reality of capitalism' -- this remains
nonetheless an impotent critique, falsely asserting 'the unalterability of
outward reality.'65 From this perspective, modernist texts are seen as




cry (Luk&cs specifically cites Kafka) but it also leads to 'the reduction of
reality to a nightmare.'66 Modernism, for Luk&cs, doesn't take objective
reality seriously enough. As a consequence,
the protest is an empty gesture, expressing nausea, or
discomfort, or longing. Its content — or rather lack of content —
derives from the fact that such a view of life cannot impart a
sense of direction.67
For Lukacs, Stephen Dedalus's complaint that 'History is a nightmare from
which I am trying to awake' contains the essence of almost all modernist
literature, which escapes from a nightmarish historical reality to the subjective
consciousness of the individual — whether Molly Bloom or Benjy Compson.
There is no attempt, though, to suggest that historical reality might be
anything other than a nightmare. Thus might we paraphrase the case for the
prosecution.
Those who see something other than self-indulgent escapism in
modernism also stress its intrinsic opposition to realism and to the attempt to
represent objective social totality. Adorno writes that
Even the suggestion that the world is unknowable, which
Lukacs so indefatigably castigates in writers like Eliot or Joyce,
can become a moment of knowledge. This can happen where a
gulf opens up between the overwhelming and unassimilable
world of things, on the one hand, and a human experience
impotently striving to gain a firm hold on it, on the other.68
The critical impotence that Lukacs castigates in modernism, portraying it as
passive escapism, is itself seen here as a form of critique. Modernist texts,
according to Adorno, criticise society by depicting a mind or minds often
unable even to grasp the complex workings and interrelations of society,
much less analyse them. This inability of the mind to grasp, and of the
66Ibid, p.31.
67Ibid, p.30.
68Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reconciliation under Duress', pp.162-163.
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literary text to represent, social totality is itself a sign of the damage done to
the psyche by dominant social forces. In this way, the inability to offer
critique is a form of critique. 'It is this alone,' writes Adorno,
which gives the work of Joyce, Beckett and modern composers
their power. The voice of the age echoes through their
monologues: this is why they excite us so much more than
works that simply depict the world in narrative form.69
Adorno's defence of modernism is, then, a historical defence. The impotence
of modernist writing expresses an artistic and historical truth, and that truth
encompasses the very denial of objective truth as a plausible artistic goal.
So we move to the central critique of realism that modernism
embodies. Here it is summarised by Fredric Jameson:
[T]he target of [the modernists'] attack becomes the very concept
of reality itself which is implied by the realist aesthetic as
Luk£cs or Auerbach outline it, the new position suggesting that
what is intolerable for us today, aesthetically, about the so-
called old-fashioned realism is to be accounted for by the
inadmissible philosophical and metaphysical view of the world
which underlies it and which it in its turn reinforces. The
objection is thus, clearly, a critique of something like an ideology
of realism, and charges that realism, by suggesting that
representation is possible, and by encouraging an aesthetic of
mimesis or imitation, tends to perpetuate a preconceived notion
of some external reality to be imitated, and indeed, to foster a
belief in the existence of some such common-sense everyday
ordinary shared secular reality in the first place.70
Realism, then, in its representation of social totality, implies an external
reality which is objective, knowable and representable. Jameson then cites
developments in modern science (e.g. the theory of relativity), modern
philosophy (e.g. post-structuralism) and the great mass of modern art from
the cubists and Joyce to Beckett and Andy Warhol. What does he conclude?
69Ibid, p.166.
70Jameson, 'Beyond the Cave', pp.174-175.
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[A] 11 these things tend to confirm the idea that there is
something quite naive, in a sense quite profoundly unrealistic...
about the notion that reality is out there simply, quite objective
and independent of us, and that knowing it involves the
relatively unproblematical process of getting an adequate
picture of it into our own heads.71
The highest achievement of realism — the representation of an objective social
totality — is here interpreted as 'profoundly unrealistic'. Thus, characteristic
features of realist narrative such as totality, objectivity and strict temporal
chronology are negated for the sake of historical truthfulness. 'The whole,'
writes Adorno, 'is the false.'
However, the distinction remains rather more complicated than that.
For Jameson, 'all modernistic works are essentially simply cancelled realistic
ones.'72 According to Jameson, realism is a decoding of allegory. The
meaning of allegory is drawn from an external or transcendent authority: e.g.
lamb=Christ; we needn't be told this in the text because it's allegory and we
know to look for a meaning in another code system, in this case Christianity.
This is discarded by realism, which depicts events which are meaningful in
themselves. There is no need to look for meaning in another code system, as in
allegory; meaning is already there. This is realism as a decoding of allegory.
Modernism recodes. The significance or meaning of modernist texts does not
exist simply in the representation of particular incidents, as we might find in
realism. Instead we find a return to symbolic meaning in the appeal to other
coding systems such as myth or to earlier, often Classical, literature. This is
very different, though, from allegory or myth itself. Modernism cannot
appeal directly to symbolic meaning; so instead, according to Jameson, it




symbolic meanings. Essentially, then, modernism is here viewed not simply
as the negation of realism, but as its conscious repression.
What the text represses we, as readers, reveal. Jameson writes:
... when you make sense of something like Kafka's Castle, your
process of doing so involves the substitution for that recoded
flux [which is the modernist text] of a realistic narrative of your
own devising. ... I think it's axiomatic that the reading of such
work is always a two-stage affair, first, substituting a realistic
hypothesis -- in narrative form — then interpreting that
secondary and invented or projected core narrative according to
the procedures we reserved for the older realistic novel in
general.73
So the modernist writer writes a 'stylization' of a realist narrative and then
we, as readers of modernist texts, take that stylization and turn it back into a
realist narrative. It is worth looking at this in relation to Faulkner's The Sound
and the Fury.
Explaining the basic narrative that underlies his novel, Faulkner writes
the following:
I saw that they [the children] had been sent to the pasture to
spend the afternoon to get them away from the house during
the grandmother's funeral in order that the three brothers and
the nigger children could look up at the muddy seat of Caddy's
drawers as she climbed the tree to look in the window at the
funeral, without then realising the symbology of the soiled
drawers, for here again hers was the courage which was to face
later with honor the shame which she was to engender, which
Quentin and Jason could not face: the one taking refuge in
suicide, the other in vindictive rage which drove him to rob his
bastard niece of the meager sums which Caddy could send
her.74
This, then, is the story. Reading the novel, it all seems rather more
complicated. It is told from four different perspectives; chronological order is
disrupted (instead, we get a narrative representation of the flux of
73Ibid, pp.183-184.
74William Faulkner, 'Introduction to The Sound and the Fury', cited in Frederick R. Karl,
William Faidkner: American Writer (New York:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), p.318.
34
psychological time). The plot itself, as summarised by Faulkner, is available
only in an estranged form, mediated both by the consciousnesses of different
characters and by the juxtaposition of their narratives. But if Jameson is right,
it is that realist plot that we mentally juxtapose with The Sound and the Fury
itself. We try to spot the temporal shifts in part one, ordering the haphazard
temporal flux of Benjy's narrative into its proper, realist chronology: A and
then B and then C. We redo precisely what the text, by focalizing the
narrative through Benjy's consciousness, has undone. What, though, might
this signify?
Jameson cites Alain Robbe-Grillet's La Jalousie [Jealousy]. He refers to
the common belief that in Robbe-Grillet's novel chronology is abolished. He
points out (quoting Gerald Prince) that one event -- the crushing of a
centipede — takes place before a trip taken by two characters, during it, and
after it. The very same incident takes place at three different points in time.
This, then, is the abolition of chronology. Jameson disagrees. 'On the
contrary,' he writes,
as every reader of Robbe-Grillet knows, this kind of narrative
exasperates our obsession with chronology to a veritable fever
pitch. ... So it is quite wrong to say that Robbe-Grillet has
abolished the story; on the contrary, we read La Jalousie by
substituting for it a realistic version of one of the oldest stories
in the world, and its force and value come from the paradoxical
fact that by cancelling it, the new novel tells this realistic story
more forcefully than any genuinely realistic, old-fashioned,
decoded narrative could.75
In its negation and repression of realism, totality and chronology, modernism
ends up provoking in the reader its own rewriting in terms of realism, totality
and chronology. And yet it is also doing something else. For while it may
provoke in the reader the desire to substitute for it a realist text or narrative,
its own aesthetic appearance, its surface disjunction, continues to deny the
75Jameson, 'Beyond the Cave', p.184.
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validity of that rewriting. What this contradiction — on the one hand
provoking a desire in the reader for all that the realist aesthetic satisfies, and
on the other unmasking the realist representation of objective social totality as
a deceitful and comforting illusion — expresses is, I think, neither totality nor
fragmentation, but the process of attempting to construct a totality from
fragmentation and alienation. This is a process of Utopian wish fulfilment,
which texts such as Faulkner's both inscribe and repress.
The representation of totality and wholeness is a lie as long as
experience remains that of alienation and suffering. We need only bear in
mind the Compsons or Kafka's protagonists. But it can also be seen as the
figure of a desire for, and belief in the possibility of, a better life. It is this
dialectic that modernist fiction expresses. Moreover, it confronts us with the
need to construct some form of order, indicating the constructedness, or
manufacturedness, of all ordering systems. The modernist slogan 'Make it
New' places as much emphasis on the first word as on the last. And yet the
negation, the insistence that the whole is the false, remains necessary. The
artistic truth of modernist fiction lies in neither side of this contradiction, but
in that contradictoriness itself.
In Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises the narrator, Jake Barnes, is
impotent. He is in love with Brett Ashley, but can never have sex with her.
He stands by while she sleeps with the other male characters. At the very end
of the novel, they are together in a taxi; a policeman holds up a baton to stop
the traffic (the symbolism is a bit obvious); they fall against one another on
the back seat. Brett turns and says, 'Oh Jake...we could have had such a
damned good time together.' Here is the nostalgic possibility of wholeness
and reconciliation. But for the impotent Jake that possibility exists only as a
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pleasing but false illusion. He replies, 'Isn't it pretty to think so.' This is the
dialogue that modernist fiction is acting out all the time.
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Caddy and Faulkner's promesse du bonheur in The Sound and the Fury
So I, who had never had a sister and was fated to lose my daughter in infancy, set out
to make myselfa beautiful and tragic little girl.
William Faulkner, 'Introduction' to The Sound and the Fury
In order to see how this might contribute to our understanding of The Sound
and the Fury, it is necessary to stress the importance of the relationships which
Faulkner establishes between his characters — the Compsons — and the social
locale in which they are situated: Yoknapatawpha Co., Mississippi. For here
Adorno's rebuke of Lukacs is particularly telling:
The great works of modernist literature shatter [the] appearance
of subjectivity by setting the individual in his frailty into
context. . . . Lukacs evidently believes that when the Habsburg
monarchy in Kafka or Musil, or Dublin in Joyce make
themselves felt as a sort of 'atmospheric backcloth for the action',
it somehow goes against the programme but nonetheless
remains of secondary importance. But in arguing thus for the
sake of his thesis, he clearly reduces something very substantial,
a growing epic plenitude with all its negative potential, to the
status of a mere accessory.76
Faulkner's novels construct a social environment with both attentiveness to
detail and ambition of scale comparable to that of Balzac's Comedie Humaine.
Yet, the town of Jefferson and the county of Yoknapatawpha are here
available to the reader, in all their 'epic plenitude', principally as refracted
through the consciousnesses of the various characters. Lukacs's suspicions,
therefore, may appear to some extent validated: it is, for the most part, only
through the inner space of the individual consciousness that the external
space of social relations can be all-too-momentarily glimpsed.
What we find in The Sound And the Fury, then, is the uneasy
coalescence of an outright preoccupation with characters' psychopathology
76Adorno, 'Reconciliation under Duress', pp.160-161.
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(as Luk£cs suggests) and an unrelenting sense of the need to re-establish a
picture, in all its totality, of the society in which these consciousnesses were
formed. Richard H. Brodhead points astutely to a further complicating factor,
the aestheticizing function of the novel itself:
The writing does not fail, eventually, to project a world that has
been radically recomposed. And recomposed, the writing tells
us, by the writing: the world not as it is, but as an act of style has
made it.77
We shall return to Brodhead in the not too distant future; for the moment,
however, it is necessary merely to note the extent to which his point renders
problematic the whole assumption of direct mimesis underlying Luk&cs's
critique of modernist narrative: Yoknapatawpha is not available to us merely
via the consciousnesses of individual characters but ultimately through the
stylized construction of the work of art itself.
Why,' asks Jean-Paul Sartre, 'is the first window that opens out on this
fictional world the consciousness of an idiot?'78 By focalizing the first
narrative through the consciousness of Benjy Compson, Faulkner not only
plunges us immediately into a world in which both temporal chronology and
relations of cause and effect appear to have evaporated, but he also introduces
the crucial theme of absence and loss. As I suggested earlier, absence here
also refers to the absence of those elements of literary realism, such as
chronology and totality, which modernist fiction tends on the surface to
discard. But in this instance it is the absence of Caddy that is most overt.
Caddy Compson is almost all that The Sound and the Fury contains of love and
compassion; and it is the loss of her, as Faulkner writes in his Appendix to the
77Richard H. Brodhead, 'Introduction: Faulkner and the Logic of Remaking', in Richard H.
Brodhead, ed. Faulkner: New Perspectives (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p.5.
78Jean-Paul Sartre, 'On The Sound and the Fury: Time in the Work of Faulkner', in Literary and
Philosophical Essays (New York: Collier, 1962; repr. 1967), p.84.
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novel, that echoes most insistently in Benjy's memory and also, therefore,
throughout the novel's opening section:
BENJAMIN....Who loved three things: the pasture which was
sold to pay for Candace's wedding and to send Quentin to
Harvard, his sister Candace, firelight. Who lost none of them
because he could not remember his sister but only the loss of
her, and firelight was the same bright shape as going to sleep,
and the pasture was even better sold than before because now
he and TP could not only follow timeless along the fence the
motions which it did not even matter to him were human-
beings swinging golfsticks, TP could lead them to clumps of
grass or weeds where there would appear suddenly at TP's
hand small white spherules which competed with and even
conquered what he did not even know was gravity and all the
immutable laws when released from the hand towards plank
floor or smokehouse wall or concrete sidewalk. Gelded 1913.
Committed to State Asylum, Jackson 1933. Lost nothing then
either because, as with his sister, he remembered not the pasture
but only its loss, and firelight was still the same bright shape as
sleep.79
The loss of Caddy and of the pasture combine in Benjy's reaction to the cries
of the golfers:
The man said 'Caddie' up the hill. The boy got out of the
water and went up the hill.
'Now, just listen at you.' Luster said. 'Hush up.' (SF, p.22)
Benjy's wails, as he listens to the call of 'Caddie', are a response to this
reminder of his sister's absence. Benjy grasps at this mistaken echo of his
sister's name.
In a sense, though, this is something which we too, as readers, are led
to do throughout the novel. As Frederick R Karl points out, each narrative
section explicitly 'creates' a Caddy for us;80 for all the apparent immediacy of
Faulkner's narratives, Caddy's voice is at best represented to us via her
brothers. What I am trying to suggest is that The Sound and the Fury is itself
79William Faulkner, 'Appendix', in The Sound and the Fury (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985),
pp.299-300. Further references to the text are from this edition and will be cited in the main
text, prefixed by the abbreviation SF.
80Karl, p.328.
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the evocation of Caddy Compson, that we should take quite seriously
Faulkner's claim : 'So I, who had never had a sister and was fated to lose my
daughter in infancy, set out to make myself a beautiful and tragic little girl.'81
The creation of the novel, it seems to me, is also the creation of Caddy, the
imaginative evocation of a Caddy who is absent.
Yet if Caddy represents something of love and affection in the novel,
her "fall" is also a figure for that of the South itself, the loss of the Civil War
and subsequent economic decline. In the reconstruction of Caddy, then, we,
as readers, are also engaged in the reconstruction of a narrative of the South's
history, a role which Susan Willis suggests is common to readers of many of
Faulkner's narratives:
The fact that so many of Faulkner's works are defined by the
need to reconstruct history, apparent in so much of Faulkner's
writings, betrays the inability to any longer experience history
directly and the haunting remembrance of what this
relationship to history was in traditional society. Indeed, we
might compare the Faulknerian narrative to a model kit, where
information about the past is given in bits and pieces and the
characters, along with the reader, work to assemble the
fragments in a meaningful way.82
Just as the Edenic symbolism which runs through The Sound and the Fury
suggests both Caddy's and the South's loss of innocence, the fragmentary
narrative reinforces in the reading experience of the novel a sense of decay,
for which the Tower of Babel might offer a more appropriate biblical allusion.
The reader's imaginative recreation of Caddy would thus run parallel to the
reconstruction of a historical narrative which charts the decline of the old
Southern landowners during the early decades of the twentieth century (e.g.
the Compsons' pasture is sold to make a golf-course, the proceeds paying for
Caddy's wedding). What must be stressed here, though, is the extent to
81William Faulkner, 'Introduction to The Sound and the Fury', cited in Karl, p.318.
82Susan Willis, 'Aesthetic of the Rural Slum', in Faulkner: New Perspectives, p.182.
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which this whole process is subject to that dialectic of Utopian wish fulfilment
and ironic reinscription of totality described in the previous section.
It is worth taking a moment to look again at some of the ways in which
The Sound and the Fury problematizes the assumption of direct mimesis which
Lukacs associates with stream-of-consciousness narration. In Benjy's section,
for example, we find his description of the incident which leads to him being
gelded:
They came on. I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. I
was trying to say, and I caught her, trying to say, and she
screamed and I was trying to say and trying and the bright
shapes began to stop and I tried to get out. (SF, pp.53-54)
Faulkner here stresses Benjy's inability to speak; elsewhere, Luster says, 'He
deef and dumb' (SF, p.50). The incapacity to use language is precisely one of
the things that Faulkner portrays as most characteristic of Benjy, and the root
cause of his mutilation. Yet it is of course only through language that his
experiences can be conveyed. Likewise, as Sartre notes of the second section:
Quentin thinks of his last day in the past, like someone who is
remembering. But in that case, since the hero's last thoughts
coincide approximately with the bursting of his memory and its
annihilation, who is remembering?83
The implausibility of either of these sections really representing directly the
consciousnesses of the characters (an implausibility which the novel itself
seems to suggest) pushes to the foreground the role of the artist himself and
the aestheticizing function of the novel. 'Everyone agrees,' writes Richard
Brodhead,
that The Sound and the Fury is the book in which Faulkner first
fully discovers how to write like Faulkner. Part of the reason is
that it is the novel in which he latches onto his distinctive
rhythm of recreation - calculating, with great deliberateness and
ingenuity, a style in which his work can be rendered (what we
call the characters or points of view in The Sound and the Fury -
83Sartre, p.91.
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Benjy, Quentin, Jason — are really so many distinctive ways of
composing a world through words), then giving a virtuoso
performance in that style, then abruptly abolishing it and going
on to construct another (and another, and another) in its place.84
The novel's narrative structure thus suggests simultaneously the possibility of
the characters' self-expression and the reality of that self-expression's
fictionality, its status as the aesthetic product of 'an act of style'.
Tempting though it might be to claim, with an exaggerated sweep of
the cape, that Faulkner's novel thus reveals itself as a mere fiction, just words
on a page, such an act would not remain true, in any meaningful sense of the
word, to the experience of reading The Sound and the Fury. 'Art,' writes
Adorno in Aesthetic Theory, 'is the promise of happiness, a promise which is
constantly being broken.'85 In its evocation of an ungraspable Caddy, its
intimation of a social history of Southern decline in all its 'epic plenitude',
and its suggestion of the impossible expression of Compsons' suffering, The
Sound and the Fury enacts precisely the promise and betrayal with which
Adorno identifies works of art. Here aesthetic autonomy produces a work
which almost seems to lament its own helpless alienation from social life,
while nonetheless exposing all that is empty in the state of the latter. Exiled
from the real life of social relations, Faulkner's novel releases us from the
world of aesthetic constructs back into the unredeemed world of actuality,
fated to chase, like Benjy, after misheard echoes of Caddy's name.
84Brodhead, pp.5-6.
85Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.196.
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Adorno and the Culture Industry
The culture industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what it perpetually
promises. The promissory note which, with its plots and staging, it draws on
pleasure is endlessly prolonged; the promise, which is actually all the spectacle
consists of, is illusory: all it actually confirms is that the real point will never be
reached, that the diner must be satisfied with the menu. In front of the appetite
stimulated by all those brilliant names and images there is finally sat no more than a
commendation of the depressing everyday world it sought to escape.
T. W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment
The promesse du bonheur with which Adorno so gratefully associates works of
art can only be retained so long as the 'necessary illusion' of art's autonomy is
held to be credible. Here it is worth calling again to mind Lukacs's opening
essay in History and Class Consciousness, 'What is Orthodox Marxism?'.
Lukacs's insistence that the study of separate aspects of the social totality
(such as art or literature) must take into account the relation of that sphere to
others (such as the socio-economic) would suggest that any change in that
relation should be reflected in a change in our understanding of the
significance of, or modes of signification in, each social sphere. What we see
in a number of novelists during the 1930s and '40s is an increasing self-
consciousness that their art is subject to precisely such a transformation: the
illusion of autonomy loses its last shred of credibility and we witness the
ageing of the new.
In After the Great Divide Andreas Huyssen suggests that modernist art
and literature developed to a large extent as a reaction to the burgeoning
culture industry of the nineteenth century.86 The antipathy of many
86See Huyssen, pp.vii-viii.
For a discussion of the irony which attends the novel's increasing respectability as a literary
genre in the nineteenth century and its simultaneous increasing commodification in a culture
industry, see Terry Lovell, Consuming Fiction (London: Verso, 1987), pp.78-81. Huyssen's
analysis of the continuity of thematic preoccupations from late nineteenth-century to early
twentieth-century literature is also suggested by Peter Keating (in The Haunted Study) when
he writes of 'the overwhelming force of democratic consumerism' which exerts a continuous
influence on literature of the Victorian and modernist periods. See Peter Keating, The
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modernist artists to "low" culture (or to "the masses" in general) and the
painstakingly achieved difficulty of their work would both serve as markers in
support of Huyssen's thesis. It was partly to distance their work from the
more easily consumable cultural goods on offer, runs this argument, that
writers from Flaubert to Eliot adopted styles and techniques which would
frustrate the more conventional expectations of a reader: Flaubert's stylistic
labours are unlikely to have been intended to appeal to a reader such as
Emma Bovary; in fact, the opposite is true. But, in the absence of any radical
transformation in the economic mode of production, the attempt to retain for
art some autonomous space largely outside the market could be successful for
a limited time span only. The modernist claim to autonomy, with its
grandiose and touching pretension to the making of supreme fictions, appears
in retrospect more of a last gasp than a bold, artistic assertion.
The writings of Adorno on the culture industry provide perhaps the
most cogent and consistent critique of the process by which art is fully
absorbed into the market. In an essay written in response to Walter
Benjamin's identification of the radical potential of mechanically reproduced
art — an essay entitled 'On the Fetish Character ofMusic and the Regression of
Listening' — and (with Max Horkheimer) in the 'Culture Industry' chapter of
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno describes the changes that art must
undergo in response to its new position within the social totality. 'The culture
industry,' he writes,
can pride itself on having energetically executed the previously
clumsy transportation of art into the sphere of consumption, on
making this a principle, on divesting amusement of its obtrusive
naivetes and improving the type of commodities.87
Haunted Study: A Social History of the English Novel, 1875-1914 (London: Seeker & Warburg,
1989; repr. Fontana, 1991).
87Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 2nd edn., trans. John
Cumming (London: Verso, 1986; repr. 1992), p.135.
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Art, then, whose autonomy had already been a consequence of its
fetishization, becomes a commodity in a new way. Whilst that previous claim
to autonomy had at least expressed some form of negation of actuality, in the
distance it established between the aesthetic and the external world of
suffering and market exchange, the refusal now to indulge in that illusion
seems, for Adorno, to represent a chilling assent to the values and conditions
of the present. What adds perhaps even further to the melancholy character
of this cultural critique is the suggestion of its virtual inexorability.
According to Jay Bernstein, Adorno's 'aesthetic theory was, almost
from the outset, self-consciously delineating the ageing of modernism.'88
Writing throughout the 1930s and '40s, Adorno describes how the logic of
commodification had required art to appear autonomous in order to fulfil
that ideological role which Herbert Marcuse calls art's 'affirmative character'.
However, the needs of the market change; and it is at this time, the high-point
of the totalitarian era, during which Adorno writes, that the necessity that the
world of art and of aesthetics be absorbed by the market and be made
purposeful becomes more and more overt. The irony which saw Adorno flee
the ubiquitous propaganda of Nazi Germany only to find the same principles
of domination at work in US advertising is less the product of Adorno's
prejudices than of history itself. The increase in commodity production that is
the result of assembly-line methods or, perhaps more properly, of Fordism
requires a similar increase in consumption. After all, '[wjhat was special
about Ford,' writes David Harvey, '(and what ultimately separates Fordism
from Taylorism), was his vision, his explicit recognition that mass production
meant mass consumption.'89 To this end, all elements of society must be
88J.M. Bernstein, 'Introduction', in Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays
(London: Routledge, 1992), p.19.
89Harvey, pp.125-126.
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mobilised; autonomous art, for all its wonderful ideological potential, is
sacrificed to the needs of the market. The world of the culture industry and of
advertising awaits.
Bernstein's dark appraisal of Adorno's aesthetic theory would appear
to be borne out by an early passage in the 'Fetish Character in Music' essay:
The categories of autonomously oriented art have no
applicability to the contemporary reception of music; not even
for that of the serious music, domesticated under the barbarous
name of classical so as to enable one to turn away from it again
in comfort.90
The desperate attempts by those such as Schonberg to evade absorption are
very much a last, desperate stand, for '[wjhere [listeners] react at all,' writes
Adorno, 'it no longer makes any difference whether it is to Beethoven's
Seventh Symphony or to a bikini.'91 It is not, then, simply the continuing
growth of mass culture to which Adorno is reacting, but a transformation in
the position and status of culture itself. This offers a redefinition of both
"high" and "low" art; it also transforms the subject's understanding of his/her
relationship to his/her social environment.
Explaining that latter point, Adorno and Horkheimer write the
following:
The whole world is made to pass through the filter of the culture
industry. . . . The more intensely and flawlessly [the movie
producer's] techniques duplicate empirical objects, the easier it
See also Henry Ford, My Life and Work (London: Heinemann, 1923); especially chapters VIII,
IX and XI. The following, for example, is from Chapter XI ('Money and Goods'):
The factory must build, the sales department must sell, and the dealer must
buy cars all the year through, if each would enjoy the maximum profit to be
derived from the business. If the retail buyer will not consider purchasing
except in "seasons", a campaign ofeducation needs to be waged, proving the
all-the-year-around value of a car rather than the limited-season value. And
while the educating is being done, the manufacturer must build, and the
dealer must buy, in anticipation of business, (p. 165; emphasis added)
90Theodor W. Adorno, 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression in Listening', in
The Culture Industry, pp.26-27.
91Ibid, p.33.
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is today for the illusion to prevail that the outside world is the
straightforward continuation of that presented on the screen.92
It is not merely the redefinition of art and culture to which Adorno and
Horkheimer's fears are directed, but also to this qualitative shift in the means
by which we, as individual cognitive subjects, perceive and reflect on our
social relations. The vision which this model suggests of the reconciled
worlds of aesthetic images and social praxis is one of barbaric harmony. The
previous alienation of art has now been erased in favour of its harmonious
reconciliation in the false totality of an unjust society. The same, they suggest,
is the fate of the individual subject:
Life in the late capitalist era is a constant initiation rite.
Everyone must show that he wholly identifies himself with the
power which is belaboring him. . . . Everyone can be like this
omnipotent society; everyone can be happy, if only he will
capitulate fully and sacrifice his claim to happiness. In his
weakness society recognizes its strength, and gives him some of
it. His defenselessness makes him reliable.... But the miracle of
integration, the permanent act of grace by the authority who
receives the defenseless person ~ once he has swallowed his
rebelliousness — signifies Fascism.93
The integration of art and the socio-economic — the insistence on art's
socio-economic purpose -- has a further, internal, consequence for art.
Adorno and Horkheimer write of 'a shift in the internal structure of cultural
commodities'94 which follows from this process, principally relating to the
dissolution of the division between "high" and "low" art. Just as the alienation
of art from other social spheres had expressed some form of 'truth content', a
melancholy expressiveness which Bernstein evokes in the phrase 'beauty
bereaved', the false distinction within art itself between "high" and "low" had
also reflected a social truth of irreconciled contradiction. Art, doubly




alienated, had embodied the social and internal alienation of the beleaguered
individual under capitalism. Now, however, the situation is very different.
In one of his most quoted phrases — from a letter?|to Benjamin —
Adorno writes of "high" and "low" culture as the 'torn halves of an integral
freedom, to which however they do not add up.'95 The popular caricature of
Adorno as a cultural mandarin, blind to the beauties of all but the most
difficult and inaccessible of artworks, is as misconceived as that which
portrays him denouncing those who write poetry after Auschwitz. The true
object of Adorno's scorn is the easy reintegration of "high" and "low" that the
culture industry achieves. This, he argues, is yet another marker of false
Utopian resolution — one which, as Bernstein writes, 'forsakes the promise of
happiness in the name of the degraded utopia of the present.'96
The truly Utopian yearning of relatively autonomous art is discarded
by the culture industry in its fusion of the aesthetic and the socio-economic.
In its disavowal of autonomy, the culture industry indicates its refusal to posit
the image or semblance of any alternative to actuality. What is expressed,
therefore, is a form of flight: 'not, as is asserted, flight from a wretched
reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance.'97 (Here, in passing,
it is worth noting the similarity of Adorno's critique of the culture industry to
Lukacs's of modernism. This is a point to which I will later return.) The
integration of the socio-economic and the aesthetic abolishes the critical
distance which art's autonomy had established. By allowing us to experience
a sense of disappointment and frustration as social actuality proved unable to
redeem the promise of happiness offered by works of art, that critical distance
presented to us starkly those Utopian possibilities which were denied to us.
95Theodor W. Adorno, 'Letters toWalter Benjamin', in Aesthetics and Politics, p.123.
96Bernstein, 'Introduction', p.8.
97Adorno & Horkheimer, Dialectic ofEnlightenment, p.144.
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In the age of the culture industry, however, disappointment and frustration
have been banished. Now that the worlds of aesthetics and of social praxis
have been absorbed by one another, the aesthetic act is depicted as fully
sufficient in itself; after all, there is no longer any separate, external reality of
which it might be said to be critical: 'Not Italy is offered, but proof that it
exists.'98
Following Adorno, a discussion of the implications of these changes to
the position and status of art for novelists of the 1930s and '40s would do well
also to concentrate on the respective situations in Germany and the United
States. What is to come is intended to be less representative than
symptomatic. The following discussion of some German and American
fiction does not necessarily show that writing to be typical of its time, but it
does at least attempt to highlight the ways in which some of the artistic
dilemmas described above in theoretical terms begin to find expression in the
work of some of the important writers of the 1930s and '40s. As we shall see,
these dilemmas are such that they impose a significant measure of self-
consciousness in their delineation. As well as providing, then, examples of
the fictional treatment of the aesthetic issues raised by the culture industry, a
consideration of these novels should also indicate something of the literary-
historical logic of the development of literary postmodernism. The novelists
at whose work I shall be — albeit briefly - looking are John Dos Passos and
Thomas Mann. For in their work we see a self-conscious reflection of what
Fredric Jameson has called 'the nature of tragedy in modern times':
98Ibid, p.148.
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the possession of man by historical determinism, the intolerable
power of history itself over life and over artistic creation, which
is not free not to reflect what it reacts against."
"Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974), p.37.
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John Dos Passos's USA
..there's such a gigantic tradition ofhokum behind political phrasemaking that the
antihokum phrases are about as poisonous as the hokum phrases.
John Dos Passos, The Fourteenth Chronicle
The association of the burgeoning American culture industry with fascistic
European forces is one which Adorno and Horkheimer make quite pointedly
in Dialectic of Enlightenment, but it can also be found in the fiction of John Dos
Passos. In the short biography of the media magnate William Randolph
Hearst in the third instalment of USA, The Big Money, Dos Passos writes of
Hearst's voice
praising the comforts of Baden-Baden under the blood
and bludgeon rule of Handsome Adolph (Hearst's own loved
invention, the lowest common denominator come to power
out of the rot of democracy).100
Dos Passos' novel, though, cannot fully escape association with that same
culture industry. Instead, Dos Passos exploits his work's inability, in
Jameson's phrase, 'not to reflect what it reacts against' by foregrounding the
mimetic element of the relationship of the novel's form to its social content to
such an extent that the reader is forced to recognise a further level to the
novel, the ironic stance assumed by Dos Passos in relation to his own literary
form. The novel, written in what Alfred Kazin calls 'a machine prose for a
machine world',101 is thus constructed in such a way that the overt (and even
excessive) manipulation of both character and reader appears to identify it
unmistakably with the deterministic social forces it also appears to criticise.
100John Dos Passos, USA (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966; repr. 1988), p.1116. Further
references to the text will be to this edition and will be marked in the main text, prefixed by
the abbreviation USA.
101Alfred Kazin, 'Dos Passos and the Lost Generation', in Dos Passos: The Critical Heritage, ed.
Barry Maine (London: Routledge, 1988), p.226.
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A consistent feature of The 42nd Parallel, part one in the USA trilogy, is
a meditation on the practical, ideological functions that culture (and literary
culture in particular) is made serve. Throughout the novel, the reader finds
presented a whole series of characters whose particular skills or whose
occupations involve them in some way in the production of public forms of
discourse: Mac, the linotype operator; Gene Debs; Woodrow Wilson; Doc
Bingham, the book salesman; "The Boy Orator of the Platte"; J. Ward
Moorhouse. There are also repeated references to William Randolph Hearst,
whose newspaper empire was the most extensive and powerful of its time,
and of whom Dos Passos felt able to write in 1934, 'Hearst is handsome
Adolph's schoolteacher.'102 The way in which the individual subject is caught
not only within a mechanistic class and economic system, but also within a
network of ideological, cultural discourses thus develops as a major theme of
the novel.
Implicit, of course, in the elaboration of this theme is the
acknowledgement of literary culture as functional. From Doc Bingham's
presentation of literature as commodity to J. Ward Moorhouse's avowed wish
'to educate the public by carefully planned publicity over a term of years'
(USA, p.211), emphasis is placed on the political and economic motivations
that underlie such cultural production. What we are seeing, then, is the
novel's focus on the American culture industry and its inevitably violent
domination of individual subjects. One example of the novel's overt
foregrounding of these concerns is in the opposition portrayed between Gene
Debs and Woodrow Wilson. Dos Passos writes that 'Woodrow Wilson had
[Debs] locked up in Atlanta for speaking against war'. Wilson, the politician
whose rhetoric helps convince Americans to support entry into the war in
10277ze Fourteenth Chronicle: Letters and Diaries ofJohn Dos Passos, ed. Townsend Ludington
(London: Deutsch, 1974), p.441.
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Europe, has his aims threatened by another's rhetoric. The biography of Debs
goes on to explain his former supporters' avoidance of him:
but on account of the flag
and prosperity
and making the world safe for democracy,
they were afraid to be with him,
or to think much about him for fear they might believe
him;
for he said:
While there is a lower class I am of it, while there is a criminal
class I am of it, while there is a soul in prison I am not free.
(USA, p.39)
Debs' supporters avoid him because they are convinced by Wilson's slogans -
'making the world safe for democracy' -- and also because they fear that they
might find his slogans equally convincing. The subject is here portrayed as a
pawn of rhetoric. Inherent in the Debs biography is the fear that there is
something intrinsic to the production of discourse aimed at a mass audience
that is incompatible with the retention of some form of autonomy for the
individual subjects who make up that audience.
It is not only, though, those to whom such discourses are directed who
find themselves manipulated and stripped of even a residual subjectivity. On
various occasions, the reader sees characters attempt to influence the reactions
of other characters through the construction of a fiction, yet who then find
themselves more prey to that fiction than are their intended victims. This is
what happens to Doc Bingham when he is sent to spend the night in a barn,
having claimed to be a travelling clergyman. We are told that 'Doc Bingham's
face was as black as thunder as he wrapped himself in a horseblanket,
muttering about "indignity to a wearer of the cloth'" (USA, p.53). The
'muttering' signals that it is unlikely that Doc is keeping up the pretence for
others. Instead, he has begun to refer to himself in private using terms
dictated by the very fiction he has created to manipulate others. His
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indignation is, therefore, caused not by their treatment of him, but by their
treatment of his fiction — a distinction which he is, comically, unable to make.
Of greater significance, though, are the ways in which characters are
shown to be caught within an inescapable mechanistic structure. Their
fictional status is foregrounded by the narrator's tendency to repeat phrases
or establish explicit parallels in his descriptions of different characters. Thus,
Mac is linked to J. Ward Moorhouse by the echo of the narrator's description
of Yuma, a stopping-point on Mac's trip to Mexico, as 'hotter'n the hinges of
hell' (USA, p.114) in the phrase 'hot as the hinges of Delaware' (USA, p.153);
Delaware being the birthplace of J. Ward Moorhouse. Moreover, the role of
the reader in establishing this association is also prominent at such times: it is
left to the reader to make a mental note of these descriptive echoes, thereby
rendering him/her complicit with the construction of a textual network of
association that binds the characters every bit as tightly as does the industrial
capitalist system. This aspect of the reader's role is further emphasized by the
fact that the phrase 'hot as the hinges of Delaware' appears in a Camera Eye
section and not in a chapter on Moorhouse himself. It is left for the reader to
make the connection when, in the very next chapter, he/she reads that
Moorhouse was born there. Later, Charley Anderson is also included when
the narrator describes New Albany, on Charley's arrival, as 'hot as the hinges
of hell' (USA, p.326).
Characters' fates are made coincide with a regularity that serves to
foreground their helplessness. The use of Mexico as a destination is
particularly striking: Mac goes there; J. Ward Moorhouse takes Janey there on
a business trip; and Charley Anderson at one point plans to go to the Mexican
border with the American militia. Examples of this sort abound throughout
the USA trilogy so much so that it is not long before the reader learns to
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expect that each new character will in some way be forcefully integrated into
the social sphere of the others. It appears to matter little whether or not they
belong to the same class or share similar aspirations; characters are made
enter a mechanistic narrative system in which everything and everyone is
reduced to the status of a functional cog, where nothing escapes the most
utter absorption and rationalisation; a social predicament described in prose
which, as Kazin writes, 'bears along and winds around the life stories in the
book like a conveyor belt carrying Americans through some vast Ford plant
of the human spirit.'103
Even economic success is unable to provide characters with an
effective escape route. Throughout the novel, a succession of short
biographies of some of the capitalist system's 'success stories' ~ Andrew
Carnegie, for example — is paraded before us. The inspirational value of these
vignettes is somewhat hampered, however, by their regular (and surely
unnecessary) intimations of mortality:
Andrew Carnegie became the richest man in the world
and died.
(USA, p.225)
This pattern is repeated with reference to Luther Burbank, Bill Haywood,
"The Boy Orator of the Platte", Minor C. Keith, Steinmetz and Bob La Follette.
The novel insists on the hopelessness even of its more successful characters:
no matter what success or distinction they attain, each of them must be shown
to reach their use-by date.
In Dos Passos's novel, then, it is the explicit parallels created between
the fictional characters and the historical subjects of these biographies that
emphasise the futility of any narrated act or achievement. The description of
the young J. Ward Moorhouse (initially 'Johnny') as the 'class orator' at school
103Kazin, p.229.
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(USA, p.155) ironically identifies him with "The Boy Orator of the Platte", the
subject of the previous biography which concludes, 'He was a big eater. It
was hot. A stroke killed him' (USA, p.153). Likewise, the reader is later told
that Moorhouse is attending a course 'in the care of fruit trees' (USA, p.211)
soon after the biography of Minor C. Keith, 'the pioneer of the fruit trade',
which begins and ends with mention of his death. Characters' fates are thus
portrayed as predetermined, a suggestion principally achieved through the
structural composition of the novel. In effect, the reader is forced to make the
connections that highlight each character's hopelessness and mock their
continuous and pitifully strenuous efforts, while those same characters
continue, oblivious to their predestined fate, to act out the same search for
success that establishes those very connections.
The retention of some form of individual autonomy, of the subject's
non-identity, is undermined in Dos Passos's novel not only through this
overtly manipulative plot structure and repeated use of similar descriptive
phrases, but also through the absence of any distinctive relation between
characters and their terms of expression. Thus, when the narrator writes of
Alice that '[s]he said it made her feel freer to spend a few hours with
broadminded people' (USA, p.130), the reader would appear to have learned
something of that particular character; especially as he/she is aware that
Janey's parents are in fact bigots who had prevented their daughter bringing
home a black girl. However, the effect of this technique changes when, later
in the novel, the narrative is focalized through Eleanor Stoppard and we read,
'Doctor Hutchins was a Unitarian minister and very broadminded and Mrs
Hutchins did watercolors of flowers that were declared to show great
talent'(LZSA, p. 187). Free indirect speech works here not to distinguish
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characters, but to blur the lines between them, to indicate a condition rather
than a particular perspective.
The overt transformation of human subjects into replaceable
components in an aesthetic structure — Dos Passos's novel — is a reflection of
the social effects of 'Hearstian demagoguery'104 and the Taylorization of
American industry. The effect of assembly-line production on the workers is,
for Dos Passos, clearly analogous to that of the emergent mass media upon
the consciousnesses of the American public. The novel thus depicts the
ideological collusion of that culture industry in which it is itself produced and
by which it is to a large extent defined. Modernism's necessary lie of
autonomy is no longer sustainable; The 42nd Parallel acknowledges this in its
formal mimicry of the forces of domination and reification associated with
assembly-line production methods.
The mimesis of novel and society in The 42nd Parallel is so complete
that we have little choice but to recognise it as primarily an ironic work. Dos
Passos allows the novel's mimesis of its subject to provide an ironic self-
commentary on its own tarnished moral standing, thereby justifying its status
as, simultaneously, commodity and instrument of social critique. He suggests
that, without this ironic retreat from the ideological collusion of aesthetic
form, all art (and particularly that which is politically engaged) must be self
devouring and lead effectively to silence. The 42nd Parallel shows similar
stories repeated under different names: Mac, Janey, J. Ward Moorhouse,
Charley Anderson. The system that is both the novel and society continually
repeats the same processes on its way to the temporary conclusion of war.
The 1914-18 war is presented as the goal toward which capitalist societies
were slowly and inexorably heading; it is present all along as an inevitability
WiThe Fourteenth Chronicle, p.441.
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— of course, for both author and reader, it is from the very start a historical
fact — and for the novel's characters, for Charley Anderson, it is what finally
enforces understanding of what is wanted:
The lookout put his hand over his mouth. At last he made
Charley understand that he wasn't supposed to talk to him.
(USA, p.341)
Here is the logic not only of industrial utilitarianism's easy adaptation to a
wartime situation, but also that of culture's own complicity in the market
reification and rationalisation of man: all that is left, without Dos Passos's self-
critical detachment, is resignation to the futility of expression. In the culture
industry the voice of protest can be no more effective than Charley's affirming
silence.
Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus
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Thoughts on holding art up to mockery, breaking out of it, dissolving it —all the while
remaining absolutely and ruthlessly devoted to it.
Thomas Mann, Diaries
The novel's formal mimicry of dehumanising social forces is justifiable for
Dos Passos as long as it is subject to the ironic stance of the author, since the
alternative to this is complete non-expression. There is, however, another,
more overtly metafictional alternative that employs the text's self-
commentary to extend debate over its ideological function rather than short-
circuiting or neutralising it as Dos Passos's option effectively does. In Thomas
Mann's Doctor Faustus the metafictional element is reinforced by the explicit
dramatisation of an artist striving to find a means of regenerating an art that
he sees as decadent and debased.
Like Dos Passos, though for different reasons, Adrian Leverkiihn,
Mann's fictional composer, also relies on a distancing mechanism. Arnold
Schonberg's twelve-tone system, whose development is here attributed to
Leverkiihn, represents an alternative method of insisting on this critical
detachment of the artist from his own aesthetic form. The creation of this
system allows the artist unlimited freedom as long as he remains within the
boundaries determined by the system. Thus, as Adorno writes in Philosophy
ofModern Music,
Twelve-tone technique . . . enchains music by liberating it. The
subject dominates music through the rationality of the system,
only in order to succumb to the rational system itself.105
105Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophy ofModern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell & Wesley V.
Blomster (London: Sheed and Ward, 1987), pp.67-68.
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It is precisely this artistic paradox that Mann explores in Doctor Faustus,
presenting more explicitly its political and historical implications.106 As
Patrick Carnegy puts it:
Here Mann develops his theme of the artistic and political
barbarity that is induced by the irrational adoption of a
totalitarian principle, and of the once-and-for-all commitment to
this principle which is taken as sufficient reason for the
suspension of further moral (or aesthetic) scrutiny.107
A similar moral uneasiness over the creation of such a mechanism is
also expressed by the novel's narrator, Serenus Zeitblom:
Quite generally this claim to ironic remoteness, to an objectivity
which surely is paying less honour to the thing than to the
freedom of the person has always seemed to me a sign of
uncommon arrogance.108
Here Mann's narrator pinpoints one of the major problems to result from the
artist's ironical treatment of his/her own artistic work: he/she divorces
him/herself from the work's listeners/readers and stands alone and aloof in
his/her ability to evade both manipulation by the artform and responsibility
for it. The impersonality that follows from this ironical stance thereby
reinforces the alienation of the artist from both his/her artistic materials and
the work's audience. Furthermore, and most significantly, this is effected
through the adoption of another systematic process and leads — as Zeitblom is
later aware and as the case of Leverkiihn exemplifies ~ to the artist's
rediscovery of him/herself as another function of form (or of a metaform),
this time unable to escape parody and the stance of ironic detachment.
106For a discussion of Adorno's influence on the musical sections in Doctor Faustus, see
Thomas Mann, The Genesis ofa Novel (London: Seeker &Warburg) and T.W. Adorno, 'Toward
a Portrait of Thomas Mann', in Notes to Literature, Vol. 2, trans. Sherry Weber Nicholsen (New
York: Columbia UP, 1992), pp.12-19.
107Patrick Carnegy, Faust as Musician: A Study ofThomas Mann's Novel 'Doctor Faustus'
(London: Chatto &Windus, 1973), p.108.
108Thomas Mann ,Doctor Faustus, trans. H.T. Lowe Porter (London: Seeker and Warburg,
1949; repr. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p.69. Further references to the text are to this
edition and are marked in the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation DF.
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The problem that Leverkiihn attempts to address is nevertheless a
valid one. As his own devil states the case: '"Composing itself has got too
hard, devilishly hard. Where work does not go any longer with sincerity how
is one to work?'" (DF, p.232). This dilemma emerges not only (as we shall see)
from Mann's own artistic grapplings, but also from his reading of Adorno's
elaboration of the artist's difficulties in Philosophy ofModern Music:
The material transformation of those elements responsible for
expression in music, which -- according to Schonberg -- has
taken place uninterruptedly throughout the entire history of
music, has today become so radical that the possibility of
expression itselfcomes into question. In the process of pursuing its
own inner logic, music is transformed more and more from
something significant into something obscure — even to itself.
[Emphasis added.]109
Leverkiihn's answer is to be sincere in his insincerity, to construct a formal
framework within which he can mock everything while signalling the
mockery's dependence upon the form itself and then subjecting to an ironic
distance both the form and 'its' mockery. Mann's novel presents as analogous
this artistic impersonality that finds some relief in aesthetic alienation and a
political bestiality that celebrates the subjugation of the individual (in the
name of the 'Volk') while allowing his/her worst excesses to go unchecked.
For Mann, therefore, the problematics of modernism are extended to the
artist's attempts to resolve those very problems. It is this extension that
particularly distinguishes the question of the justification of self-consciously
modernist art, a self-consciousness which simultaneously identifies the work
as modernist and exposes to it the limited historical horizons of the
modernist project itself. Or, as Georg Lukacs writes:
Hitherto the tragedy of the artist has, almost without exception,
been presented from the standpoint of the relationship and
conflict between the artist and life, between art and reality. This
109Adorno, Philosophy ofModern Music, p.19.
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is largely true of the early Mann. Here, however, the work of art
itself is called into question. Therefore, its genesis and structure
must be shown; the tragic predicament of modern art must be
demonstrated by the work of art itself.110
Unfortunately, Lukcics goes on to try to justify the reading of Mann's
novel as a realist critique of modernist aesthetics. Doctor Faustus is revealed
as far more interesting, however, and far more complex than Luk&cs would
have us believe when we recognise the elements that serve to question and to
problematize the novel itself; that is, when we perceive the novel not only as
the dramatisation but also as the exemplification of the moral and political
dilemmas of modernist art.
The key to such a reading lies in the use Mann makes of the parallels
between his novel and Leverkiihn's compositions, particularly his
masterpiece, The Lamentation of Dr Faustus. Echoing Leverkiihn's lament,
'"Why does almost everything sound to me like its own parody?"' (DF, p.131),
Mann too in The Genesis of a Novel confesses, 'In matters of style I really no
longer admit anything but parody.'111 His novel draws from as many sources
as does Leverkiihn's music, while the explicit stylisation of Leverkiihn's
language, whose significance in pointing to Luther and the doctrine of
predestination is missed by the narrator, finds an echo in Mann's own use of
leitmotif, which also exposes Zeitblom's ignorance of the influence dictating
the story he tells. That influence is, of course, diabolic and is signalled in the
leitmotif of laughter, Adrian's laughter in particular. An especially striking
example of this use of leitmotif to undermine Zeitblom occurs during his
account of the visit he and Leverkiihn pay to the home of the theology
professor, Kumpf, and their reaction to the professor's claim that the devil is
also present:
110Georg Lukacs, Essays on Thomas Mann, trans. Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin, 1964; repr.
1979), p.67.
lllrThomas Mann, The Genesis ofa Novel, p.47.
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All this was pretty awful, and I take it Adrian must have
thought so too, though his pride prevented him from exposing
his teacher. However, when we went home after that fight with
the Devil, he had such a fit of laughter in the street that it only
gradually subsided with the diversion of his thoughts.
(DF, p.97)
Zeitblom is here presented with the image of the devil and with his friend's
mocking laughter. At this point, however, he is unable to link them, unable to
see the presence already of a demonic spirit that he is later only to recognise
through viewing Adrian Leverkiihn's mental collapse as analogous to the
moral collapse of Germany. In fact, although Zeitblom professes to have
learned much since the time of the composer's death, he remains to the very
end oblivious to the inevitability, signalled unwittingly in his memoir, of the
terrible fate awaiting his friend. It is in this same "innocent" and oblivious
manner that he shrugs off his tendency to narrate prematurely events that do
not take place until much later in the plot: 'I have fallen into my old, bad habit
and got ahead of my story' (DF, p.252), he tells us, inadvertently integrating a
pattern of predestination into the very narration of that story.
The establishment of an ironic distance between himself and his
narrator is an important means through which Mann identifies himself and
his creation with Leverkuhn and his symphony. As I suggested earlier, the
laughter of Leverkuhn functions as a leitmotif; one in which, Mann writes,
'the devil, as the secret hero of the book, is invisibly present.'112 Yet Mann's
explanation of the use he makes of his narrator surely raises the question of
his own diabolic laughter:
To make the demonic strain pass through an undemonic
medium, to entrust a harmless and simple soul, well-meaning





Elaborating on the association of himself with Leverkiihn, Mann states that
the use of Zeitblom as narrator 'removed some of the burden, for it enabled
me to escape the turbulence of everything direct, personal and confessional
which underlay the baneful conception.'114 In fact, throughout The Genesis ofa
Novel the confessional element is emphasized. Mann reports feeling that 'the
whole thing has something forbidding about it', that he 'was not at ease about
the business'. More to the point, and of far greater centrality in defining the
nature of Mann's anxiety, he writes of 'the danger of my novel's doing its part
in creating a new German myth, flattering the Germans with their
"demonism".'115 Not only does Mann face the same problem of the
regeneration of art as does his fictional composer — he claims to have been
particularly struck by Harry Levin's assertion that Joyce "'has enormously
increased the difficulties of being a novelist'"116 — but he is also aware that his
attempt to resolve the problem may be morally compromised in a similar way
to Leverkiihn's.
Having shown how Leverkiihn's subjection of musical form to an
ironic distance, culminating in The Marvels of the Universe and the Apocalypse,
leads to the negation of faith in personal artistic expression and offers an
analogy to the anonymous barbarism of political totalitarianism, Mann can
hardly resolve his anxieties over Doctor Faustus by himself retreating to an
ironic distance in the manner of Dos Passos. Zeitblom explains how The
Marvels of the Universe appears to embody
a luciferian sardonic mood, a sneering travesty of praise which
seems to apply not only to the frightful clockwork of the world-
structure but also to the medium used to describe it: yes,





similarly, of the Apocalypse, he writes that 'in the searing, sussurant tones of
spheres and angels there is not one note that does not occur, with rigid
correspondence, in the hellish laughter' (DF, p.364). He adds immediately,
'That is Adrian Leverkiihn. Utterly.' Leverkiihn is thus defined not by
musical form, for that he parodies, but by his role as the parodist of that form.
In other words, Leverkiihn pays the price of accepting that personal
expression is no longer possible so that, through parody, he might escape
absorption into his musical system; but he does so only to find that he is
absorbed into a metasystem, fated to distance himself eternally from all that
his art supposedly expresses. The art for which Leverkiihn searches, that is
"per du" with humanity, is consequently further than ever from reach as a
result of his attempt to create it from a position of aloofness and detachment.
In his final work, however, Leverkiihn does, according to Zeitblom,
achieve true expression: 'expression as lament'. He does so by finally
renouncing ironic distance and submitting to his musical form. This act of
submission is nonetheless a true expression of Leverkiihn's despair, of his
conclusion that expression is now truly impossible. For Zeitblom, though not
for Leverkiihn himself, The Lamentation of Dr Faustus offers 'a hope beyond
hopelessness'.
Mann, too, clings to this same, barely-perceptible ray of hope. He
attempts no clear resolution of his moral and artistic dilemma, the dilemma of
a morally tainted art. Instead he accepts responsibility for a work whose
possible aesthetic complicity with forces of social domination charts the end
of autonomous art itself. In The Genesis of a Novel Mann ponders the
possibility that the artist's submersion of him/herself in art rather than in
human relations marks him/her as inhumane, and asks whether the guilt that
this knowledge provokes in the artist is enough to redeem him/her. He adds,
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'Here is a speculation impious enough to be ascribed to Adrian Leverkiihn.'117
Unable to stand aloof from his literary form, Mann accepts definition by that
form, as Leverkiihn does, aware however that such acceptance might well
provide a further allegorical parallel to political domination, the willing
submersion of the subject in the impersonal aesthetic structure. As with his
hope that the artist's sense of guilt might 'reconcile others .. . even win their
affection', Mann is here left hoping that his awareness of the problems
inherent in his acceptance of literary form and renouncement of ironic
distance might be enough to express a lamentory ambivalence, an
ambivalence that is directly expressive of his thoughts on the future of art and
of Germany. That Mann is, then, unable to find a means of resolution to his
moral dilemma and consequently submits to his tainted artistic form while
still questioning the morality of that submission is surely for him to integrate
within his work of art the perpetual moral self-inquiry that is properly his
own. The novel itself must, therefore, actually be about the justification of art
and can never reach resolution, for at that point the author is guilty of an
outright affirmation of, and active collusion in, the violent forces of
domination.
117Ibid, p.144.
Adorno: The Ageing of the New
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'To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,' writes Adorno in 'Cultural
Criticism and Society';118 by which, of course, he does not mean that poetry
should not be written. Explaining his point perhaps more cogently in
Negative Dialectics, he insists:
All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is
garbage. In restoring itself after the things that happened
without resistance in its own countryside, culture has turned
entirely into the ideology it had been potentially. . . . Whoever
pleads for the maintenance of this radically culpable and shabby
culture becomes its accomplice, while the man who says no to
culture is directly furthering the barbarism which our culture showed
itself to be. [emphasis added]119
Adorno here stresses the dialectical nature of his critique, implying that,
particularly in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the cultural critic must affirm
Walter Benjamin's dictum that '[t]here is no document of civilization which is
not at the same time a document of barbarism'120 and simultaneously negate
any suggestion that culture is therefore best jettisoned. While it is common to
associate this aspect of Adorno's late thought with the critique of culture he
identifies in his essay on Beckett's Endgame,121 I intend here to look briefly at
the ways in which, particularly in some of his essays on New Music, Adorno
applies something like this dialectic to offer his intimations of the irreversible
ageing of modernism.
118T.W. Adorno, 'Cultural Criticism and Society', in Prisms, trans. Samuel & Shierry Weber
(London: Spearman, 1967), p.34.
119T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1973; repr. Routledge, 1990), p.367.
120Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Illuminations, ed. Hannah
Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), p.256.
121T.W. Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Beckett's Endgame', in Notes to Literature, Vol. 1, trans.
Sherry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), pp.241-275.
For a comparison of this essay to the above section from Negative Dialectics, see Lambert
Zuidervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (London: MIT, 1991), pp.150-
177.
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In 'Music and New Music' he writes that '[a]s a concept "new music"
seems to share the fate of growing old which has so often been its destiny in
the past.'122 The critical content of New Music is itself in danger of being
dissipated, lost in a process of cultural commodification through which
emerge the values of the culture industry triumphant:
Just as traditional music has culminated in the synthetic
illiteracy of the culture industry, it may well turn out that the
extraordinary efforts which the new music makes and which it
imposes on its audiences will come to grief on the rocks of
barbarism. Its fate is not wholly in its own hands, but depends
on whether it is possible to break through the fatedness of
society, a fatedness before which every bar of its music stands as
if hypnotized.123
Of course, we have just seen Adorno's fear that the culture industry will
change art irrevocably and the suggestion, by Bernstein, that the ageing of
modernism was implicit in Adorno's writing from the very outset; but what
we find in the essays on New Music of the 1950s and '60s is an oppressive
recognition that even those forms which had taken negativity into their core —
for example, in the jarring dissonance of twelve-tone composition — were now
subject to the laws of socio-aesthetic reconciliation:
The sounds remain the same. But the anxiety that gave shape to
its great founding works has been repressed. Perhaps that
anxiety has become so overwhelming in reality that its
undisguised image would scarcely be bearable: to recognize the
aging of the New Music does not mean to misjudge this aging as
something accidental. But art that unconsciously obeys such
repression and makes itself a game, because it has become too
weak for seriousness, renounces its claim to truth, which is its
only raison d'etre.124
What Adorno fears here is the acceptance of '[t]he detestable ideal of a
moderate modernism'. Those very forms which had been developed to
122T.W. Adorno, 'Music and New Music', in Quasi una Fantasia, trans. Rodney Livingstone
(London: Verso, 1992), p.250.
123Ibid, pp.263-264.
124T.W. Adorno, 'The Aging of the New Music', Telos, 77 (1988), pp.97-98.
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shock, to scandalise, to offend have, he suggests, lived on into an age in which
they are no longer radical, but 'radically empty'.125 And yet it remains
impossible for the significance of that earlier moment of the New Music ('the
twenties') to be wrested back:
... the geological shifts that have taken place since then are such
that nobody could step outside of them, no matter how
earnestly he wanted to devote himself to a time that already
appeared riddled with crises and yet was a paradise compared
to what was to come.126
The experience which was to follow was, of course, that of the Third
Reich. In his essay on Beckett's Endgame, Adorno discusses the work's
assumption that 'the individual's claim to autonomy and being has lost its
credibility.'127 Here, he argues, such an assumption facilitates the expression
of both the historical contingency of the individual subject and, as a
consequence, 'the antinomy of contemporary art' — its post-Holocaust
depiction of the end of the self, and its acknowledgement that 'in art only
what has been rendered subjective, what is commensurable with subjectivity,
is valid.'128 In the New Music of the Federal Republic, though, Adorno
refuses to accept a similar expressiveness. In part, this distinction may
perhaps be seen as one of personal taste. More significantly, though, it can be
understood as a symptom of the force with which Adorno's argument tore
him in separate directions. While accepting that the logic of his argument led,
in the final instance, to the end of that bourgeois art which the critical
theorists of Western Marxism held so dear, he nonetheless felt the need to
retain some affiliation to what he perceived as its final remnants:
. . . the foundation of music, as of every art, the very possibility
of taking the aesthetic seriously, has been deeply shaken. Since
125Ibid, p.110.
126Ibid, p.lll.
127Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Beckett'sEndrame', p.249.
128Ibid, p.250.
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the European catastrophe culture hangs on like houses in the
cities accidentally spared by bombs or indifferently patched
together. . . . Even so, the earnestness that would rather
renounce art than put it in the service of a debased
contemporary reality may itself be only a disguised form of
adaptation to an already universal attitude of a praxis:
submission to a praxis that aspires to the given without in any
way going beyond it.129
If Jay Bernstein is right to claim that Adorno's writings on the culture industry
and the ageing of modernism can be seen as his 'judgement in advance on
postmodernist culture',130 it may well be possible to suggest a revision of
Adorno's most misunderstood sentence: To write poetry after Auschwitz is
postmodern.
129Adorno, "The Aging of the New Music', p.116.
130Bernstein, 'Introduction', p.17.
Postmodernism and the Avant-Garde
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Older discussions of the space, function, or sphere of culture (most notably Herbert
Marcuse's classic essay "The Affirmative Character of Culture") have insisted on
what a different language would call the "semiautonomy" of the cultural realm: its
ghostly, yet Utopian, existence, for good or ill, above the practical world of the
existent, whose mirror image it throws back in forms which vary from the
legitimations of flattering resemblance to the contestatory indictments of critical
satire or Utopian pain.
What zve must now ask ourselves is whether it is not precisely this
semiautonomy of the cultural sphere which has been destroyed by the logic of late
capitalism. Yet to argue that culture is today no longer endowed ivith the relative
autonomy it once enjoyed as one level among others in earlier moments in capitalism .
. . is not necessarily to imply its disappearance or extinction. Quite the contrary; we
must go on to affirm that the dissolution ofan autonomous sphere ofculture is rather
to be imagined in terms ofan explosion: a prodigious expansion ofculture throughout
the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life --from economic
value to state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself - -can be
said to have become "cultural" in some original and yet untheorized sense. This
proposition is, however, substantively quite consistent with the previous diagnosis of
a society of the image or the simulacrum and a transformation of the "real" into so
many pseudoevents.
Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism
The above description of the postmodern cultural condition — by definition, it
seems, the postmodern condition per se — has by now attained a near-
canonical status as an attempt to grasp the cultural formations of the
contemporary in the language of Western Marxism. Jameson's work has
involved, in a sense, the rearticulation of Adorno's critique of the culture
industry in an age in which the works of Beckett and Schonberg (as Adorno
predicted) have themselves been comfortably integrated into the cultural
catch-all of consumer capitalism. That aesthetic space to which Adorno, for
all his melancholy prognosis, nevertheless clung is now thoroughly
eradicated.
Yet in order to understand more fully the terrible irony of the
relationship of the postmodern to modernity and the culture of modernism, it
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is necessary, as Terry Eagleton suggests, to take into account the whole
critique of aesthetic or cultural autonomy as proposed by the work of the
historical avant-garde.131 In his Theory of the Avant-Garde Peter Burger argues
that the art of the revolutionary avant-garde in the early twentieth century
was based on an explicit denunciation of art's claim to autonomy or social
transcendence. Burger begins by citing Marx's critique of religion as ideology
in the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right — which asserts dialectically that
'[t]he wretchedness of religion is at once an expression of and a protest
against real wretchedness' — and offers the following commentary:
It is in religion that this twofold character of ideology is brought
out. 1. Religion is an illusion. Man projects into heaven what
he would like to see realized on earth. To the extent that man
believes in God who is no more than an objectification of human
qualities, he succumbs to an illusion. 2. But religion also
contains an element of truth. It is "an expression of real
wretchedness" (for the realization of humanity in heaven is
merely a creation of the mind and denounces the lack of real
humanity in human society). And it is "a protest against real
wretchedness" for even in their alienated form, religious ideals
are a standard of what ought to be.132
Burger then shows how such ideology critique (Ideologikritik) has been applied
in the writings of Western Marxism to the sphere of culture. His principal
example is the essay cited above by Fredric Jameson, Herbert Marcuse's 'The
Affirmative Character of Culture'.133 'It is not difficult,' writes Burger, 'to
recognize that Marcuse is guided by the Marxist model of the critique of
religion.'134 He explains Marcuse's argument that (just as Marx says of
religion) bourgeois, autonomous culture is simultaneously affirmative and
critical of the society in which it is produced: 'Marcuse demonstrates,' writes
131Terry Eagleton, 'Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism' in Against the Grain
(London: Verso, 1986), pp.131-147.
132Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p.7.
133Herbert Marcuse, 'The Affirmative Character of Culture', in Negations: Essays in Critical
Theory, trans, Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Free Association Books, 1988), pp.88-133.
134Btirger, p.11.
73
Burger, 'that bourgeois culture exiles humane values to the realm of the
imagination and thus precludes their potential realization;' while he adds that
'Marcuse views the humane demands of great bourgeois works of art as a
protest against a society that has been unable to live up to them.'135
It is important to grasp, however, that what both Burger and Marcuse
are referring to is not the significance or status of individual artworks in
themselves, but the general categorisation of culture itself. '[Wjorks of art,'
writes Burger, 'are not received as single entities, but within institutional
frameworks and conditions that largely determine the function of the
works.'136 Burger terms these conditions the 'institution of art' and it is to this
'institution', this categorisation of what is deemed 'cultural' in bourgeois
society, that he attempts to portray the avant-garde as an explicit and critical
response:
...with the historical avant-garde movements, the social
subsystem that is art enters the stage of self-criticism. Dadaism,
the most radical movement within the European avant-garde,
no longer criticizes schools that preceded it, but criticizes art as
an institution, and the course its development took in bourgeois
society. The concept 'art as an institution' as used here refers to
the productive and distributive apparatus and also to the ideas
about art that prevail at a given time and that determine the
reception of works. The avant-garde turns against both -- the
distribution apparatus on which the work of art depends, and
the status of art in bourgeois society as defined by the concept of
autonomy.137
An example of such critique is offered by Andreas Huyssen in After the Great
Divide. Huyssen cites Marcel Duchamp's ready-made L. H. O. O. Q., which
consists of a reproduction of Leonardo's Mona Lisa complete with additional
moustache and goatee beard. The title, as Huyssen points out, when spoken





cul/she has a hot ass.138 'It is not,' writes Huyssen, 'the artistic achievement of
Leonardo that is ridiculed by moustache, goatee and obscene allusion, but
rather the cult object that the Mona Lisa had become in that temple of
bourgeois art religion, the Louvre.'139 Burger argues that this process is
historically driven. Although the autonomy of art as an institution is
established in the eighteenth century, Burger writes that it is really only with
late nineteenth-century Aestheticism that the full logic of aesthetic autonomy
is properly expressed. The response of the avant-garde to this attempts,
though, to preserve something of the critical potential of such autonomy:
The avant-gardistes proposed the sublation of art — sublation in
the Hegelian sense of the term: art was not simply to be
destroyed, but transferred to the praxis of life where it would be
preserved, albeit in a changed form. The avant-gardistes thus
adopted an essential element of Aestheticism. Aestheticism had
made the distance from the praxis of life the content of works.
The praxis of life to which Aestheticism refers and which it
negates is the means-ends rationality of the bourgeois everyday.
Now, it is not the aim of the avant-gardistes to integrate art into
this praxis. On the contrary, they assent to the aestheticists'
rejection of the world and its means-ends rationality. What
distinguishes them from the latter is the attempt to organize a
new life praxis from a basis in art.140
What is perhaps most striking in this formulation of the avant-garde
project is its similarity to Adorno's horrified description of the achievements
of the culture industry. This is acknowledged by Burger, who notes that
'[djuring the time of the historical avant-garde movements, the attempt to do
away with the distance between art and life still had all the pathos of
historical progressiveness on its side.'141 The situation of the culture industry,
as Burger realises, is quite different. It has effected not merely the sublation






'an assiduous audience admires L. H. 0. O. Q. as a masterpiece of modernism
in the museum.'142 Or, as Burger would have it, 'now the protest of the
historical avant-garde against art as institution is accepted as art.'143 That this
'art' is no longer autonomous — as the avant-gardistes wished — yet remains
fetishized as 'culture' in an economically productive culture industry, whose
'means-ends' rationality remains undisturbed, is perhaps the final cruel irony
of the avant-garde's failure-in-success.
Terry Eagleton, in one of the most overtly polemical analyses of the
postmodern, describes postmodernism as 'among other things a sick joke at
the expense of such revolutionary avant-gardism.'144 For Eagleton,
postmodernism is the culture industry triumphant. 'In its early stages,' he
writes,
capitalism had sharply severed the symbolic from the economic;
now the two spheres are incongruously reunited, as the
economic penetrates deeply into the symbolic realm itself, and
the libidinal body is harnessed to the imperatives of profit. We
are now, so we are told, in the era of postmodernism.145
Eagleton's writings on postmodernism are an explicit response to those of
Jameson. As we shall see in a moment, Jameson attempts to recuperate some
sense of political radicalism for the postmodern, some space for the aesthetic
expression of social conflict. For Eagleton, though, the postmodern is quite
utterly bereft of conflict (just as the culture industry is for Adorno). This
postmodernism is less a condition than an attitude, less the cultural logic of a
stage in historical development (as Jameson would have it) than the product
of conscious political will. Thus Eagleton hypothesises a political form of
contemporary art which combines both modernist and avant-gardist impulses
142Huyssen, p.147. See aiso Huyssen's description of AndyWarhol's use of Duchamp in the
serial portrait "Thirty are better than one", pp.146-148.
143Burger, p.53.
144Eagleton, 'Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism', p.131.
145Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990; repr. 1994), p.373.
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in a quite different way to the postmodern, creating an alternative response
to the culture of modernity and taking a different turn from that of
postmodernism.146 This, as we shall see, is very different from Jameson's
insistence on the need for a political art today to be produced through an
engagement with postmodernism itself. For Eagleton, postmodernism is —
both politically and culturally — the false resolution of the dilemmas of
modernism. The whole problematic of autonomy is here resolved by the
postmodern with a chilling sangfroid:
If the work of art really is a commodity then it might as well
admit it, with all the sang froid it can muster. Rather than
languish in some intolerable conflict between its material reality
and its aesthetic structure, it can always collapse that conflict on
one side, becoming aesthetically what it is economically.147
A resolution of this sort can be seen by briefly comparing Hermann
Broch's The Death of Virgil with a contemporary, postmodernist text,
Christoph Ransmayr's The Last World. Broch's work, written almost
contemporaneously with Mann's Doctor Faustus, is a tortured (and, at times,
tortuously difficult) response to the fate of an art which can no longer pretend
to the autonomy of a discrete aesthetic sphere. Broch's Virgil wants to destroy
the Aeneid because he believes his art to be inimical to the historical age: 'the
time,' he tells Caesar,
determines the direction in which the task [of the artist] lies, and
he who goes contrary to it must collapse ... an art that is
consummated outside these limits, evading the real task, is
neither perception nor help ~ in short it is not art and cannot
endure.148
146Eagleton, 'Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism', p.147.
147Ibid, pp.140-141.
148Hermann Broch, The Death of Virgil, trans. Jean Starr Untermeyer (London: Routledge,
1946; repr. 1977), p.335. Further references to the text are to this edition and are marked in
the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation DoV.
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There is, though, a younger generation of poets in whom Virgil seems to see
art's future: the love poets Tibullus, Propertius and 'young Ovid who is so full
of poor taste' have, he says, 'struggled through to an originality which I am
unable to approach' (DoV, p.254). The case against is made by Lucius, who
views Ovid and the others as weak, ephemeral and, perhaps above all,
irredeemably imitative: 'They are imitators of Theocritus, pupils of Catallus,
and whatever they can take from our Virgil, that they take' (DoV, p.256).
If The Death of Virgil really is a novel which charts, in a displaced form,
the death of modernism, it is not surprising that the young Ovid (before
whom lies the writing of the Metamorphoses) should be in some way
associated with the future of poetry. Virgil's attempt to make of the Aeneid a
supreme fiction does not any longer seem credible when the actuality of the
Roman state imposes so much more powerfully an image of reality's
possibilities on the minds of the citizens. Ovid's Metamorphoses, however, will
reassert art's ability to offer new images of the real by insisting on the fluidity
and unceasing mutability of reality itself.
The Last World by Christoph Ransmayr is a novel in which the newness
of Ovid's work is depicted as itself a transformation of the world. A young
Roman dissident named Cotta comes to the island of Tomi in search of the
banished Ovid. Ransmayr's Ovid (here called Naso) has been punished for
his accidental act of democratic rebellion; he has forgotten to address the
Emperor first in the introduction of his speech and has begun instead with the
words, 'Citizens of Rome'. Cotta comes to Tomi in search not only of Ovid,
but also of his final poem — the Metamorphoses — which he understands as a
work of political subversion — and which the poet has burned.
As Cotta's search progresses, it becomes clear to the reader that the
inhabitants of Ransmayr's Tomi are reworked, debased versions of characters
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from the Metamorphoses. Here, as Salman Rushdie writes in his review of the
novel, we see 'Ransmayr's vision of art conquering defeat by remaking the
world in its own image.'149 In fact, the world of Tomi is Ovid's work of art.
The anxieties which haunted Broch's Virgil have gone. The contemplation of
art's destruction in the face of an overwhelming reality can now be borne with
all the sangfroid that Terry Eagleton fears; for the world of images and the
world of political punishment are one, and the dream of the avant-garde --
'the attempt to organize a new life praxis from a basis in art' -- has finally been
realised. And unto Caesar is rendered what is still Caesar's.
149Salman Rushdie, 'Christoph Ransmayr', in Imaginary Homelands: essays 1981-1991, 2nd
edn. (London: Granta, 1992), p.293.
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As I suggested earlier, Fredric Jameson is probably the best known of Marxist
theorists to have written at length on postmodernism. Following Adorno's
writings on the culture industry, Jameson portrays the postmodern as a new
and more complete stage of capitalist commodification; while, citing Guy
Debord's The Society of the Spectacle, he writes that
the ultimate form of commodity reification in contemporary
consumer society is precisely the image itself. With this
universal commodification of our object world, the familiar
accounts of the other-directedness of contemporary conspicuous
consumption and of the sexualization of our objects and
activities are also given: the new model car is essentially an
image for other people to have of us, and we consume less the
thing itself, than its abstract idea, open to all the libidinal
investments ingenuously arrayed for us by advertising.150
The postmodern is that stage when what had once been thought ~ however
problematically — as real, genuine or authentic has been lost completely, not
even remaining (as it does with modernism) in the form of a longing or
lament for what is now absent. 'Postmodernism,' writes Jameson, 'is what
you have when the modernisation process is complete and nature is gone for
good.'151 The end of art's autonomy has, then, led not only to the
commodification of culture, but also to the aestheticization of the external
object world, producing what we saw Jameson call earlier 'a society of the
image or simulacrum', an aspect of the postmodern which, as Jameson
acknowledges, has been dealt with most comprehensively by Jean
Baudrillard.152
150Fredric Jameson, 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture', in Signatures of the Visible
(London: Routledge, 1992), pp.11-12.
151Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso,
1991; repr. 1992), p.ix.
152See Jameson, Postmodernism, p.234; see also Jean Baudrillard, 'Simulations and Simulacra',
in Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), pp.166-184.
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Thus far Jameson is little different from either Adorno or Eagleton.
Where he takes a step that is quite original is in his insistence on a dialectical
approach to the study of postmodernism. Taking his cue from The Communist
Manifesto — 'Marx powerfully urges us to do the impossible, namely, to think
this development [of capitalism] positively and negatively all at once' —
Jameson argues that it is the duty of any Marxist analysis of the postmodern
to attempt to 'identify some "moment of truth" within the more evident
"moments of falsehood" of postmodern culture.'153 This produces in
Jameson's critique not a paralysing ambivalence, but the desire to trace the
expression of some element of conflict, of irreconciled ideological significance
in the cultural products of the postmodern. If Jameson can trace those, he
believes that Marx's insistence on the capitalist mode's necessary
contradictions will be shown to remain true, thereby reasserting the validity
of Marxist critique itself and identifying postmodernism quite firmly as 'the
cultural logic of late capitalism'.
This is not the place to discuss Jameson's identification of
postmodernism's principal stylistic characteristics in any detail; instead, these
features (such as pastiche, depthlessness, playfulness, etc.) will be looked at in
relation to specific texts in the chapters to come. For the moment, however, it
is worth stressing the quite striking ahistoricism that Jameson associates with
postmodernism. 'It is safest,' he writes in the opening sentence of the
Postmodernism book, 'to grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to
think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to think
historically in the first place.'154 What he is to offer us -- 'the concept of the
postmodern' ~ is the historicization of a resolutely ahistorical cultural




'[h]istory is extruded from tales which have become cultural commodities,
even and especially there where historical themes are exploited.'155 Just as we
saw in the opening pages how Marx depicts the commodity as a fetishized
object wiped clean of the historical markers of its production, Adorno here
suggests that such a process might also be identified in cultural commodities.
The various ways in which this problem might be seen to relate to specific
postmodernist texts will be explored in the following chapters on Martin
Amis, Don DeLillo and Salman Rushdie.
It is worth noting, though, that the critique Jameson offers of Adorno's
analyses of the culture industry is also based on a perceived inadequacy of
historicization: 'what has been omitted from the later judgements,' he writes,
'is precisely Adorno's fundamental discovery of the historicity, and in
particular, the irreversible aging process, of the greatest modernist forms.'156
Just as Adorno criticised Lukacs's ahistorical prejudice for the realist aesthetic
of Balzac and (far more problematically) Mann, Jameson questions Adorno's
own reliance on a modernist mode whose time would seem to have passed.
Where Adorno saw in the work of modernist writers the expression of a
particular historical experience (' [t]he voice of the age echoes through their
monologues'), Jameson tries to identify in postmodernism a similar
expressiveness:
. . . insofar as postmodernism really expresses multinational
capitalism, there is some cognitive content to it. It is articulating
something that is going on. If the subject is lost in it, and if in
social life the psychic subject has been decentered by late
capitalism, then this art faithfully and authentically registers
that. That's its moment of truth.157
155TheodorW. Adorno, 'The Schema of Mass Culture', in The Culture Industry, pp.66-67.
156Jameson, 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture', p.14.
157Anders Stephanson & Fredric Jameson, 'Regarding Postmodernism:A Conversation with
Fredric Jameson', in Douglas Kellner, ed., Postmodernism/jameson/Criticjue (Washington DC:
Maisonneuve Press, 1989), p.55.
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Jameson's rebuke of Adorno is thus based on what he has called 'the one
absolute and we may even say "transhistorical" imperative of all dialectical
thought': 'Always historicize!'158 'Who, after all/ as Andreas Huyssen asks,
'would want to be the Lukacs of the postmodern.. .'159
It is with this attempt to historicize both the ahistoricism and
cognitive decentering that he associates with postmodernism that Jameson
also seeks to find something redemptive, some cultural expression of
contemporary social experience. We have already seen — briefly -- Jameson's
identification of that spatial confusion to which postmodern culture
contributes with the individual subject's decentering in late capitalism.
Jameson's well-known and extensive description of John Portman's Westin
Bonaventure Hotel in Postmodernism is a good example of the cultural
space/social space analogy on which this analysis rests.160 Probably of
greater relevance to the present argument, though, is the way in which
Jameson discusses the ahistoricism of postmodern fiction.
Taking E.L. Doctorow as his principal example, Jameson attempts to
interpret such ahistoricism as a feature of cultural and historical necessity.
'The historical novel,' he writes,
can no longer set out to represent the historical past; it can only
"represent" our ideas and stereotypes about that past (which
thereby at once become "pop history").... If there is any realism
left here, it is a "realism" that is meant to derive from the shock
of grasping that confinement and of slowly becoming aware of a
new and original historical situation in which we are
condemned to seek History by way of our own pop images and
simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of
reach.161
158Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (London:





Thus, Doctorow's novels do not express for Jameson (as they do for Linda
Hutcheon) 'an extended critique of American democratic ideals through the
presentation of class conflict',162 but instead the very inability to sustain such
a critique. 'Doctorow,' he writes, 'is the epic poet of the disappearance of the
American radical past.' For Jameson, then, the 'moment of truth' of a novel
such as Ragtime is not in its delineation of class conflict, but in its
transformation of 'the past into something which is obviously a black
simulacrum'163 and its evocation of the left's 'poignant distress' as it witnesses
the disappearance of the historical referent, the disappearance of those
historical parameters in which class conflict is situated. Jameson's key claim
for Doctorow's writing is as follows:
What is culturally interesting, however, is that he has had to
convey this great theme formally (since the waning of the
content is very precisely his subject) and, more than that, has
had to elaborate his work by way of that very cultural logic of
the postmodern which is itself the mark and symptom of his
dilemma.164
Above all, Jameson is here stressing the inescapability of the cultural logic
that is postmodernism. '[Ojne can't,' he writes elsewhere, 'wish this
postmodern blockage of historicity out of existence by mere self-critical self-
consciousness.'165 Rather, he insists on the need to work, as he claims
Doctorow does, from within postmodernism, using postmodernist techniques
and modes of representation to depict the condition of postmodernity itself,
and thereby to suggest its own necessary historicization. What Jameson
seems to be claiming for Doctorow's writing is nothing less than a form of
aesthetic negative dialectics of the postmodern:
162Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics ofPostmodernism, pp.61-62.
163Stephanson & Jameson, p.61.
164Jameson, Postmodernism, p.25.
165Stephanson & Jameson, p.61.
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[Doctorow] suddenly makes us realize that this is the only
image of the past we have, in truth a projection on the walls of
Plato's cave. This, if you like, is negative dialectics, or negative
theology, an insistence of the very flatness and depthlessness of
the thing which makes what isn't there very vivid. That is not
negligible. It is not the reinvention of some sense of the past
where one would fantasize about a healthier age of deeper
historical sense: it is the use of those very limited instruments to
show their limits. And it is not ironic.166
This is as far as Jameson has yet reached in his attempt to recuperate
for Marxist theory some element of postmodernist culture. It is, as we have
seen, quite a different form of response to that of both Adorno and Eagleton;
(the latter, in fact, views Jameson's project as distinctly naive politically). As
Jameson depicts it, at its best postmodernist art and literature can seek to offer
a form of 'cognitive mapping' for the decentered subjects of the late capitalist
age. This is quite different from those networks of totality that Lukacs saw in
the novels of Balzac, different even from the solitary (but typical) suffering
selves of Adorno's Beckett. Instead, the representation both of totality and of
the alienated individual subject is sacrificed for the sake of immanent critique.
Although, as we have seen, Jameson identifies it in some examples of
postmodern culture, he portrays this form of critique as the goal of a new and
truly political postmodernism:
. . . the new political art (if it is possible at all) will have to hold
to the truth of postmodernism, that is to say, to its fundamental
object — the world space of multinational capital — at the same
time at which it achieves a breakthrough to some as yet
unimaginable new mode of representing this last, in which we
may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and
collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle





In my short concluding chapter I return to the theoretical concept of the
postmodern as discussed by Jameson, suggesting some revision of his model.
For the moment, though, it suffices to note that the argument pursued in the
course of the next three chapters is predicated on the assumption that there is
adequate complexity in postmodern fiction of the 1980s and '90s to trace those
internal dialectics of complicity and immanent critique without anticipating
some 'unimaginable new mode' of representation which will somehow make
it all easier for us. Better to start, claimed Brecht, with the 'bad new things'
than the 'good old ones,' a sentiment cited with ironic approval by Terry
Eagleton.168 Above all however ~ since the unimaginable is rarely as
anticipated ~ it is advisable, as the following chapters are intended to
demonstrate, to begin with what is to hand.
168gagjeton, 'Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism', p.141.
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Martin Amis: Of Murderers and their Prose Styles
If I were not perfectly sure of my power to write and of my marvellous ability to
express ideas with the utmost grace and vividness ... So, more or less, I had thought
of beginning my tale. Further, I should liave drawn the reader's attention to the fact
that had I lacked that power, tlrnt ability, et cetera, not only should I have refrained
from describing certain recent events, but there would have been nothing to describe,
for, gentle reader, nothing at all would have happened. Silly perhaps, but at least
clear. The gift ofpenetrating life's devices, an innate disposition towards the constant
exercise of the creative faculty could alone have enabled me ... At this point I should
have compared the breaker of the law which makes such a fuss over a little spilled
blood, with a poet or a stage performer. But as my poor left-lmnded friend used to put
it: philosophic speculation is the invention of the rich. Down zvith it.
Vladimir Nabokov, Despair
In an entry to The Oxford Guide to Contemporary Writing, the critic James Wood
comments, 'No writer of his generation has been more influential (in both
good and bad ways) on younger writers than Martin Amis.'169 It might also
be true to say, though, that no English writer of Amis's generation has been
more overtly influenced. His work bears a series of watermarks which at
times it seems to proffer as proof of its own literary authenticity. It is that
authenticity, that mark of art's distinction (as in distinctiveness), which Amis
prizes above all. Yet, as we shall see, there are problems with such a stance,
with even such remnants of faith in artistic status. The writers who, for Amis,
'fill up the sky' are Saul Bellow and Vladimir Nabokov. It is hardly possible,
in the light of the very considerable influence which these writers' work has
exerted over Amis's fiction, to prevent the following from leaning heavily and
more or less awkwardly on the points of intersection between their work and
Amis's own. But by keeping those influences at the forefront ofmy reading of
169James Wood, 'England', in John Sturrock, ed., The Oxford Guide to Contemporary Writing
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), p.137.
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Amis's fiction, I hope to show something of the complicated relation that
fiction establishes with the contemporary cultural dominant of
postmodernism.
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Money: The Self-Made Man
Money: A Suicide Note, published in 1984, marked a new stage in Amis's
writing. Significantly fatter than his four previous novels, it also operates on
a larger scale of ambition. This was the first of his books to which his later
claim that 'Everything I know on earth is in the novel I've just finished' might
be plausibly applied. It is a book behind which the presence of Saul Bellow is
unmistakable:
Aware of all the prescriptive dangers, Bellow nonetheless
believes that the time has come for serious (i.e. talented) writers
to be serious, without losing lyricism or laughter. 'No more
novels about adolescence, career problems, sexual adventure,
wounded ethnicity.' Why not address 'the mysterious
circumstance of being', and say what it's like to be alive at this
time, on this planet?170
Conscious that it was precisely this prescribed move away from novels about
adolescence (The Rachel Papers), career problems (Success) and sexual
adventure (Dead Babies or all of the above) to a larger, less wieldy subject of
the survival of the self in contemporary Western society which he was
attempting in Money, Amis is here acknowledging this shift in breadth of
focus that his new novel offered and simultaneously suggesting the higher
level of artistic company with which he would henceforth prefer to be
associated — note the reference to 'serious (i.e. talented) writers'.
The story of Money is the story of John Self. As a suicide note, it is also,
by the crudest of allegorical reckonings, the story of the self-destruction of the
individual in late twentieth-century consumer culture. Again writing of
Bellow (and, in particular, of his novel The Dean's December), Amis is almost
170Martin Amis, 'Saul Bellow in Chicago', in The Moronic Inferno and Other Visits to America
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987; repr. 1990), pp.206-207.
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rhapsodic in his lament for those moral and cultural values which he sees
being lost:
Many times in Bellow's novels we are reminded that 'being
human' isn't the automatic condition of every human being.
Like freedom or sanity, it is not a given but a gift, a talent, an
accomplishment, an objective. In achieving it, some will need
more time or thought or help. And, put that way, it doesn't
sound too hard a lesson to learn.171
The self has become, as he suggests in his collection of nuclear-obsessed short
stories, one of 'Einstein's monsters, not fully human, not for now.' The word
'human' seems to signify for Amis a set of values which links the self, the
individual bourgeois subject, with the world of high art, of culture. What he
dramatises in Money, then, is the destruction of both of these elevated ideas.
Yet, Amis is also trying to do something else, something which takes us to the
heart of his aesthetics; the writing of Money is the attempt — aesthetically — to
retain that self, to reconstitute a subjectivity compatible with the "high"
culture values that he associates with the 'human'.
In a sense, Money is working on a cruel irony inherent in our
understanding of the development of the bourgeois subject. That individual
may emerge as a product of modern industrial capitalism, but it is also
destroyed by the economic system's development into contemporary
consumerism. The self and the commodity are perhaps from the very start
colluding in a deadly embrace, one whose conclusion Amis portrays in the
gluttonous John Self's frantic and headlong plunge into auto-destruction.
The retention or conservation of that self, though, (and this, it seems, is
Amis's gambit) may now prove more subversive than acceptance of its
demise. As Adorno commented in another context: the individual is 'both
171 Ibid, p.208.
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the outcome of the capitalist process of alienation and a defiant protest
against it, something transient himself.'172
But how does Amis try to reconstruct some form of subjectivity in the
novel? The narrative form of Money appears to take the form of Nabokov's
Lolita: Lolita, writes Amis, 'constructs a mind in the way that a prose
Browning might have gone about it, through rigorous dramatic
monologue.'173 This, of course, foregrounds that very subject under
construction: we find out about Self not only through his 'adventures', but (as
in any monologue) through his way of telling us about them. Here he is
confessing to a few misdemeanours:
I have a confession to make. I might as well come clean. I can't
fool you. The truth is, I — I haven't been behaving as well as I've
led you to believe. No doubt you suspected that it was all too
good to be true. I've gone back to Third Avenue, not to the
Happy Isles but to places like it, to Elysium, to Eden, to Arcadia
— no more than once a day, I swear to God, and only for
handjobs (and on the days when I'm ill or unusually hungover I
don't go there at all). I go to porno-loop parlours. . . . Ah, I'm
sorry. I didn't dare tell you earlier in case you stopped liking
me, in case I lost your sympathy altogether -- and I do need it,
your sympathy. I can't afford to lose that too. Napoleon, the
bully: this pig likes his apples.174
Like portly Napoleon, Self too may be a bully but here it is his chronic
inability to bully or manipulate us that is most graphic. He seems quite
touchingly unaware of how appalling his behaviour had already appeared. It
is this, perhaps above all, which allows him to retain some measure of
sympathy: Self may enjoy his 'apples', but we are given some inkling that he
just couldn't cut it in the bully stakes.
172Theodor W. Adorno, 'Trying to Understand Endgame', in Notes to Literature, vol. 1, ed. Rolf
Tiedemann, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), p.249.
173Martin Amis, 'Low Hum & Little Lo', 'Review Section', The Independent on Sunday, 25
October 1992, p.24.
174Martin Amis, Money: A Suicide Note (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p.211. Further
page refemces to the novel are from this edition and will be cited in the main text, prefixed by
the abbreviation M.
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Another example suggests a probable further reason for the
indulgences with which we favour Self:
The evening, at last, has reached its promised, its destined stage.
We've just got back from dinner at Kreuzer's. This was
traditional, a matter of convention. Kreuzer's provides the
costly setting of our reunions, our foreplay and our lies. There
have been rich meat and bloody wine. There have been
brandies, and thick puddings. There has already been some
dirty talk. Selina is in high spirits, and as for me, I'm a gurgling
wizard of calorific excess. (M, p.73)
This is not John Self's voice. It is not the prose style of a man who refuses to
budge from page 1 of Animal Farm because he doesn't know what 'pop-holes'
are. Could Self really describe himself as 'a gurgling wizard of calorific
excess'? What we are witnessing is not expression of self but its overt
aestheticization. Thus Money attempts to portray the retention of self ~ the
salvage of some form of subjecthood — through the transformative powers of
art. Humbert Humbert, the narrator of Nabokov's Lolita, takes no little pride
in his literary aptitude: 'You can always count on a murderer for a fancy prose
style,'175 he promises. The same could not be said of Self. He is defined by
his lack of culture. Money, says Amis, 'is a novel about what happens when
people don't have Culture, and how impossible that makes it for them to
understand what is going on.'176 Self's continual bewilderment, his near-
realisation at times that he is subject to another's designs and, most obviously,
his bathetic vulgarity show him to be Amis's representative of philistinism.
The writing that we read, the rhythmic voice that we hear, cannot be Self's.
Like the character of Martin Amis in the novel, the author lends his writing
talent to the narrator, playfully exploiting Self's half-grasped connection of
Amis with plagiarism:
175Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p.9.
176Val Hennessy, 'Martin Amis', in A Little Light Friction (London: Futura, 1990), p.235.
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Fielding, of course, had heard of Martin Amis — he hadn't read
his stuff, but there'd recently been some cases of plagiarism, of
text-theft, which had filtered down to the newspapers and
magazines. So, I thought. Little Martin got caught with his
fingers in the till, then, did he. A word criminal. I would bear
that in mind.177 (M, p.235)
In two of Nabokov's novels - Invitation to a Beheading and Bend Sinister
— the author finally spares his protagonists from the furthest extremes of their
misery by exposing them to the truth of their fictional status. This very nearly
occurs in Money too. But just as Self's crimes are never quite as monstrous as
those of Paduk in Bend Sinister, nor do his sufferings elicit anything like the
compassion of Adam Krug's. The horror of children's pain, so recognisably
central in Nabokov's work, does not emerge as a major thematic concern in
Amis's writing until Einstein's Monsters and London Fields. In Money the
punishments are unmistakably adult.
What happens in Money, instead of the compassionate leave
engineered by Nabokov, is that Self is repeatedly taunted over his role as
authorial pawn, but remains unable to grasp the significance of these
comments. Here Martin explains to Self some narrative principles:
'The distance between author and narrator corresponds to the
degree to which the author finds the narrator wicked, deluded,
pitiful or ridiculous. I'm sorry, am I boring you?'
Uh?'
'This distance is partly determined by convention. In the
epic or heroic frame, the author gives the protagonist
177Amis was involved in a plagiarism scandal. In 1980 he pointed out that Jacob Epstein's
Wild Oats plagiarized from his own novel The Rachel Papers. The following are his later,
published comments on the affair:
MA: All I feel is that on the whole I wish I'd never bothered to bring anyone's attention to it.
BL: Why?
MA: Just the human reason. I think he suffered inordinately, and it didn't do me any good.
Funnily enough, plagiarism is such a weird business that I perhaps was tainted as well. It's
not like a normal transaction. It doesn't seem to even out morally at all. If I could do it again,
I'd just let it go. I think it should have gone on the record somehow. But I wish someone else
had done it.
Brendan Lemon, 'Interview with Martin Amis', Interview, March 1990, p.155.
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everything he has, and more. The hero is a god or has godlike
powers or virtues. In the tragic ... Are you all right?'
'Uh?' I repeated. I had just stabbed a pretzel into my
dodgy upper tooth. Rescreening this little mishap in my head, I
suppose I must have winced pretty graphically and then given a
sluggish, tramplike twitch. Now I checked the tooth with my
tongue. Martin talked contentedly on.... I sipped my drink and
sluiced the scotch round my upper west side.
'The further down the scale he is, the more liberties you
can take with him. You can do what the hell you like with him,
really. This creates an appetite for punishment. The author is
not free of sadistic impulses. I suppose it's the —' (M, pp.246-
247)
David Lodge has cited the relationship between Self and Amis dramatised
here as an example of 'the death of the author', pointing out that the narrator,
Amis's creation, goes so far as to throw a punch at the author-figure.178 What
Lodge neglects to mention is that the punch misses by some way, throwing
Self off-balance and leaving him in a crumpled heap on the floor, staring up
in frustrated and dejected failure at the unscratched and apologetic figure of
Amis. Norman Mailer has claimed that the first thing he thinks when he sees
a man is 'will I fight him?' and when he sees a woman 'will I fuck her?' In his
relations with Martin Amis and Martina Twain, Self is a failure on both these
counts: unable to connect with Martin's jaw, he finds it impossible to raise
more than an apologetic smile in bed with Martina.
And yet the impotence which this demonstrates is something for which
we should be well prepared. The authorial note with which the book begins
is itself a marker of Self's outright reliance on, and subjugation to, a higher
authority:
This is a suicide note. By the time you lay it aside (and you should
alzvays read these things slowly, on the lookout for clues or giveaways),
John Selfwill no longer exist. Or at any rate that's the idea. You
never can tell, though, with suicide notes, can you?...
178David Lodge, After Bakhtin: essays on fiction and criticism (London: Routledge, 1990), p.3.
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...To whom is the note addressed? To Martina, to Fielding, to
Vera, to Alec, to Selina, to Barry - to John Self? No. It is meant for
you out there, the dear, the gentle. (M, 'Author's Note')
That his own apparent suicide note should be thus prefaced signals to us
readers from the very outset the prime importance of our role(s) in the novel.
There are, then, two pivotal relationships on which Self's narrative depends:
that which links Martin and Martina to Self; and that which is established
between Amis, his narrator, and the reader.
Martin rents his artistic skills to Self and the culture industry. The
"feelgood" techniques to which he subjects the original script are designed to
help Self manipulate the actors; ultimately, however, neither he nor his
hedonistic would-be benefactor benefit. John Self's film and career are
destroyed; Martin isn't paid. Similarly, Martina attempts to redeem or save
Self with the help of "high" culture: she buys him a book; she even takes him
to the opera. In return, Self somehow misses the allegorical point of Animal
Farm and confuses Desdemona with a porn star. The civilising effect of art
has gone awry, and the novel's protagonist slips back into the sack with
Selina. Looking for Amis's phone-number, Self comments, 'Martin was in the
book all right — in fact he was there twice. .. Some people will do anything to
get their names in print' (M, p.235). Martina is the female reflection of Amis, a
point which we will soon see to have repercussions for the depiction of other
artists-manques. For the moment, however, it is important merely to note that
both seem to be trying — and failing — to save Self through art.
This aspect of the novel's ostensible content relates of course very
closely to those features of the narrative form discussed earlier. Here, then,
we return to the question of Amis's non-credible use of dramatic monologue
as an attempt to salvage the self (or subject) through aestheticization. The
absence of naturalistic credibility in Self's narrative, the extent to which there
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is a clear disparity between the characterisation of Self and his mode of
expression, is an indication of Amis's view that the self can no longer be seen
as an expression of the values of high culture. The element of critique which
this disparity generates is, however, fully dependent on a critical distance of
the aesthetic to the consumerist culture that Self inhabits. Yet what we have
just witnessed is Amis's dramatisation of the aesthetic's complicity with the
market (in Martin's rewritten script) and its impotence as a force in changing
characters' modes of behaviour (see Martina's failed self-improvement course
in culture).
Yet if it is Self who seems initially to be subject to art's educative
mission, it nonetheless remains the reader to whom the note (and, therefore,
the novel) is addressed. The question of how we actually engage in the act of
reading Money is clearly marked as significant. The extent to which this role
helps associate the reader with Self is signalled in Self's mistaken grasp of a
hissed homosexual's insult:
I walked past them.
'Reader,' someone seemed to say.
I paused. I hung my head. You can walk away but I
cannot walk away. I turned, and asked with real interest, 'What
did I hear you call me?'
'Breeder,' said the man. He held a kind of grappling hook
between his legs. 'Big breeder.' (M, p.195)
This is an association with which, though, we might be seen to collude.
Despite those moments (referred to earlier) when a substantial ironic distance
is established between the reader and Self, it is all too tempting at times
simply to enjoy the squalor of the narrator's behaviour, to indulge in a certain
voyeuristic pleasure -- to go slumming:
I knew Martina from way back at film school, and I used to
amble up with whatever stylist or make-up girl I was squiring
and say hi to the talented team. It did my rep a lot of good.
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Martina always seemed pleased to see me. Perhaps she fancied
a bit of rough, even then.
So, towards the end of dinner, as Martina stood at my
side pouring out the last of the wine, I rammed my hand up her
skirt and said, 'Come on, darling, you know you love it' . . .
Relax. I didn't really. (M, p.215)
A passage such as the above shows the extent to which Self is capable of
engaging us in a playful relationship, dramatising a moral outrage at which
we too are then invited to laugh. Self, though, is not capable of sustaining this
intimacy with his reader; at times, as we have already seen, Amis stresses
Self's loss of narrative control. Again, the narrative hierarchy which is
established in Money seems eerily similar to that of Nabokov's Lolita:
Morally the novel is all ricochet or rebound. However cruel
Humbert is to Lolita, Nabokov is crueller to Humbert —
finessingly cruel. We all share the narrator's smirk when he
begins the sexual-bribes chapter with the following sentence: "I
am now faced with the distasteful task of recording a definite
drop in Lolita's morals." But when the smirk congeals we are
left staring at the moral heap that Humbert has become,
underneath his arched eyebrow.179
In establishing narrative parallels with Lolita, Amis would seem to be
reinforcing the significance of the theme of cruelty that Money shares with
Nabokov's novel. Pointing to Nabokov's identification of the sadism at work
in Don Quixote, he implicitly suggests that both Money and Lolita indulge in
something of the same practices:
The author seems to plan it thus: Come with me, ungentle
reader, who enjoys seeing a live dog inflated and kicked around
like a soccer football; reader, who likes, of a Sunday morning, on
his way to or from church, to poke his stick or direct his spittle
at a poor rogue in the stocks; come. ... I hope you will be
amused at what I have to offer.180
It is therefore worth switching our attention, for a few moments, from the
moral transgressions of John Self to the ethical status of Amis's reader. It is,
179Amis, 'Low Hum & Little Lo', p.24.
180Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on 'Don Quixote'; cited in Amis, 'Low Hum & Little Lo', p.24.
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for Nabokov, write both Michael Wood181 and Richard Rorty,182 the sin of
inattentiveness or neglect that is most indicative of our habitual cruelties:
Both Kinbote and Humbert are exquisitely sensitive to
everything which affects or provides expression for their own
obsession, and entirely incurious about anything that affects
anything else. These characters dramatize, as it has never before
been dramatised, the particular form of cruelty about which
Nabokov worried most — incuriosity.183
'I wonder how many readers survive [Lolita],' writes Amis,
without realising that its heroine is, so to speak, dead on arrival,
like her child. Her brief obituary is tucked away, with others, in
the "editor's" foreword, in nonchalant, school-newsletter
form.184
To most readers of Lolita, the death of Dolores Haze is as much of an
immediate concern as is the suicide of Hazel Shade to Charles Kinbote in Pale
Fire. It is of this same lack of humane concern that John Self is accused by
Frank the Phone:
'Remember, in Trenton, the school on Budd Street, the
pale boy with glasses in the yard? You made him cry. It was
me. Last December, Los Angeles, the hired car you were
driving when you jumped that light in Coldwater Canyon? A
cab crashed and you didn't stop. The cab had a passenger. It
was me. 1978, New York, you were auditioning at the Walden
Center, remember? The redhead, you had her strip and then
passed her over, and you laughed. It was me. Yesterday you
stepped over a bum in Fifth Avenue and you looked down and
swore and made to kick. It was me. It was me.' (M, pp.217-218)
'I don't remember,' says Self, 'the pale boy with glasses crying in the
playground — but no doubt there were one or two, and I was a mean kid.'
Perhaps even more significantly, Amis attempts to replicate his
protagonist's hedonistic surrender in the response of the reader. Lolita, he
181Michael Wood, TheMagician's Doubts: Nabokov and the Risks ofFiction (London: Pimlico,
1995).
182Richard Rorty, 'The barbar of Kasbeam: Nabokov on cruelty', in Contingency, Irony, and
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989), pp.141-168.
183Ibid, p.158.
184Amis, 'Low Hum & Little Lo', p.24.
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writes, 'rushes up on the reader like a recreational drug more powerful than
any yet discovered or devised.'185 Money, in a sense, does precisely the same.
When the character of Martin Amis explains to Self how Fielding's scam
worked (see M, p.378), it all seems so simple. Yet few readers, particularly
on a first reading, will have noticed the moment when Self mistakenly
assumes sole financial responsibility for the movie:
He had me doublesign some contracts on the hood (the usual:
once under 'Co-signatory', once under 'Self'). Then he waved,
and vanished behind the black glass. (M, p.142)
Like Self, the reader is lost in the rush of the novel, in the pull and jerk of
Amis's prose. Ignoring the warning to 'read these things slowly, on the
lookout for clues or giveaways', most of us will be content to enjoy the
sensuous pleasures afforded by Money. The didacticism of Amis's novel is
therefore inextricably bound up in its elevation of aesthetic pleasure, a force
to be simultaneously enjoyed and held suspect.
If 'the point of good art,' as Amis claims, 'is .. . an educative process, a
humanizing and enriching process,'186 it is also, as he acknowledges, an
exercise in manipulation. '[Ejvery character in [Money],' he says, dupes the
narrator, and yet I'm the one who has actually done it all to him: I've always
been very conscious of that.'187 Raising a question that will be dealt with
more fully in London Fields, Amis the character asks in Money:
'Is there a moral philosophy of fiction? When I create a
character and put him or her through certain ordeals, what am I
up to — morally? Am I accountable. I sometimes feel that -' (M,
p.260)
Does this, though, make Amis just another Fielding Goodney? The characters
of Quentin Villiers in Dead Babies and Prince in Other People have already
185 Ibid.
186John Haffenden, 'Martin Amis', in Novelists in Interview (London: Methuen, 1985), p.24.
187Ibid, p.ll.
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stood as examples in Amis's fiction of the artist as criminal or murderer.
Fielding Goodney is clearly another of these figures; he represents the artist
manque who, like Humbert in Lolita, 'because they cannot make art out of life,
make their lives into art.'188 Martin Amis, the fictional character, is certainly
associated with Fielding: 'Cross dresser!' cries Self to the retreating, battered
Fielding; but the term could equally be applied to Amis, doubled in the
character of Martina Twain. The association of the two would therefore seem
to raise the question of whether, in the age of the postmodern, an author can
be anything but manque.
In Martin Amis's Money the world of the aesthetic is depicted as deeply
complicit with the social and economic forces that are destroying the subject;
yet it is only through aestheticization that Amis can try to retain that self. The
credibility of such a stance, and the possibility that it is dependent on a now
out-of-date set of values which may really only have been those of a
narrowly-defined liberal elite will be discussed later in this chapter. The
present study of Money must leave, then, unresolved the question of whether,
in the end, the power of the author's art can salvage Self — Amis, for example,
points to the fact that 'the only semi-colon in the book appears in the last
sentence, which is meant to be a mighty clue to the idea that [John Self] is
slowing down ... because at one point he has said that he wants semi-colons
in his life'189 — or whether, despite its author's best intentions, Money is just
another reminder that, as in Lolita, 'you can always count on a murderer for a
fancy prose style.'
188Amis, 'Low Hum & Little Lo', p.25.
189Haffenden, p. 14.
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London Fields: Realism and Relief
The example of Saul Bellow's later fiction — 'Late Bellow', as Amis calls it —
offers perhaps the most appropriate perspective from which to approach
London Fields. The tragedy of Bellow's principal protagonists in at least his
last two novels -- The Dean's December and More Die ofHeartbreak — lies in their
recognition that in order to retain any valid notion of self, of selfhood, they
must divorce themselves from the social sphere and retreat to an aloof
introspection whither neither society nor Bellow himself can follow them.
The fates of Albert Corde and Ben Corder reflect the defeat of liberal
humanist values and aspirations in contemporary America. However, to this
pessimistic retreat to the introspective Bellow opposes both the role of the
author and the form of the novel. There is little elegiac in the prose of The
Dean's December. Instead we find a level of sustained, carefully-weighted
polemical critique, whose vigour is sharply at odds with the despair that
leads Corde to wish that he need never descend from the frosty seclusion of
an astronomical observatory.
Awareness of the interplay of these contradictory impulses in the face
of social forces is crucial to an understanding of the artistic dilemmas that
Amis inherits from Bellow. Reviewing The Dean's December, Amis writes:
Citing Rilke's wartime letters, the Dean observes that there is no
effective language for the large-scale terrors; during such times
'the heart must hang in the dark', and wait. But there is a
countervailing urge 'to send the soul out into society', 'to see at
first hand the big manifestations of disorder and take a fresh
reading from them'. The result is head-spin, heart-fever.190
It is the very possibility of an adequate literary response to the contemporary
world that Bellow explores in this novel, his first since being awarded the
190Amis, 'Saul Bellow in Chicago', p.203.
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Nobel Prize in 1976. The critical reception accorded on its publication in 1982
was ambivalent in the extreme; although both Martin Amis and Salman
Rushdie reviewed it favourably, others criticised the novel's didacticism, its
sermon-like qualities. Bellow's own comments on the intention behind the
novel merely add credence to such criticisms: 'I don't think I've ever written a
book with so many declarative sentences,' he said. 'The idea was to hit and to
hit hard, to make sure that every stroke of the hammer would tell.'191
That Bellow believes a certain level of didacticism ~ or, more
euphemistically, of directness -- to be now acceptable, perhaps even
necessary, appears to be borne out by the text of The Dean's December. An
ever-present threat is that of silence. The pervasiveness of this threat is
perhaps why there seems such a sinister edge to one of the questions that
Albert Corde is asked by his nephew concerning the death of Rickie Lester,
gagged and thrown out a window: "'Would it have been more humane if he
wasn't gagged, so he could speak his last words?"'192 Here also, by
implication, the justification of Corde's published attacks on corruption in
Chicago is called into question: can literature any longer express an adequate
response to the human predicament, or is it no more than a dying man's
screams? If Corde by the novel's end is no longer sure that he can answer
these questions, the form and style of the novel indicate that Bellow himself
is as determined as ever to oppose any notion of the social irrelevance of
literature. It is, therefore, for a specific reason -- to combat the silence of
irrelevance — that in The Dean's December - Bellow's method becomes so direct
and his voice so strident.
The issues with which Martin Amis deals in London Fields are
extremely similar, though viewed from a slightly different historical and
191Melvyn Bragg, 'Interview with Saul Bellow', London Review ofBooks, 6 May 1982, p.22.
192Saul Bellow, The Dean's December (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p.45.
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literary-historical perspective. London Fields poses a question that The Dean's
December does not, that of the historical development, if not determination, of
literary form. Bellow's fiction remains significantly reliant upon the
conventions of literary realism, his Nobel Lecture being largely a defence of
this position (as well as an attack on Alain Robbe-Grillet's theory of the
nouveau roman).193 Therein lies one of the great paradoxes engendered by
Bellow's fiction: how can a contemporary novelist show the social destruction
of liberal humanist values while continuing to practice a realist mode of
writing that has historically been based on precisely those values?194
London Fields is the dramatisation of a writer's attempt to write a novel
which reflects the author's immediate social environment, chronicling the
effect on a society of the prospect of universal death. In other words, Amis
allows us to witness Samson Young's attempts to use the novel as a means of
relating individual consciousness to historical experience in the manner of the
great realist novelists of the nineteenth century, when the novel is now itself
perhaps no longer an appropriate medium for such lofty aspirations. The
earnestness of Samson's ambitions seem strangely out of place in London
Fields. As a would-be realist, trying to adopt something of Balzac's role as
public 'secretary', he recounts a story of sex, murder and class which he
nonetheless finds somehow developing into more of a literary game-playing
exercise than the 'comprehensive description of the totality of society' that we
have already seen Lukacs associate with the realist aesthetic. Samson seems
to be a victim of what Fredric Jameson calls 'the relief of the postmodern':
This is, then, the relief of the postmodern, in which the various
modernist rituals were swept away and form production again
became open to whoever cared to indulge it, but at its own
19^Saul Bellow, 'Nobel Lecture', in It All Adds Up: From the Dim Past to the Uncertain Future
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), pp.88-97.
194For a discussion of the association of realism and the Weltanschaung of the bourgeoisie see
the essays collected in Lilian R. Furst, ed., Realism (London: Longman, 1992).
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price: namely, the preliminary destruction of modernist formal
values (now considered "elitist"), along with a range of crucial
related categories such as the work or the subject. "Text" is a
relief after "work", but you must not try to outsmart it and use it
to produce a work after all, under cover of textuality. A
playfulness of form, the aleatory production of new ones or
joyous cannibalization of the old, will not put you in so relaxed
and receptive a disposition that, by happy accident, "great" or
"significant" form will come into being anyhow... .The status of
art (and also of culture) has had to be irrevocably modified in
order to secure the new productivities; and it cannot be changed
back at will.195
In effect, Amis illustrates the tragic irony of this situation by placing Samson,
a narrator who seems to have stepped straight from a novel by Bellow, in
what seems a novel by Nabokov.
The formally postmodern aspect of London Fields is based on a
Nabokovian twist to the 'whodunit' detective novel genre. Once the principal
protagonists have been introduced and their roles identified (e.g. 'Chapter
One: The Murderer. Keith Talent was a bad guy'), the supposed surface plot
of the novel - the impending and inevitable murder of Nicola Six - gives way
to another plot involving the effect of each of the main characters on the
creation of the novel. It is as though Amis is reinforcing the point we have
already seen him make in relation to Money, that it is the author whom the
reader must finally identify as responsible for the fates of each character.
Consequently, London Fields leads the reader to search among the characters
for the mind responsible for Nicola's death. This search is the 'elaborate
puzzle or game' that Robert Alter identifies as characteristic of the
postmodern novel;196 but here it is also used to expose the ideological content
of this trend in the development of the novel. The reading of London Fields
which immediately follows is then an interpretation which the novel itself
pre-empts and to which, as I hope later to show, it cannot be reduced.
195Jameson, Postmodernism, pp.317-318.
196Robert Alter, Motives for Fiction (London: Harvard UP, 1984), p.6.
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The first to offer himself as an authorial figure is M.A.. The note which
precedes the start of Samson Young's narrative is, like all such notes in Amis's
previous novels, signed 'M.A.'. At first it appears quite normal, but at its
conclusion there is the distinct impression that M.A. is trying to distance
himself from the novel, trying to retreat from the action: 'So let's call it London
Fields. This book is called London Fields. London Fields...' The note is further
complicated by the reader's discovery later of the character Mark Asprey (to
whom, of course, we shall return); but initially the function it serves, in a
similar fashion to the note which prefaces Money, is to undermine the
authority and the claims to authorial responsibility of the second candidate,
Samson Young our narrator.
Samson's cause is, from the very moment he begins his narrative, a lost
one. Initially he sees his uncertainties, his lack of control, as a result of his
dependence upon external events, a marker of his narrative's authenticity. So
Although he perceives himself as an intermediary from the very outset, he
believes himself to be an intermediary of social events or of history, not that
of another author. 'Real life is coming along so fast that I can no longer delay,'
he writes. 'It's unbelievable.'197 But for the reader the wider perspective
created by the preceding note is available. He/She is aware that it is the
novel rather than the city which provides the structure for whose needs
Samson is to be sacrificed. When Samson asks, 'If London is a spider's web,
then where do I fit in?' it is for the reader, remembering the ironic faith with
his narrator that M.A. had kept in his choice of title, to see that London Fields
might easily be substituted for 'London'. Samson's queasy answer, 'Maybe
I'm the fly. I'm the fly' (LF, p.3), shows that early on in the novel, perhaps like
197Martin Amis, London Fields (London: Cape, 1989), p.3. Further page refernces to the novel
are from this edition and will be cited in the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation LF.
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John Self in Money, he already suspects that he is to be a victim; it is, therefore,
doubly ironic that, mistaking textuality for reality, his expression of those
suspicions is itself part of the structure that overwhelms him.
This perhaps excessive reliance on a naive notion of what Samson calls
'real life' is what marks him as a pawn even to some of the other characters, to
Nicola Six and to Mark Asprey. His lack of aptitude in the imaginative realm
is central to others' recognition of his frailty and vulnerability. When he says
to Nicola, "'I can't imagine how you're going to work it,"' and she replies,
"'The story of your life'" (LF, p.455), it is to this aspect of his insufficiency as an
authorial candidate that she is alluding. Nicola's own imaginative faculties
allow her to picture herself (as early as p. 118) as a character in a story.
Lacking these powers, Samson does not even consider this possibility until
late in the novel (p.409), and then only as a frustrated and less-than-half-
serious reaction to his feelings of persecution. Only at the novel's conclusion
— at the death, as Keith Talent might put it — does this sense of persecution so
crush Samson that he writes, in his letter to Kim, 'I feel seamless and
insubstantial, like a creation. As if someone made me up, for money. And I
don't care' (LF, p.470). Here, though, the prospect of imminent death makes it
safe for Samson to accept that he is not the autonomous subject he had
thought himself to be.
Of perhaps greater significance in terms of the novel as a 'whodunit' is
Samson's open recognition that he has lost any claims to authorship he might
once have had, and his subsequent speculations on who the true author might
be. These speculations are reflected in Samson's debates over whether he is
the father of Missy Harter's expected child:
I am the father of Missy's baby. Or Sheridan Sick is. ('I suppose
it's Sick's.' 'Don't call him that.' 'It's his name, isn't it?') (LF,
p.435)
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For 'Sick's' we can of course read 'Six', Nicola Six. 'I failed, in art and love,'
writes Samson. Just as the child is not his, nor is the novel on which so many
of his hopes depend. This motif of the novel as child is present throughout
London Fields (just as it is in Time's Arrow) and is another pointer to the debt
Amis owes to Nabokov, whose suffering children (aestheticized at times
almost out of existence), from David Krug to Dolores Haze to Hazel Shade,
are acknowledged in the figures of Debee Kensit and Kim Talent. For the
moment, though, it is necessary only to register the air of failure that
surrounds Samson's acts of devotion, to acknowledge his tragic inability to
create.
Samson's knowledge that he has been duped leads him, as the novel
and his life both draw to a close, to try to guess the identity of his tormentor,
the novel's true author. In his parting letter to Mark Asprey, he concludes
with a PPS: 'You didn't set me up. did you?' (LF, p.468). But there persists the
tempting possibility that the novel is really Nicola's own work, like her death.
'She outwrote me. Her story worked. And mine didn't' (LF, p.466). Unable to
choose definitively between them, Samson retreats instead to an introspective
despair over his own marginalised status, which leads finally to a last,
pathetic attempt to claim responsibility:
So if you ever felt something behind you when you weren't even
one, like welcome heat, like a bulb, like a sun, trying to shine
right across the universe -- it was me. Always me. It was me. It
was me. (LF, p.470)
Even here, however, in the very last words of the novel, his claims can be seen
to undermine themselves. 'It was me' is less an assertion of independence
than a gesture of resigned acquiescence to Nicola's often hinted-at murder
plan: 'Get you. Aren't you the one,' she mocks him (LF, p.119).
The murderee herself is an obvious choice for the role of author. We
are told that Nicola 'always knew what was going to happen next' (LF, p.15).
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This foreknowledge allows her to give a constant appearance of control and to
flaunt her superiority over Samson in terms of awareness or insight. It was
precisely these traits that provoked the novelist Jay Mclnerney to write in his
review of the novel, 'Collaborating in her own murder appeals to her creative
instincts. . . . Nicola becomes the real creative genius behind the novel.'198
Mclnerney's conclusion is well-founded, for Nicola also proves herself adept
at creating different characters and personae, such as her fictional friend
Enola Gay and the elaborate fiction she presents to Guy Clinch of herself as an
innocent virgin.
Nonetheless, this is not an interpretation which can be supported by a
close reading of the text, as it ignores the extent to which Nicola herself is
exposed as a literary artefact, as the creation of another artist. Nicola is
described in terms plainly borrowed from other literary works (her breasts,
for example, are 'so close together, in fearful symmetry'); her story, moreover,
is made to follow a determinate course that echoes, both in its general
structure and in specific events, past literary models.
The most overt and influential of these models is the story of Lise in
Muriel Spark's The Driver's Seat. Lise, too, carefully plans the circumstances
of her death and ruthlessly manipulates her unwilling murderer. The echoes
in London Fields of Spark's novel are copious, often extending beyond
elements of plot and structure to direct textual allusion:
Lise touches him on the arm. 'You're coming with me,' she
says.199
Nicola was laughing with her mouth as long and wide as it
would go, when Guy stepped forward.
'You 're going back with me.' (LF, p.461)
198Jay Mclnerney, 'Review of London Fields',The Observer, 24 September 1989, p.47.
199Muriel Spark, The Driver's Seat (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), p.101.
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These scenes serve, of course, different functions in each novel ~ in The
Driver's Seat this is the moment when the murderer is finally identified, while
this is emphatically not the case in London Fields — but the effect of this kind of
allusion, this foregrounding of the textual-dependency of Nicola and her
story, is manifestly part of a strategy to suggest, however covertly, Nicola's
status as a literary creation subject to a creator. In this respect, Nicola evinces
far greater insight than Jay Mclnerney:
I said uneasily, 'But you're not in a story. This isn't some
hired video Nicola.'
She shrugged. 'It's always felt like a story,' she said. (LF,
p.118)
Although certainly the most obvious, The Driver's Seat is far from the
only literary model from which Nicola is constructed. Her own description of
the terrible thing she did to Mark Asprey, burning his novel, portrays her as a
Hedda Gabler figure, torching the manuscript of her former beloved. That
particular passage (see LF, p.453), is also a reworked version of a similar
episode in another of Amis's novels, Other People, whose narrator also turns
out to be the main protagonist's murderer:
'. . . I'd been writing a play, been writing it the whole year I'd
been with her.... One day she locked herself inmy study, I was
banging on the door. I heard the sound of paper being thrashed
about — there was an open fire in there. She whispered through
the door that she was going to burn it. My play. Her voice was
mad, not like her at all. She knew I had no copy.'200
Thematically it is this allusion that is most significant; for not only does it
offer further evidence of Nicola's fictionality, but it also puts in implicit doubt
the authority of Nicola's version of events. This doubt is the result of the
subsequent revisions undergone by the above story from Other People. The
character telling the story, Michael Shane, adds that his girlfriend, Amy, had
200Martin Amis, Other People (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), p.136.
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not destroyed the play but had only been pretending. He goes on to say that
he destroyed it himself later because he realised how much she hated it. By
this stage, Shane's initial version has been subject to two revisions (or
additions); the novel's narrator then intervenes to add a third:
Michael says, 'A week later I burnt it.' This isn't strictly true
either. Doesn't he remember? Is he still blinded by smoke and
his own ball-broken tears? He burnt it, but she made him. He
didn't want to, but she made him. She did. Oh, she did.201
This has two principal implications for London Fields. The first is that Nicola's
story is not originally Nicola's, but that of Amy Hide from Other People. The
second is that the reader is left unsure as to how far he/she should accept the
finality of Nicola's version. "'Some things are never over,"' she tells Samson of
her relationship with Asprey. Is the existence of London Fields perhaps
evidence that Mark Asprey's one good novel was not burnt but is in the
process of being written?
Although never a physical presence in the novel, Asprey's influence is
nevertheless powerful and consistent. As well as having initials to match
those at the foot of the authorial note, Asprey is a former(?) lover of Nicola Six
and a successful writer. He likes to taunt Samson (in notes which he signs
'M.A.'), and keeps constant tabs on him by entrusting him to the care of the
ever-watchful Incarnacion. Equally suspicious is the enigmatic nature of his
relationship with Nicola. Samson sees the photographic proof that their
relationship was not without its sadistic and masochistic elements (see above
for Amis to John Self on the author's sadistic impulses in Money ), and Nicola
confesses that '"[s]ome things are never over'" (LF, p.305).
Samson's suspicion that Asprey has set him up is thus supported by a
vast array of evidence. However, the narrator's judgements are distinctly
fallible. The credibility of Asprey as an authorial figure is, therefore,
201Ibid, p.138.
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dependent upon the absence of signs in the text to indicate that he, like both
Samson and Nicola, is merely another's creation. Therein lies the significance
of Asprey's non-appearance, in physical terms, in the text; only his writings
are present. Asprey never fully shares, for the reader, the same ontological
world as the other characters. The clinching clue, however, is Asprey's novel
Crossbone Waters. Here is the evidence, for both the reader and Samson, that
Asprey has in the past used literature to record his amorous conquests. The
pseudonym chosen for the book's author, 'Marius Appleby', creates a chinese-
box structure of authorship, with the reader (aware, of course, of the name
'Martin Amis' on the novel's dust-jacket) led to associate all three — Appleby,
Asprey and Amis — with a single, authorial 'M.A.'. This act involves a
conflation of the extradiegetic, diegetic and metadiegetic levels, at least in
terms of authorship, as Mark Asprey replaces the ostensible author of the
novel on the diegetic level, Samson, and is associated through his initials with
the metadiegetic and extradiegetic authors (Appleby and Amis, respectively).
If the novel is a whodunit, a literary game, then it is Mark Asprey ('M.A.')
who is guilty.
The last few pages have offered, as I indicated earlier, a textually-
generated misreading of the novel. In London Fields Martin Amis exploits the
contemporary temptation to view the novel as simply a game between the
author and the reader. It is, in a sense, the result of Amis's reflections on
Money:
Everyone in the book is a kind of artist - sack-artists, piss-artists,
con-artists, bullshit-artists — and perhaps this will lead on to
something Iwill understand and write about later.202
202Haffenden, p.5.
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But rather than make of this simultaneous profusion and degradation of
artists a puzzle based on the 'whodunit', Amis attempts to explore in London
Fields the historical developments and social conditions that have helped
shape contemporary literary conventions, and to analyse some of the political
and ethical implications of those assumptions. In the figures of Samson
Young and Mark Asprey, then, the reader is presented less with a choice of
author than with alternative understandings of the function or role of
literature in contemporary, late capitalist societies. The novel is less a search
than an enquiry: 'Not a whodunit,' as Samson writes in one of his few
moments of illumination. 'More a whydoit' (LF, p.3).
London Fields thus shares, as a central preoccupation, the theme of the
very possibility of an adequate literary response to a contemporary, capitalist
society that haunts the later fiction of Saul Bellow. It is therefore no mere
accident that its Jewish-American narrator, Samson Young, is so reminiscent,
so suggestive of Bellow's habitual protagonists. But the environment in
which Samson is placed is more fragmented, more overt in its threat to the
individual subject than that in which Bellow's characters are usually depicted.
In fact, it soon becomes clear to the reader — and later to Samson himself —
that Samson's attitudes and the essentially liberal humanist assumptions they
embody are hopelessly out of date. In London Fields the self is neither
alienated nor mocked by its social environment; instead, it has become the
flimsy construction of advertising hoardings and tabloid newspapers, no
longer able to situate itself at the distance from these social and cultural
artefacts that alienation would presuppose.
The character who most readily fits this model of the self as a
degraded, tabloid fiction is, of course, Keith Talent. As Samson explains:
It was the world of TV that told him what the world was. How
does all the TV time work on a modern person, a person like
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Keith? . .. TV came at Keith like it came at everybody else; and
he had nothing whatever to keep it out. He couldn't grade or
filter it. So he thought TV was real.... Of course, some of it was
real. Riots in Kazakhstan were real, stuff about antiques was
real (Keith watched these shows in a spirit of professional
dedication), mass suicide in Sun City was real. But so, to Keith,
was Syndicate, and Edzuin Drood: The Musical and Bow Bells and
The Dorm That Dripped Blood. (LF, p.55)
Samson may end up feeling 'seamless and insubstantial, like a creation', but in
comparison with Keith he initially appears the veritable model of the
autonomous individual subject. Keith's description to Guy of a football match
might seem to have come straight from the pages of a tabloid newspaper, but
to believe that Keith has simply committed the report to memory would be to
miss the extremity of the situation. Keith is not merely manipulated by the
media, he is fully reconstructed by it; for as Samson realises, 'When Keith
goes to a football match, that misery of stringer's cliches is wlzat he actually sees'
(LF, p.98).
Samson gradually becomes aware, while narrating, that the novel he is
attempting to write is out of place in this historical moment: 'It just never is
the time,' is his repeated lament. He aspires to forms of liberal humanism and
literary verisimilitude in an age in which those categories are held no longer
really to mean anything in themselves but, as in London Fields, appear as
pastiche, as the disinterested adoption of one mask among many. Rather than
actually representing a liberal humanistic author, Samson can only represent
a postmodern version or pastiche of one. He attempts to write a novel based
on real historical experience and employing the conventions of realism when
those conventions and the social assumptions on which they were historically
founded have shattered in the face of the same historical experiences that
Samson wishes to reflect. This paradox to which Samson's literary
endeavours (his 'London Fields') are subject is precisely that which we have
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seen in relation to Saul Bellow's fiction. Samson is therefore to be seen not
necessarily as one of Bellow's protagonists, but rather as a pastiche of Bellow
himself, or at least as the embodiment in a postmodern novel of the
assumptions and impulses intrinsic to Bellow's authorial craft.
Mark Asprey, on the other hand, is perfectly attuned to the
contemporary Zeitgeist and well aware of the redundancy of all that Samson
represents. The key to Asprey's attitude is to be found in the conclusion to
the note he leaves Samson, congratulating him on toiling his way 'to the crux
of the Cordelia Constantine business':
You don't understand, do you, my talentless friend? Even as
you die and rotwith envy. It doesn't matter what anyone writes
anymore. The time for it mattering has passed. The truth
doesn't matter anymore and is not wanted. (LF, p.452)
For Asprey, literature is no longer to be taken seriously, in the sense that it
bears no significant relation to external, social forces. His 'London Fields' is the
misreading of the novel that was summarised earlier: the novel as a
'whodunit', as a technical game leading to the identification of the 'author'.
According to this view, the successful reader is finally to be congratulated on
toiling his/her way to the crux of the Nicola Six business. But the
congratulations ring hollow, for if 'it doesn't matter what anyone writes any
more,' the author and the reader are involved in simply an economic
relationship and novels, as Mary Lamb in Other People conjectures, are merely
'lies, imagined for money, time sold'.203
Although Asprey denies that novels are seriously related to the social
realm or to historical experience, it is clear in London Fields that this very
denial is socially and culturally determined. Asprey is a writer for whom
commercial success is the prime motivation. He writes what Nicola calls
'schlock plays and cute journalism' (LF, p.434); and his bookshelves, as
203Amis, Other People, p.69.
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Samson discovers, are full of 'stuff like Good Bad Taste or Bad Good Taste or
Things You Love to Hate or Hate to Love' (LF, p.284). Like Fielding Goodney
in Money and Dewey Spangler in Bellow's The Dean's December — in fact, even
like London Fields' own redoubtable Keith Talent — Asprey is so much the
creation of his society that he is unable to summon so much as a critical
thought. The exposure of his superficiality, his fakeness — when, for example,
Nicola tells Samson, "'The gowns, the baubles, the awards and everything.
They're all fake.... Look at that translation. It's gobbledegook. He has them
printed up'" (LF, p.434) -- may perhaps acquire a more broadly cultural
significance. For if, as Fredric Jameson writes, 'It is safest to grasp the concept
of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age
that has forgotten how to think historically in the first place,'204 it might be
possible to read London Fields as an attempt to historicize the postmodern's
failed attempt to historicize itself. In this sense, Amis's novel might offer less
the critique of 'the conventionality and unacknowledged ideology' of the
realist novel that Linda Hutcheon associates with postmodern fiction than the
representation of a social and cultural condition of postmodernity informed
by the ambitions of nineteenth-century critical realism.
Also addressed in London Fields is the issue of the moral anxieties of
literary creation that the character Martin Amis raises in Money. Asprey
clearly transgresses moral boundaries: the writing of Crossbone Waters, which
its author describes as a 'story of natural love' ('natural love' is, of course,
what the Lolita-esque Debee Kensit gives Keith), is itself a shameless act, the
result of unmotivated malice. 'There is a type of person who is a handsome
liar, a golden mythomaniac, who lies for no reason, without motivation,' says
Amis. Although this is ostensibly a description of Fielding Goodney, it could
204Jameson, Postmodernism, p.ix.
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just as easily refer to Mark Asprey (or, for that matter, Quentin Villiers in
Dead Babies). Asprey's manipulation of Samson Young is similarly
unmotivated and significantly more malicious, but the moral status of his
actions is referred to neither by him nor by any of the other characters.
Ironically, it is of course Samson, the novel's greatest victim, who is
racked by moral anxiety. 'It seems to me that writing brings trouble with it,'
he confides, 'moral trouble, unexamined trouble. Even to the best' (LF, p.117).
The sickly sentimental letter that he leaves Kim Talent shows him attempting
to retain a notion of individual moral responsibility by claiming an authority
over the events narrated in the novel to which he knows he has no right:
'There was a sense in which I used everybody, even you.' It is the
unacceptability, the historical implausibility of sentiments such as these
which resonate at the novel's core.
Amis juxtaposes Samson Young and Mark Asprey in part to represent
exaggerated facets of his own writing. As he later insisted of the similarly
antagonised Richard Tull and Gwyn Barry in The Information: 'If anything,
both writers are me.'205 Accounting for something of the novel's realist
pretensions, Amis has identified one influence on the writing of London Fields
as the example of Dickens:
When I was writing about a future London in London Fields,
Dickens was the writer I thought of most.. .. [H]e likes to write
about the whole of society. He likes to see what links Lady
Dedlock and Joe the Sweep, and that's very much what I'm
interested in, too. He likes to see society as one thing,
mysteriously interdependent.206
Here Amis clearly signals a desire to represent what, in Lukacsian terms, is a
social totality. Yet, as we have already seen, these literary-realist desires,
205Nicci Gerrard, 'Martin Amis: The Year of Living Desperately', W, 5 (1996), p.5.
206'Martin Amis Interviewed by Christopher Bigsby', in Malcolm Bradbury & Judy Cooke,
eds., New Writing (London: Minerva, 1992), p.183.
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embodied in the figure of Samson Young, remain unfulfilled. Amis is
simultaneously subjecting his realist ambitions to the textual playfulness of
what Jameson identifies as the relief of the postmodern, while exposing
something of the social totality whose cultural logic is postmodernism. In this
sense, London Fields can be seen both to enact and to critique the cultural logic
of postmodernity, expressing perhaps that moment of historicized aesthetic
conflict of which postmodernism, for the critical theory of Western Marxism,
was supposed to be all but bereft.
And yet Amis's writing remains here, as in Money, predicated on the
need to distinguish between true aesthetic value (which is good) and fake art
(which is corrupt). In other words, there remains a strong association in
Amis's fiction of aesthetic and moral worth: the manipulative Asprey, for
example, must be characterised by his fakeness; his success is commercial
rather than artistic. Although both Samson and Asprey are subjected to irony,
it is Samson who retains some measure of sympathy. It might, then, be
questioned whether Amis in London Fields ever fully takes on board the
implications of the loss of aesthetic autonomy; he seems unwilling to
contemplate the need to revise an elevated perspective of "true" art. Just as in
the above discussion of Money, this issue will for now be left unresolved, to be
returned to finally in relation to Amis's most recent novel The Information. For
now, though, I'll turn to Time's Arroiv to look at the most sustained treatment
yet in Amis's fiction of the theme of artistic guilt.
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Time's Arrow: The Art of Justification
Reviewing Einstein's Monsters in the London Review of Books, John Lanchester
identified 'a new manner and a new range of concerns' in Amis's writing:
Its real imaginative focus is hard to pinpoint, but it is something
to do with the death of children — something to do with dead
babies. In any case, however Amis got into this subject, it's too
late now: he clearly hasn't finished with it, nor it with him.
Middle Amis is upon us.207
This judgement now seems remarkably prescient, for Amis's two subsequent
novels — London Fields and Time's Arrow -- make consistent use of the motif of
the child, employed both as a marker of vulnerability (as in Nabokov) and as
an implicit metaphor for the work of art, the novel itself. The novel-as-child
metaphor in London Fields is associated with the prospect of nuclear holocaust
and a contemporaneous literary fear of 'the death of the novel' (for Samson,
both reading and children presuppose a future; they go 'the other way'), but
the metaphor also leads to the association of the novel with destructiveness in
the form of Little Boy, the bomb that was exploded over Hiroshima. It is
probably in Time's Arrow, though, that these concerns are given their fullest
expression. Here Amis seems to be attempting to explore the very limits of
art's ability to transform our perception of historical events.
Its playfulness of form and narrative mimicry of film or videotape
running in reverse marks Time's Arrozv as a characteristically postmodern text.
(In this respect, the connection with Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughter-FIouse Five,
cited by Amis in his 'Afterword', is quite obvious.) The novel tells the story,
backwards, of the life of a Nazi doctor, a member of the medical staff in
Auschwitz who later (and, therefore, at the novel's outset) practices medicine
207John Lanchester, 'As a Returning Lord', London Review of Books, 7 May 1987, p.12.
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in the USA. The fact that it applies these features of textual play to the
writing or re-imagining of a historical narrative would also seem to identify
Time's Arrow with Linda Hutcheon's genre of historiographic metafiction.
Moreover, in common with the work of a number of postmodern writers,
Amis's novel also suggests a certain continuity between the rhetoric of Nazi
propaganda and the kitsch melodrama of American tabloid culture (a notable
feature, too, of Don DeLillo's writing — to be discussed in the following
chapter). The elderly Tod Friendly sits reading his American tabloid while
the narrator inside him reports its contents to the reader:
Greta Garbo, I read, has been reborn as a cat. All this stuff about
twins. A Nordic superrace will shortly descend from the cosmic
iceclouds; they will rule the earth for a thousand years. All this
stuff about Atlantis.208
Later in the novel, when Odilo (formerly Tod) has reached Auschwitz, Nazi
propaganda replays the messages he first read in the US:
In the clubroom I am told (I think I've got this right): Jews come
from monkeys (from Menschenaffen), as do Slavs and so on.
Germans, on the other hand, have been preserved in ice from
the beginning of time in the lost continent of Atlantis. This is
good to know. A meteorology division in the Ahnenerbe has
been looking into it. Officially these scientists are working on
long-range weather predictions, in fact, though, they are seeking
to prove the cosmic-ice theory once and for all.
It sounds familiar. Atlantis . . . twins and dwarfs. (TA,
p. 140)
The association of Nazi Germany with the trash culture of contemporary
America here serves to mock the pseudo-grandiosity of Nazi rhetoric,
bathetically exposing its kitschness. It is also, though, in the spirit of Adorno
and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment, identifying forms of
contemporary mass culture with political barbarism. The novel itself seems to
208Martin Amis, Time's Arrow (London: Cape, 1991), p.20. Hereafter, references to the novel
will be to this edition and marked in the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation TA.
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suggest that the contemporary culture of postmodernity, in which it is
situated, ought to be regarded with a degree of scepticism and suspicion.
This theme of the ambiguous moral and political status of the text is
expressed, as in London Fields, through the metaphor of the novel as child.
One of Tod's dreams is of a powerful baby who holds the power of life and
death over everyone around it. Its 'drastic ascendancy has to do with its
voice. Not its fat fists, its useless legs, but its voice, the sound it makes, its
capacity to weep' (TA, p.54). 'In here,' says the narrator, 'the baby is more like
a bomb' (TA, p.55). Sentimentality and force are unified in the figure of the
child; human concern and manipulation are made one. As well as referring to
the text itself, the baby is also a reference to the young Odilo Unverdorben.
As Frank Kermode writes, the impotent baby to which Tod/Odilo finally
regresses 'has a potential of evil so dreadful that one can think of it as a
bomb.'209 Both Odilo and the text are in some way as dangerous as Little Boy.
In London Fields, Samson Young dreams of telling the expectant Missy Harter
that he will give up his 'wicked book', but his book is not so wicked that it
transforms Auschwitz into a fantastical site where men, women and children
are born from the womb of the gas chambers or re-assembled on 'Uncle Pepi's'
operating table. It takes Time's Arrow, where '[c]reation is easy', to do that.
If we want to see why Amis should associate his text so strongly with
forces of destruction, it is necessary to look more closely at the way in which
Time's Arrow rewrites the history of the Nazis' Final Solution. The texts used
to shed further light on this aspect of the novel are, for the most part, those
cited by Amis in his 'Afterword' to Time's Arrozv: The Nazi Doctors by Robert
Jay Lifton; andIf This Is A Man, The Truce and The Drozvned and the Saved by
209Frank Kermode, 'In Reverse', London Review of Books, 12 September 1991, p.ll.
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Primo Levi. I will also refer, though perhaps less frequently, to Hannah
Arendt's classic study The Origins of Totalitarianism.
The narrative order of Time's Arrow, which I have thus far attributed to
the text's postmodernity, might also be ascribed to a mimetic impulse, a
narrative reflection of the process of remembering. As James Wood, in his
excellent review of the novel, writes:
The backwards momentum of the Nazi's life, narrates by a soul
who knows what has already happened, is not unlike the way in
which a guilty man (say a Nazi war criminal) goes back, again
and again, over past crimes. Memory, especially guilty
memory, forces us to live our lives backwards.210
However, it would be wrong to believe that the narrator, who forWood is the
Nazi's soul, comes to any true understanding of what Odilo has actually
done. The backward repetition of the events of Odilo's life, dictated perhaps
by guilty memory, here leads only to an obscene distortion of the facts: 'The
world, after all,, here in Auschwitz, has a new habit,' insists the narrator. 'It
makes sense' (TA, p.138). Rather than offering a morally-informed
perspective on the acts committed by Odilo in Auschwitz, the narrative of
Time's Arrow conforms more closely to the example of how Nazi doctors and
camp functionaries have in memoirs sought to excuse or justify their actions.
In her preface to the second edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah
Arendt offers the following comments on such "literature":
I left out, without regret, the rather voluminous literature of
memoirs published by Nazi and other German functionaries
after the end of the war. The dishonesty of this kind of
apologetics is obvious and embarrassing but understandable,
whereas the lack of comprehension they display of what
actually happened, as well as of the roles the authors themselves
played in the course of events, is truly astonishing.211
210James Wood, 'Slouching towards Auschwitz to be born again', Guardian, 'Review Section',
19 September 1991, p.9.
211 Hannah Arendt, The Origins ofTotalitarianism, 2nd edn., trans. Therese Pol (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1958), p.xii.
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A more specific model for the absence of moral awareness in Time's
Arrow is to be found in Robert Jay Lifton's The Nazi Doctors, a book without
which Amis's novel, as he confesses, 'would not and could not be written.'
Lifton's approach is psychohistorical: he is interested the psychological states
necessitated and formed by specific historical crises. In The Nazi Doctors he
reports lengthy interviews carried out with those who put into effect the
Nazis' genocidal biological programme. From these interviews, Lifton
attempts to formulate the general principles of what he calls 'the psychology
of genocide'. Early in the book, he reveals one of the most striking features
common to all the interviews:
Some part of these men wished to be heard: they had things to
say that most of them had never said before, least of all to
people around them. Yet none of them -- not a single former
Nazi doctor I spoke to — arrived at a clear ethical evaluation of
what he had done, and what he had been part of. They could
examine events in considerable detail, even look at feelings and
speak generally with surprising candour - but almost in the
manner of a third person. The narrator, morally speaking, was
not quite present.212
Lifton's judgement is similar to Arendt's, but it is these two concluding
sentences, in which he hints at the reason why there is no 'clear ethical
evaluation' of their crimes, that offer one of the keys to understanding the
mode of narration in Time's Arrow.
The narrator of Amis's novel is the 'Auschwitz self created by Odilo to
allow him to carry out his genocidal duties unsullied or, as his name suggests,
unspoilt. Lifton writes of the Nazi doctors' practice of doubling, 'the formation
of a second, relatively autonomous self, which enables one to participate in
evil' (ND, p.6). This second self he calls the 'Auschwitz self, explaining that
212Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology ofGenocide (London:
Papermac, 1987), p.8. Further references to the textwill be to this edition and will hereafter
be marked in the main text by the prefix ND.
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this in a sense replaces the original self, thereby allowing the doctor to
convince himself of his own innocence. 'In doubling,' he adds,
one part of the self "disavows" another part. What is repudiated
is not reality itself — the individual doctor was aware of what he
was doing via the Auschwitz self — but the meaning of that
reality. The Nazi doctor knew that he selected, but did not
interpret selection as murder. (ND, p.422)
It is precisely this distortion of the significance of historical acts and events
that the narration of Time's Arroiv is made to reflect.
The result of Amis's narrative strategy is an intensification of the
novel's reflection of Auschwitz from the Nazi doctor's perspective, at least in
as far as that perspective is described by Lifton. After all, perhaps the
principal (and probably the most shocking) consequence of the narrative's
inversion of past and future is the inversion of healing and killing represented
in the text. The narrator describes seeing 'an old Jew float to the surface of the
deep latrine, how he splashed and struggled into life, and was hoisted out by
jubilant guards, his clothes cleansed by the mire' (TA, p.132). His world is
that of the healing mugger and rapist, where 'violence is salutary'. The novel
thus dramatises a world in accordance with what Lifton identifies as the
"'healing" claim' of the Nazi regime: the 'reversal of healing and killing,' he
writes, 'became an organizing principle' of the Nazi doctors' work (ND,
pp.xii-xiii). The same reversal is so similarly central to Time's Arrozu that
some of Lifton's descriptions look as though they could be summaries of
passages from Amis's novel. For example:
[The Nazi doctor] is a recognized healer with special powers; his
killing is legitimated by, and at the same time further
legitimates, the regime's overall healing-killing reversals. Thus
it became quite natural to use a vehicle marked with a red cross
to transport gas, gassing personnel, and sometimes victims, to
the gas chambers. (ND, 431)
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What this reversal achieved was 'the destruction of the boundary
between healing and killing' (ND, p. 14). The binary opposition is here
nullified, as it is in Time's Arrow, by the process of inversion. Furthermore,
Lifton explicitly states that the destruction of this boundary was dependent
upon the medical staffs fictional interpretation of their situation. He writes
that those whose job was to kill children in mental hospitals 'proceeded as if
these children were to receive the blessings of medical science, were to be
healed rather than killed' (ND, p.54). To show how this fictional "as if"
operated, he refers to a Dr. Heinze, who later excused his actions in court by
claiming that a fatal overdose might have to be prescribed in order to ensure
that an excitable child would "'avoid endangering itself through its own
restlessness'". Lifton argues that the psychological adoption of this fiction
. i
was so effective and so widespread that it
is quite possible that Dr Heinze not only was consciously lying,
but was enabled by the medicalization of the murders partly to
deceive himself: to come to believe, at least at moments, that the
children were being given some sort of therapy, and that their
deaths were due to their own abnormality. (ND, p.54)
Just as the reversal of time's arrow inverts the healing/killing
opposition, this inversion naturally extends itself to the roles of the healer and
the persecutor. Early in Time's Arrow it is Tod and his American colleagues
who inflict violence: Tod, we are told, rubs dirt in the prostitutes' wounds
'before the longsuffering pimp shows up and knocks the girls into shape with
his jewelled fists' (TA, pp.39-40). Later, as John Young, his violence is more
extreme:
Some guy comes in with a bandage around his head. We don't
mess about. We'll soon have that off. He's got a hole in his
head. So what do we do. We stick a nail in it. (TA, p.85)
When he reaches Auschwitz, however, as Odilo Unverdorben, his role
changes to that of healer. The "patients" he treats are remarkably compliant
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with all his treatments, though some seem less than grateful afterwards. Even
then, though, there are exceptions: 'an old man hugging and kissing my black
boots; a child clinging to me after I held her down for 'Uncle Pepi" (TA,
p. 144).
This depiction of the Jews and Nazis as complicit in the experience of
the camp indirectly reflects the way in which, according to Lifton, Nazi
doctors would attempt to involve prisoner doctors in the murderous process
of selection:
To the extent that they could succeed in tainting those they
ruled over, they felt themselves to be less tainted. In that way
they could blur, at least for themselves, distinctions between
victimizer and victim, between physician jailer and physician
prisoner. (ND, p.218)
It is precisely this distinction that is blurred in Amis's choice of Odilo's
surname: Unverdorben. A literal translation would be "unspoilt" or
"undepraved". More importantly, however, it alludes to two historical
figures, one a Nazi doctor and the other a camp inmate. Eduard Wirths was
the chief doctor in Auschwitz who, because of his comparative mildness and
compassion, was given the nickname "Dr. Unbliitig" (Dr. Unbloody). Primo
Levi, on the other hand, writes in The Truce of 'a mild touchy little man from
Trieste' called Mr. Unverdorben who, recalls Levi, 'had survived the Birkenau
Lager.'213 Not only are Odilo Unverdorben's actions in Auschwitz
transformed by the novel into those of a miraculous healer, but his very name
symbolically undermines the distinction between victim and persecutor. Levi
himself, in one of the books Amis cites as an influence on his novel, comments
at some length on the blurring of this distinction:
213Primo Levi, IfThis Is A Man and The Truce, trans. StuartWoolf (Harmondsworth: Abacus,
1987), p.275.
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This mimesis, this identification or imitation, or exchange of
roles between oppressor and victim, has provoked much
discussion....
I am not an expert of the unconscious or the mind's
depths, but I do know that few people are experts in this sphere,
and that these few are the most cautious; I do not know, and it
does not much interest me to know, whether in my depths there
lurks a murderer, but I do know that I was a guiltless victim and
I was not a murderer. I know that the murderers existed, not
only in Germany, and still exist, retired or on active duty, and
that to confuse them with their victims is a moral disease or an
aesthetic affectation or a sinister sign of complicity; above all, it
is a precious service rendered (intentionally or not) to the
negators of truth.214
Levi here touches on one of the central elements underpinning Time's Arrow:
that the means by which we interpret or attempt to represent a historical
situation are themselves open to moral and ideological critique.
Before turning to the analytical self-reflexivity of Amis's novel, it is
important to acknowledge the extent to which language itself was directly
implicated in the Nazi programme. 'A leading scholar of the Holocaust,'
writes Robert Lifton,
told of examining "tens of thousands" of Nazi documents
without once encountering the word "killing", until after many
years he finally did discover the word — in reference to an edict
concerning dogs. (ND, p.445)
Lifton lists the euphemisms employed in Auschwitz to disguise what was
really happening. Doctors there, he claimed, spoke not of executions but of
'ramp duty', 'medical ramp duty', 'prisoners presenting themselves to a
doctor', 'evacuation', 'transfer' and 'resettlement'. The psychological effect of
this language is clear:
[it] gave Nazi doctors a discourse in which killing was no longer
killing.... As they lived increasingly within that language - and
they used it with each other — Nazi doctors became
214Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (London: Abacus, 1989),
pp.32-33.
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imaginatively bound to a psychic realm of derealization,
disavowal, and nonfeeling. (ND, p.445)
This is reflected, in Time's Arrow, in the naming of the gas chamber and
sprinkleroom as 'the central hospital' (TA, p.133). More significantly, though,
the whole novel represents 'a discourse in which killing was no longer
killing'. The title of Primo Levi's The Drowned and the Saved is a reference to
the victims and survivors of the death camps. Time's Arrow draws on the
description in The Nazi Doctors of how language, too, was victimised, taken
apart and reassembled for ideological purposes: 'What was she saying, Irene,
what was she going on about, in words half saved, half drowned — in gasps
and whispers?' (TA, p.44).
The bilingual puns, the cartoon names, the playfulness of form and
intertextuality all surely indicate to the reader the text's self-reflexivity. The
arbitrariness and ease with which the text resurrects the victims of Auschwitz
suggests that here death is merely a textual predicament. At the moment of
selection, the narrator describes 'fathers, mothers, children, the old scattered
like leaves in the wind. Die... die Auseinandergeschrieben' (TA, p. 141). As well
as playing on the English "die", the last phrase translates literally into "the
written apart" and links with the earlier claim that, when Odilo first arrived at
the camp, '[h]uman life was all ripped and torn' (TA, p.124). It is also,
however, a more specific reference to Paul Celan's poem 'Engfiihrung' (the
following are the first two stanzas only):
Verbracht ins
Gelande
mit der untriiglichen Spur:
Gras, auseinandergeschrieben. Die Steine, weiss,
mit den Schatten der Halme:
Lies nicht mehr - schau!
Schau nicht mehr - geh!215
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Celan describes the landscape here as textual. Those driven into that
landscape, then, are also driven into a text; they are textualized. It is the
violence of this process of textualization in Time's Arrow that Amis's narrative
here acknowledges in its definition of the Jews to be murdered as die
Auseinandergeschrieben: the written asunder.
The construction of Amis's novel reflects not only the perspective of a
Nazi doctor but also the cultural dominant of postmodernism. In this sense,
the novel as a whole reinforces that association of a contemporary, late
capitalist, tabloid culture with the rhetoric of Nazi propaganda referred to
earlier. Time's Arrow may be read as a specifically postmodern attempt to
rewrite the history of the Holocaust which simultaneously foregrounds the
ways in which that rewriting reflects the Nazi justification of the act in the
first place. Thus, the backwards order of narration is determined by both its
focalization through Odilo's Auschwitz self and its imitation of a video or film
running in reverse (as in Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five). It would seem,
then, that Time's Arrozv is at least in part offering a critical dramatisation of a
specifically postmodern reworking of historical phenomena.
The reader of Amis's novel is made to undergo a process of
disorientation that is also to some extent a reflection of the cognitive
dislocation of Nazi doctors in the synthetic environment of the camps:
215Paul Celan, 'Engfuhrung', Gesammelte Werke, Vol. l(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), pp.197-




with the unmistakable track:
grass, written asunder. The stones, white
with the shadows of grassblades:
Do not read any more - look!
Do not look any more - go!
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Doctors assigned there, then, had limited contact with anything
but Auschwitz reality. They became preoccupied with adapting
themselves to that reality, and moral revulsion could be
converted into feelings of discomfort, unhappiness, anxiety and
despair. Subjective struggles could replace moral questions.
They became concerned not with the evil of the environment but
with how to come to terms with the place. (TA, pp.198-199)
Hannah Arendt also emphasises this feature of the camps, though with
regard to their intended effect on prisoners. She writes that the total
domination which could be practiced there depended 'on sealing off [the
camps] against the world of all others, the world of the living in general.'216 It
would seem no mere coincidence that the main camp of Auschwitz appeared
to Primo Levi as 'a boundless metropolis'.217 Time's Arrow reproduces this
feature of a sealed-off environment through the inverted temporal order of its
»
narration. The reader's need to locate him/herself in the disorientating
textual environment of the novel thus creates a literary analogy for the spatial
confusion of both the prisoners and personnel of the camps.
But if the novel's reliance on an internal logic sealed-off from the
outside world associates it with the Lager, it also identifies Amis's text with
the creation of what Fredric Jameson calls 'postmodern hyperspace'. In his
analysis of postmodern architecture, Jameson discusses the Westin
Bonaventure Hotel in Los Angeles. He compares it with a number of other
characteristically postmodern buildings (e.g. the Beaubourg in Paris; the
Eaton Centre in Toronto) and argues that, in common with them, the
Bonaventure 'aspires to being a total space, a complete world, a kind of
miniature city.'218 The effect on the individual subject who has entered one of
these buildings is, I think, comparable to that experienced on one level by the
216Arendt, p.438.
217Levi, IfThis Is A Man, p.194.
218Jameson, Postmodernism, p.40.
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reader of Time's Arrow, who has imaginatively entered an environment in
which Auschwitz 'makes sense':
... this latest mutation in space — postmodern hyperspace — has
finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the
individual human body to locate itself, to organize its
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map
its position in a mappable external world.219
Just as for both Arendt and Lifton the concentration camp is designed to
overwhelm, or perhaps to short-circuit, the ability of the individual (whether
prisoner or functionary) to comprehend the events that take place with any
degree of moral or political awareness, 'postmodern hyperspace' effects a
similar confusion of the means by which we relate ourselves to the social and
cultural forms that surround us.
Time's Arrow does not simply assert a simplistic equation of a Nazi past
and the postmodern present, but (like Don DeLillo's White Noise -- to be
discussed in Chapter 3) rather exposes, while simultaneously exemplifying,
the inadequacy of the postmodern reimagining of history. Like London Fields,
it indulges in the relief of the postmodern — here, moulding its narrative form
to one reminiscent of the capabilities of video — while silently implying regret
for all that the celebration of textual play leaves unacknowledged.
Again reasserting the mimetic element of the novel's inversion of
narrative order, James Wood writes that '[t]he Nazis first attempted to turn
the Holocaust into a Utopian narrative, not Amis.'220 The reproduction of that
narrative is not, though, in Western Marxist terms, the Utopian element of
Amis's text. 'The ideology in a great work,' writes Ernst Bloch, 'reflects and
justifies its times, the Utopia in it rips open the times.'221 The irony of Time's
219Ibid, p.44.
220Wood, 'Slouching toward Auschwitz', p.9.
221 Ernst Bloch, 'Art and Society', in The Utopian Function ofArt and Literature: Selected Essays,
trans. Jack Zipes & Frank Mecklenburg (London: Mit, 1989), p.39.
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Arrow lies in its suggestion that it is its Utopian reclamation of the history of
the Holocaust that is most thoroughly ideological, reenacting in the cultural
forms of the contemporary a rhetoric of past justifications.
In contrast, the Utopian aspect of Amis's novel can be situated in the
continuously (and guiltily) implied expression of what it can never quite
openly acknowledge: namely, the horror of its own aesthetic mutilation of a
narrative of others' suffering. Time's Arrow relies for its power on the reader's
appreciation of how its narrative has distorted the history of the Endlosung.
'A dream of reversal, of reconstruction: who has not, in the fifty years since
the European devastation, swum off into this dream?' asks Cynthia Ozick.
'As if the reel of history ~ and who does not see history as tragic cinema? —
could be run backward;'222 but Time's Arrow suggests that that dream had
*
been dreamt at the outset, had in fact helped to anaesthetise the doctors to the
peculiarity of their work. It is in the incidental details — the motif of the
deadly child; the words 'half drowned, half saved'; 'die Auseinandergeschrieben'
-- that the novel signals some acknowledgement of its guilty ideological
complicity, expressing something of the guilt and remorse that has been
banished from the narrator's account.
The end of Time's Arroiv is signalled as a boundary point, a point of
disorientation as we move out of the novel's textual world. Keats' final line in
'Ode to a Nightingale' -- 'Fled is that music - Do I wake or sleep?' — conveys
the giddy uncertainty of the speaker's state of consciousness as the poem is
brought to a close. Amis's narrator too, is confused as the novel finishes, but
his uncertainty is temporal. The arrow of time reverses again as the text slips
away and a new form of reality rushes on to greet us:
Beyond, before the slope of pine, the lady archers are gathering
with their targets and bows. Above, a failing-vision kind of
222Cynthia Ozick, What Henry James Knew (London: Vintage, 1994), p.323.
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light, with the sky fighting down its nausea. Its many nuances
of nausea. When Odilo closes his eyes I see an arrow fly — but
wrongly. Point-first. Oh no, but then . . . We're away once
more, over the field. Odilo Unverdorben and his eager heart.
And I within, who came at the wrong time — either too soon, or
after it was all too late. (TA, p.173)
The narrator, disorientated and confused, disappears with Odilo, leaving the
reader to make his/her necessary departure from the text. Amis is aware,
though, that his reader has been outside the text all along, measuring up
his/her knowledge of the history of the Holocaust to Time's Arrow's
distortions.
This suggests the limits to ideological domination, the inability of a
textualised postmodern hyperspace ever to absorb our cognitive faculties
totally; in fact, Time's Arrow implies the coexistence in the postmodern of the
playful regurgitation of the past and the retention of some necessary historical
memory to which the former must eventually appeal. As well as retaining,
then, in bothMoney and London Fields, some necessary distinction between the
values of the aesthetic and the market, Amis's writing also seems to insist on
an identifiable, external reality which art transforms, thereby disavowing
(whether in an act of critique or evasion) the claims of the postmodern to the
dissolution of those very distinctions. A postmodern novel, Time's Arrow
implies the necessity of its own ideology critique; but it does so by making a
seemingly unpostmodern assumption, that there is an external space outwith
cultural representation by which those representations might be judged.
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Conclusion: Escape from Amelior
Each of the three preceding studies of Money, London Fields and Time's Arrow
has concluded with the acknowledgement of an aesthetic dilemma left
unresolved. The significance of these can be summarised in the following
fashion: it seems unclear, throughout Amis's novel-writing, whether he is
truly writing from within the social and cultural condition of postmodernity
he depicts, or whether, despite that depiction, his writing attempts to
maintain a modernist aloofness as the repository of some form of "humane"
value. It seems to me that, at least in part, this latter aspect of Amis's writing
is closely connected to his reading or interpretations of both Bellow and
Nabokov. In order to come to some greater understanding of those tensions
within Amis's work, it might, then, be worthwhile looking at those aspects of
Bellow's and Nabokov's writing that he has signalled as particularly
pertinent.
Borrowing Northrop Frye's genealogy of literary protagonists, Amis
discusses in a review of The Dean's December what he sees as one of Bellow's
most singular traits as a late twentieth-century novelist:
The heroes of Saul Bellow's major novels are intellectuals; they
are also (if you follow me) heroes, which makes Bellow doubly
remarkable. In thumbnail terms, the original protagonists of
literature were gods; later, they were demigods; later still, they
were kings, generals, fabulous lovers, at once superhuman,
human, and all too human; eventually they turned into ordinary
people. The twentieth century has been called an ironic age, as
opposed to a heroic, tragic or romantic one; even realism, rock-
bottom realism, is felt to be a bit grand for the twentieth century.
Nowadays, our protagonists are a good bit lower down the
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human scale than their creators: they are anti-heroes, non-
heroes, sub-heroes.223
For Amis, Bellow's protagonists 'represent the author at the full pitch of
cerebral endeavour.' 'This careful positioning,' he adds, 'allows Bellow to
write in a style fit for heroes: the High Style. To evolve an exalted voice
appropriate to the twentieth century has been the self-imposed challenge of
his work.'224 This reading of Bellow is surely also a misreading, a failure to
appreciate how well attuned Bellow is to the rhythms and varieties of
everyday American vernacular. It also ignores, or at least seems to, the extent
to which the perspectives of Bellow's intellectuals are subject to critique or
revision in light of the dialogues into which they enter with those of his more
worldly characters. For example, Charlie Citrine of Humbolt's Gift is
simultaneously repulsed and fascinated by the gangster (or hoodlum) world
of Rinaldo Cantabile: 'As soon as I saw Rinaldo Cantabile at George Swiebel's
kitchen table,' narrates Charlie, 'I was aware that a natural connection existed
between us.'225 Later, reflecting on his estranged wife's financial demands
and legal manoeuvres: 'What if Cantabile had the right idea after all — run her
down in a truck, kill the bitch.'226 Equally, despite the intelligence and acuity
of Victor Wulpy's social and cultural analyses in 'What Kind of Day Did You
Have?' (the lengthiest of the stories collected in Him With His Foot In His
Mouth), most readers can hardly fail to be struck by his thoughtless and
callous mistreatment of his mistress Katrina Goliger.227 The story ends with
Katrina nearing emotional collapse. In Bellow's most powerful writing, the
intellectual and emotional force is generated by the suggestion that there
223Amis, 'Saul Bellow', p.5. For the literary-critical model Amis adapts here, see Northrop
Frye, Anatomy ofCriticism: Four Essays (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1990), p.34.
224Ibid
225Saul Bellow, Humbolt's Gift (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976; repr. 1979), p.91.
226Ibid, p.230.
227See Saul Bellow, 'What Kind of Day Did You Have?', in Him With His Foot In His Mouth
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), pp.63-163.
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might be some emotional or practical inadequacy to the perspectives and
actions of his protagonists. Those characters might, as Amis argues,
'represent the author at the full pitch of cerebral endeavour', but the
generosity of Bellow's art lies in its frequent dramatisation of the limitations
and failings of that endeavour. By elevating the cultural aficionados who
people Bellow's novels, Amis's reading of Bellow would seem blind to the
richness and pathos of much of Bellow's best writing.
Moreover, in most of his own fiction Amis avoids like the plague the
depth of scepticism toward culture that we find given expression in Bellow's
novels. Instead, as in Money, aesthetic and moral value become entwined.
The novels can retain a didactic edge which needn't be explicitly stated, as it is
expressed through a form of aestheticism. 'Style,' claims Amis, 'is not neutral;
«
it gives moral directions.'228 In this sense, Amis's writing (in particular Money
and, as we shall see, The Information) can be described in terms remarkably
similar to those Erich Auerbach uses to discuss Flaubert:
Though men come together for business and pleasure, their
coming together has no note of united activity; it becomes one¬
sided, ridiculous, painful, and it is charged with
misunderstanding, vanity, futility, falsehood, and stupid hatred.
But what the world would really be, the world of the
"intelligent," Flaubert never tells us; in his book the world
consists of pure stupidity, which completely misses true reality,
so that the latter should properly not be discoverable in it at all;
yet it is there; it is in the writer's language, which unmasks the
stupidity by pure statement; language, then, has criteria for
stupidity and thus also has a part in that reality of the
"intelligent" which otherwise never appears in the book 229
Or, as James Wood writes of Amis's novels: 'The prose, not the world,





Unlike Bellow, though, Amis peoples his novels principally with con-
men, manipulators, 'golden mythomaniacs' like Fielding Goodney and
Quentin Villiers. The 'heroes' that he sees in Bellow's fiction are
conspicuously absent from Amis's novels. Instead, he depicts fake artists
who, as he describes Nabokov's Humbert Humbert, 'because they cannot
make art out of life, make their lives into art.' The moral transgressions of
these characters are of course never allowed to cast into serious doubt the
intrinsic value of true art; in fact, their very fakeness consolidates the
association of the aesthetic and the moral. Amis's use of characters such as
these is clearly informed by his reading of Nabokov. It is interesting to note
that, again, this reading is extremely selective and tells us perhaps more about
the priorities of Amis's artistic concerns than about the novels of Nabokov.
In direct contrast to Amis's interpretation of Nabokov, Richard Rorty
describes Lolita and Pale Fire as
reflections on the possibility that there can be sensitive killers,
cruel aesthetes, pitiless poets — masters of imagery who are
content to turn the lives of other human beings into images on a
screen, while simply not noticing that people are suffering.231
Kinbote, he claims, is a better writer than John Shade. Humbert, too, 'is
exactly as good a writer, exactly as much of an artist, capable of creating
exactly as much iridescent ecstasy, as Nabokov himself.'232 This reading of
Nabokov's two major protagonists, which runs counter not only to Amis's
interpretation but to the general thrust of Nabokov's own critical writings, is
one I find particularly convincing. The cruelty of Humbert's and Kinbote's
neglect of others' suffering need not, for Rorty, lead us to identify them as
failed artists. Rather, he writes, Nabokov's novels dramatise the absence of




might be thought to have.233 If this is true, what seems in Amis's writing an
allusory motif -- all those fake artists pointing us back to the cruel pseudo-
artistry of Humbert Humbert — is in fact, though probably influenced by
Nabokov's Lectures on Literature, a far more singular trait of Amis's fiction, one
which reinforces the lengths to which he will go in order to preserve an
elevated moral status for art and the artist.
And yet in Amis's most recent writing there has been something of a
minor revision in his dramatisation of artistic status. Gwyn Barry in The
Information is drawn along something of the same lines as Mark Asprey of
London Fields. Gwyn, though, is successful both commercially and critically.
Whilst the translations of Mark Asprey's works found in his apartment in
London Fields are 'gobbledegook', printed privately, Richard Tull is horrified
to discover in The Information the extent to which his rival has become a figure
of Weltliteratur:
He really didn't mind the central space-platform of floppy discs
and X-ray lasers. What he minded were Gwyn's books: Gwyn's
books, which multiplied or ramified so crazily now. Look on
the table, and what do you find? The lambent horror of Gwyn
in Spanish (sashed with quotes and reprint updates) or an
American book-club or supermarket paperback, or something in
Hebrew or Mandarin or cuneiform or pictogram that seemed
blameless enough, but had no reason to be there if it wasn't one
of Gwyn's. And then Gallimard and Mondadori and Alberti
and Zsolnay and Uigeverij Contact and Kawade Shobo and
Magveto Konyvkiado.234
Gwyn's writing, Amis's narrator assures us, is 'no good'. 'Clearly,' he adds,
'but not demonstrably' (I, p.137). Mark Asprey may have been guilty of
writing 'cute journalism' but there is, it seems, nothing quite so cutesy as
Gwyn Barry's Profundity Requital-winning, worldwide bestselling Amelior:
233Ibid, p.168.
234Martin Amis, The Information (London: Flamingo, 1995), pp.19-20. Hereafter, references
will be to this edition and will be marked in the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation I.
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If Richard had chortled his way through Summertozvn, he
cackled and yodelled his way through Amelior. its cuteness, its
blandness, its naively pompous semi-colons, its freedom from
humour and incident, its hand-me-down imagery, the almost
endearing transparency of its colour schemes, its tinkertoy
symmetries . . . What was it 'about', Amelior? It wasn't
autobiographical: it was about a group of fair-minded young
people who, in an unnamed country, strove to establish a rural
community. And they succeeded. And then it ended. (J, p.43)
Nonetheless, Amelior establishes Gwyn as a major literary figure. Here,
perhaps for the first time in his fiction, Amis explores the possibility that
literary or artistic value might not be intrinsic but the construct of historical
circumstances. And who is to say that he might not get away with it? 'Gwyn,
or Amelior, was even/body's favourite,' writes Amis. 'Or nobody's aversion.
Amelior was something like the missionary position plus simultaneous
orgasm' (/, p.137). The fear that haunts Richard Tull is less that of Gwyn's
present success than the possibility that what he has written might last, that
he may have inadvertently given expression to something universal.
Amelior, as the title suggests (ameliorate, ameliorative), is an example
of naively "improving" literature. In this respect, the hyperbolic disdain that
Amis shows in his interview with Val Hennesey for 'the sociological view' of
literature is instructive. A brief description makes clear that Amelior is a novel
suffused with a deadly anodyne political correctness:
Every racial group was represented, the usual rainbow
plus a couple of superexotic extras — an Inuit, an Amerindian,
even a taciturn Aborigine. Each of them boasted a serious but
non-disfiguring affliction: Piotr had haemophilia, Conchita
endometriosis, Sachine colitis, Eagle Woman diabetes. Of this
twelve, naturally, six were men and six were women; but the
sexual characteristics were deliberately hazed. The women
were broad-shouldered and thin-hipped. The men tended to be
comfortably plump. In the place called Amelior, where they
had come to dwell, there was no beauty, no humour and no
incident; there was no hate and there was no love. (/, p.139)
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For all its apparent celebration of difference, what Gwyn's novel seems to
have excluded is any sense of distinctiveness. In Amelior, egalitarianism has
been transformed into an oppressive sameness. There are no fine distinctions
to be made, no nuanced judgements to be reached. Amelior, having bought
literally and wholesale the rhetoric of a confused political correctness, is a
novel quite utterly free of discrimination. It is also worth noting how this
"improving" form of literature differs so markedly from the literary morality
that Amis espouses. Amis values, instead, the importance of detail in
literature, the way in which it forces us to notice things we might otherwise
pass over. In fact, it is in the very power to discriminate, the insistence on the
necessity of subtle distinctions and curious details that Amis locates the
morality of literature.
c
This explains, in part, what often seems the most reactionary elements
of Amis's comedy. Here we find Richard Tull in the offices of Bold Agenda,
being told the heart-warming story of how John Two Moons got his name:
'Well. You know how Native Americans get their names.'
'I think so. It's the first thing the dad sees.'
'Right. Now. The night John Two Moons was born there
was this beautiful full moon, and his father
'Was drunk,' suggested Richard.
'Excuse me?'
'Was drunk. And saw two moons. Well they are meant
to be incredible drunks, aren't they? Native Americans? I
mean, we're bad enough but they ...'
'. . . And — and his father walked out, by the lake, and
saw the full moon reflected in the water.' (/, pp.301-302)
Amis is dependent on his reader's willingness to find funny this way of
puncturing the cosy assumptions of American political correctness. The
comedy, of course, is aimed not at Native Americans, but at the humourless
iconoclasts of Bold Agenda Inc., left aghast that anyone could even think such
a thing in this day and age. Just as he seems determined to hold on to some
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form of art's distinctiveness, some perhaps outdated measure of aesthetic
autonomy, Amis also seems compelled to insist repeatedly on giving
expression to biases and prejudices shunned by genteel society, suggesting
that to ignore these attitudes and the class, gender or racial distinctions on
which they are based is to miss an important facet of contemporary
experience in the ludicrous pretence that such things no longer exist. The
attempt to retain some sense of what is distinctive, in both aesthetic and social
terms, is a prime motivating feature of Amis's writing and also accounts for at
least something of the old-fashioned, outdated or apparently reactionary
elements of his fiction.
Gwyn Barry is not, though, depicted as a credible artistic figure.
Although he clearly gets closer to this than many of Amis's characters, the
bland superficiality of Amelior is made too horribly palpable to the reader for
any serious doubts to linger. The critical dismissal in The Information of
Gwyn's novel is ultimately too convincing for the reader to be allowed some
suspicion of the possible literary worth of Amelior. There is another way in
which The Information offers a clue to Gwyn Barry's artistic inadequacies, but
that will be discussed later. For the moment, we turn to Richard Tull to see a
more familiar treatment of failure in Amis's writing.
Richard Tull writes but, generally, is not read. Ironically, given his
almost mandarin allegiance to the cause of high culture, the figure from
Amis's previous fiction that Richard most resembles is John Self. Like Self, he
is trapped in what appears at times an exercise in authorial sadism. The more
that Richard attempts to manipulate circumstances and plot the downfall of
his old friend Gwyn Barry, the surer is his own eventual humiliation. Plots, it
seems, have never been his strong suit. The most obvious example of how his
actions work against his interests is probably his misplaced attempt to
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influence the Profundity Requital jurists. By Richard's own criteria, the
attempts to sully Gwyn's name can only really make the work look richer and
more interesting than it is. The way in which he condescends to the jurors,
assuming them to share the embarrassingly naive social and literary priorities
of the Bold Agenda radicals, sets the scene for an easy inversion by Amis:
what had appeared bland and simplistic now takes on the demeanour of a
hard-won literary grace under pressure.
More significantly, though, there are linguistic games that Richard
seems unaware are even being played. Gal Aplanalp, the agent with whom
Gwyn sets Richard up, is a common acquaintance from the past. Her name,
then, cannot signal a plot hatched by Gwyn himself, but is part of the author's
sadistic tease: Aplanalp is a hardly hidden Plan A, whichever way she is read.
The successful publication of Untitled, Richard Tull's novel, is thereby
signalled in advance as a foretaste of Richard's further suffering, a mirror-
image of his plans to hurt Gwyn Barry ('Of TV fame'). Nor does Richard see
anything wrong with the name of his prospective editor at Bold Agenda: Roy
Biv. Only later can he be made to understand:
'Roy Biv! Tell me. Did he ever sign himself Roy G. Biv? ... He
changed his name to that. If you were American, you'd
understand. It's a mnemonic. The rainbow. Red, orange,
yellow, green. Blue, indigo, violet. He wanted to please
everyone. That's Roy. Poor Roy.' (I, p.387)
Richard Tull simply doesn't notice.
The most important example, though, is Demi's confession that Gwyn
'can't write for toffee.' 'Demi's linguistic quirk,' we are told,
is essentially and definingly female. It just is. Drawing in
breath to denounce this proposition, women will often come out
with something like 'Up you!' or 'Ballshit!' For I am referring to
Demi's use of the conflated or mangled catchphrase ~ Demi's
speech-bargains: she wanted two for the price of one. The result
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was expressive, and you usually knew what she meant, given
the context. (I, p.257)
Richard has presumably had dealings with Demi in this mode before, but on
this occasion he has blinded himself to the possibility that Demi means Gwyn
can't write for peanuts, that he has to get paid something. It is ironic that it is
in linguistic matters that Richard's failings are so mercilessly exploited. Like
John Self, Richard Tull is guilty of incuriosity; just as his novels' narratives
effectively take the form of a private language, preventing the possibility of a
dialogue with readers, Richard himself neglects to take into account others'
idiosyncrasies or even to look closely at their names. In retrospect, it hardly
even seems surprising that he was incapable of working out that his wife
Gina had been screwing Gwyn for money and revenge. The artistic failing of
incuriosity costs him more than a novelistic career.
As in Money, the novel itself is an attempt to enact a solution to
problems it dramatises as irresolvable. The Information sets out early on one of
its key dilemmas:
We are agreed — come on: we are agreed — about beauty
in the flesh. Consensus is possible here. And in the
mathematics of the universe, beauty helps tell us whether things
are false or true. We can quickly agree about beauty, in the
heavens and in the flesh. But not everywhere. Not, for instance,
on the page. (I, p. 15)
The ability to distinguish between the true and the false is associated with the
artist. Despite the failings of both Richard and Gwyn in artistic terms, The
Information nonetheless enacts a form of aesthetic justice itself. This is
achieved through the use of the child motif seen in previous novels and a
pattern of Dickensian allusion.
When Marco describes to his father, in the closing pages of the novel,
how his abduction by Steve Cousins had ended with the arrival of others
intent on doing his abductor harm, he repeats the last words he heard
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Cousins say: 'The man said, "I'm a child'" (I, p.493). Richard is bemused,
mistakenly thinking that the man had been talking about Marco:
No. He said I'm a child.
'But he wasn't a child.'
No. He was a man. (/, p.493)
In fact, Scozzy (Steve Cousins) is here being identified with a character from
Dickens' Bleak House, the false child Harold Skimpole. We have already seen
Amis's comments on the influence of Dickens on his work, where he
specifically cites Bleak House. Perhaps more particularly, though, the use he
makes of that novel in The Information suggests that he is alluding not only to
Dickens' work, but to Nabokov's study of it in his Lectures on Literature.235
There Nabokov describes the function of Harold Skimpole as follows:
Skimpole deceives the world, and he deceives Mr. Jarndyce into
thinking that he, Skimpole, is as innocent, as naive, as carefree
as a child. Actually he is nothing of the sort; but this false
childishness of his throws into splendid relief the virtues of
authentic childhood in other parts of the book.236
Scozzy, like Skimpole, is a false child; and just as Skimpole is instrumental in
hastening the death of young Jo the Sweep, Scozzy seems intent on doing
unspecified harm to Marco Tull. It is Scozzy, though, who is left to suffer. It
seems that The Information enforces a form of justice, insisting that on this
occasion at least the innocent will be spared. The references which recur
throughout the novel to children's violent deaths reinforce a sense of
singularity in Marco's escape. It is almost as though Amis is explicitly
revising the fate that Dickens delineates, while suggesting that in The
Information we can view true aesthetic value, a value which allows the artist to
distinguish correctly between the true and the false.
235viadimir Nabokov, 'Charles Dickens: Bleak House', in Lectures on Literature, ed. Fredson
Bowers (London: Harvest, 1982), pp.63-124.
236Ibid, p.83.
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The pattern of Dickensian allusion extends to a number of the other
major protagonists. Lady Demeter ('Demi') recalls Dickens' Lady Dedlock:
children, of course, are important for both — Demi is denied a child by Gwyn,
while the secret of Lady Dedlock's child is central to the plot of Bleak House.
Richard Tull combines two references: Richard Carstone, a decent if
somewhat easily led astray ward of John Jarndyce; and Mr. Tulkinghorn,
Lord Dedlock's devious legal advisor. In Richard, then, we find a
combination of the malign and the benign, as perhaps suits the plotter who is
really always the loser. Gwyn Barry is rather more complicated. It is made
clear that Gwyn is not Welsh for John, so an analogy with the saintly John
Jarndyce, who asks the smallpox-scarred Esther Summerson to marry him ,is
explicitly ruled out. Here a curious detail comes into play: the rainbow-
coalition populus of Amelior each bear a physical affliction, but one which is
'non-disfiguring'. The avoidance of disfigurement is clearly part of Amelior's
more general exclusion of hierarchy, whether of beauty or anything else. It
also, though, points to another of Esther's prospective suitors in Bleak House,
William Guppy, the legal clerk who retracts his proposal of marriage to the
scarred Esther. Gwyn is Welsh not for John, but for Will.
Further references are scattered throughout: from a comment on the
complexity of Dickensian plot-structure to a brief mention of a biography of
Leigh Hunt that Richard has read (it was on Hunt that the figure of Harold
Skimpole was said to be based). In part, this reinforces that desire for the
representation of a social totality that we noted earlier with reference to
London Fields (here Amis is interested in what connects Lady Demeter and 13).
But it seems to me that the most significant aspect of these allusions is the
identification of Scozzy with Skimpole. The novel shows its ability to
discriminate between the true and the false, thereby demonstrating, for Amis,
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one of the most important facets of genuine aesthetic value. It is The
Information, then, rather than Amelior or Untitled that Amis offers as an
exemplar for a truly contemporary art, an art which superficially concedes the
postmodern incredulity toward notions of intrinsic literary value while
nonetheless enacting a form of moral and aesthetic judgement which runs
entirely counter to such a concession.
If the postmodern, as Fredric Jameson argues, is merely 'the force field
in which very different kinds of cultural impulses — what Raymond Williams
has usefully termed "residual" and "emergent" forms of cultural production —
must make their way,' it would seem useful to identify Amis's as an art which
repeatedly insists on retaining a special place for the "residual".237 His novels
offer a constant reminder that the postmodern condition explains far from the
whole story, that there are countless facets of aesthetic and social experience
left unaccounted for by an art which adopts wholesale the assumptions and,
indeed, the "relief" of the postmodern. If Amis's fiction is often frustrating, it
is principally because he has not yet been able to expose the postmodern
literary pretence of that fiction while maintaining the reader's willingness to
invest emotionally in the desires or predicaments of his characters in the way
that perhaps the very best postmodern novelists, such as Salman Rushdie,
have. (For me, he comes closest in Time's Arroiv, where the emotional power
is created by the fact that Amis needn't evoke it dramatically.) Generally, it
remains all too obvious, as James Wood writes, that Amis is 'always an
adjective ahead of his subjects.'238 Still, though, his writing draws
importantly (and often accurately) on values, prejudices and attitudes which
were supposed to be left behind. The faith which Amis retains in an
outdated, autonomous literary value can be seen as the flip-side of his




insistence on the survival of pre-postmodern conditions and distinctions. In
this sense, Amis's incompatibility with what we have seen Jameson call 'the
relief of the postmodern' is not dissimilar to Terry Eagleton's criticism, noted
in the previous chapter, that discussions of the postmodern are all too often
based on the situation of a privileged social and cultural elite:
So class and race and gender were supposedly gone (and other
things were supposedly going, like age and beauty and even
education): all the really automatic ways people had of telling
who was better or worse — they were gone. Right-thinkers
everywhere were claiming that they were clean of prejudice,
that in them the inherited formulations had at last been purged.
This they had decided. But for those on the pointed end of the
operation — the ignorant, say, or the ugly — it wasn't just a
decision. Some of them had no new clothes. Some were still
dressed in the uniform of their deficiencies. Some were still
wearing the same old shit.239
239Martin Amis, 'State of England', Esquire, September 1996, p.139.
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Chapter Three
Don DeLillo: Some American Environments
Baudelaire envisaged readers to whom the reading of lyric poetry would present
difficulties. The introductory poem of the Fleurs du mal is addressed to these
readers. Will power and the ability to concentrate are not their strong points; what
they prefer is sensual pleasures; they are familiar with the "spleen" which kills
interest and receptiveness.
Walter Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire'
There was something at loose now in American life, the poet's beast slinking to the
marketplace.
Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night
A Portrait of the Postmodern: Goods and Simulacra
In common with that of Martin Amis's Money, the title of Don DeLillo's White
Noise perhaps resembles more a deflationary label, applied in a spirit of
utilitarian earnestness, than any aesthetic or artistic adornment. In the case of
DeLillo's novel, even the vulgar temptation that Amis's title seems to offer is
absent, while the cultural expectations excited by such titles as Joyce's A
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man or Garcia Marquez's One Hundred years of
Solitude (to pick two almost at random) are cursorily bypassed. It is as though
DeLillo does not want us, as readers, to expect too much. More accurately,
perhaps, it is the acknowledgement that his text competes for our time in the
same realm as TV ads and computer games; the status of the literary text itself
has been transformed and it is to this state of affairs that the title of White
Noise stands testament.
Of course, it is precisely that society in which such a situation has come
to pass which also provides the subject matter of the novel. In its opening
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paragraph, Jack Gladney, the narrator, describes the return of the students to
the College-on-the-Hill:
The roofs of the station wagons were loaded down with
carefully secured suitcases full of light and heavy clothing; with
boxes of blankets, boots and shoes, stationary and books, sheets,
pillows, quilts; with rolled-up rugs and sleeping bags; with
bicycles, skis, rucksacks, English and Western saddles, inflated
rafts.240
The list of goods, products and belongings continues for some time: 'personal
computers . . . controlled substances . . . Dum Dum pops, the Mystic mints.'
Books are included in this list, sandwiched between footwear and bedding,
but they are hardly conspicuous. As Frank Lentricchia rightly observes, 'these
books are things like other things, commodities, too, or — in the most
question-begging of all economic terms — goods.'241 White Noise is therefore a
book written about, and written from within, a society in which books have
no more worth than, and cannot be differentiated from, any other consumer
commodity item: from neither 'small refrigerators and table ranges' nor from
'Waffelos and Kabooms'.
DeLillo's novel, then, can lay no claim to the status of the autonomous
work of art. Instead, it is a product of the contemporary, American culture
industry, emerging side-by-side with the films of Chuck Norris or the
bellybutton of Madonna. Early in the novel, Jack and Babette go shopping in
the supermarket, where they meet Murray Jay Siskind, an ex-sportswriter and
recent appointee to the college's popular culture department. While Murray
talks to them about the packaging of the peanuts and the peaches in his
basket, a woman falls into 'a rack of paperback books' (WN, p. 19). No
explanation is given for her fall. As Jack leaves with Babette and Murray, he
240Don DeLillo, White Noise (London: Picador, 1986), p.3. Further references to this text will
be to this edition and will be marked in the main text, using the prefix WN.
241 Frank Lentricchia, 'Tales of the Electronic Tribe', in New Essays on 'White Noise', ed. Frank
Lentricchia (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991), p.95.
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comments, 'The three of us left together, trying to maneuver our shopping
carts between the paperback books scattered across the entrance.' The only
thing in the passage that distinguishes the books from the peaches in
Murray's basket is the fact that they are now lying on the floor, dislodged
from their proper place on the supermarket racks. Here, art has finally
become functional, a commonplace, everyday, untroubling feature of late
capitalist existence, like tinned peaches or the background white noise
emitted by the TV.
Two novels later, in Mao II, DeLillo proves to be no less preoccupied by
this ever-closer relation of the work of art to ordinary commodities. Bill Gray,
the character on whom the novel is principally focused, is an author. In the
manner of a J.D. Salinger or a Thomas Pynchon (the two role models most
frequently cited by the novel's reviewers), Gray has become an obsessive
recluse. His status as such renders him more sought-after than ever: for
others, it becomes his gimmick, perhaps serving as an inadvertent example of
niche marketing. Gray is tracked down by Scott, an event which precedes the
novel's point of narration, and is persuaded to employ him as an assistant. It
is with the novel's introduction of Scott, who is killing time in a bookstore
while on the way to a meeting with the photographer chosen for Bill's first
photographs in over thirty years, that DeLillo signals in Mao II his
acknowledgement of the loss of art's autonomy in the society in which Bill
(and, by implication, DeLillo too) finds himself writing:
He examined books stacked on tables and set in clusters near
the cash terminals. He saw stacks on the floor five feet high,
arranged in artful fanning patterns. There were books standing
on pedestals and bunched in little gothic snuggeries. Bookstores
made him slightly sick at times. He looked at the gleaming
bestsellers. People drifted through the store, appearing caught
in some unhappy dazzlement. There were books on step-
terraces and Lucite wall-shelves, books in pyramids and theme
displays. He went downstairs to the paperbacks, where he
stared at the covers of the mass-market books, running his
fingertips erotically over the raised lettering. Covers were
lacquered and gilded. Books lay cradled in nine-unit
counterpacks like experimental babies. He could hear them
shrieking Buy me.242
Here, downstairs, in the 'section on modern classics', Scott finds copies of
Bill's two novels 'in their latest trade editions'. They are not, it seems safe to
presume, quite as shameless in matters of self-promotion as their lacquered
and gilded cousins, but the bookstore generously finds room to accommodate
even such a pair 'banded in austere umbers and rusts'. Like the market itself,
the bookstore into which Scott has wandered offers a place for all, but at a
price: namely, the substitution of specific, artistic value by the abstract
exchange or commodity value; in other words, submersion in the commodity
structure. The loss of cultural autonomy can, then, here be perceived in those
few easy strides from 'best seller' to 'modern classic'.
It would, however, be wrong to view this loss of cultural or artistic
autonomy merely as the integration of what would formerly have been self-
avowedly autonomous works of art into the commodity structure. Rather, as
we have already seen Fredric Jameson contend, it must be understood
dialectically, as a fundamental transformation in the relation of two aspects of
the social totality. He writes:
What we must now ask ourselves is whether it is not precisely
this semiautonomy of the cultural sphere which has been
destroyed by the logic of late capitalism. Yet to argue that
culture is today no longer endowed with the relative autonomy
it once enjoyed as one level among others in earlier moments of
capitalism (let alone in precapitalist societies) is not necessarily
to imply its disappearance or extinction. Quite the contrary; we
must go on to affirm that the dissolution of an autonomous
sphere of culture is rather to be imagined in terms of an
explosion: a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the
social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life --
242Don DeLillo, Mao II (London: Vintage, 1991), p.19. Further references to this text will be to
this edition and will be marked in the main text, using the prefixMIL
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from economic value and state power to practices and to the
very structure of the psyche itself — can be said to have become
"cultural" in some original and yet untheorized sense.243
Thus, on one level, the novel (e.g. White Noise) becomes indistinguishable
from economic products or commodities; while, at the same time, those same
commodities, as Jameson writes elsewhere, take on 'an aesthetic
dimension'.244 How this loss of autonomy should properly be imagined, then,
is not as a simplistic, one-sided integration of the cultural realm into the
commodity structure or merely as the absorption of that commodity structure
by cultural or aesthetic forms; instead, it must be grasped as the operation of
both these processes at once.
But how might this help us to understand Don DeLillo's novels? If it is
true, as I have been arguing, that these are novels which reflect the loss of
cultural autonomy, we would perhaps expect to see, in the light of Jameson's
model, the depiction of a society permeated by simulacra and culturally
mediated forms of experience occurring simultaneously with the
transformation that we have already witnessed of art into mere commodity.
In fact, that is exactly what we find. As I plan to show, DeLillo consistently
portrays a society in which simulations and images of "the real" increasingly
take precedence over "the real" itself. A good place to start is at 'the most
photographed barn in America', a passage in White Noise whose significance
for any understanding of DeLillo's fiction is rightly highlighted by Frank
Lentricchia.
Jack Gladney, the first-person narrator of White Noise, undergoes in the
course of the novel, at the hands of Murray Jay Siskind, a rite of passage into
the study of contemporary cultural phenomena (TV, advertising, commodity
packaging). His education begins in earnest when he and Murray take a trip
243Jameson, Postmodernism, p.48.
244Jameson, 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture', p.12.
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to a local tourist attraction: 'THE MOST PHOTOGRAPHED BARN IN
AMERICA'. While driving there, they pass signs advertising the forthcoming
attraction. Arriving, Jack and Murray find themselves among a crowd of
tourists, each photographing 'the most photographed barn in America'. There
is a man in a booth who sells postcards and photographic slides of the barn to
the tourists; there is an elevated spot — a grassy knoll — from which the barn
might be viewed or, indeed, photographed. Murray feels compelled to
explain the significance of what they are witnessing:
"No one sees the barn," he said finally.
A long silence followed.
"Once you've seen the signs about the barn, it becomes
impossible to see the barn." (WN, p.12)
Murray's monologue is punctuated by lengthy silences; we cannot be sure
whether he is considering his next point or stringing out a performance:
"They are taking pictures of taking pictures," he said. He did
not speak for a while. We listened to the incessant clicking of
shutter release buttons, the rustling clank of levers that
advanced the film. "What was the barn like before it was
photographed?" he said. "What did it look like, how was it
different from other barns, how was it similar to other barns?
We can't answer these questions because we've read the signs,
seen the people snapping the pictures. We can't get outside the
aura. We're part of the aura. We're here, we're now." (WN,
P-13)
As such passages indicate, Murray serves as a would-be postmodern
guru. His is the celebratory voice of mass, consumer culture; for not only is
Murray attuned to the dissolution of the object world into so many images
and simulacra of itself, as we have seen above, but he is willing to act as an
enthusiastic advocate of this new "reality". "'You have to learn how to look,'"
he tells Jack. "'You have to open yourself to the data'" (WN, p.51). His classes,
too, he uses to proselytise the new creed:
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"I ask my students, 'what more do you want?' Look at the
wealth of data concealed in the grid, in the bright packaging, the
jingles, the slice-of-life commercials, the products hurtling out of
darkness, the coded messages and endless repetitions, like
chants, like mantras. 'Coke is it, Coke is it, Coke is it.'" (WN, p.51)
This advocacy of the primacy of image extends, though perhaps
unconsciously, even to Murray's dress sense. Jack tells us that Murray
dresses 'almost totally in corduroy'. He adds: 'I had the feeling that since the
age of eleven in his crowded plot of concrete he'd associated this sturdy fabric
with higher learning in some impossibly distant and tree-shaded place' (WN,
p.11). Like Jack himself, who has changed his name to J.A.K. Gladney in
order to approximate more closely the image of a head of 'Hitler Studies',
Murray is the simulacrum of an academic. The difference between them is
that Murray, were he aware of the false shadow he casts (and we cannot be
sure that he is not), would no doubt react positively and find the whole thing
amusing; Jack, on the other hand, is disquieted when he finds his identity
thus uncertain: 'I am the false character that follows the name around,' he says
(WN, p.17).
As the novel progresses, Jack discovers that his environment is coming
to resemble more and more that alien and disconcerting world described to
him by Murray. When the 'Airborne Toxic Event' forces the Gladneys and
others to abandon their homes, Jack finds that the evacuation procedure is
being overseen by SIMUVAC, an organisation of which he knows nothing:
"That's quite an armband you've got there. What does
SIMUVAC mean? Sounds important."
"Short for simulated evacuation. A new state program they're
still battling over funds for."
"But this evacuation isn't simulated. It's real."
"We know that. But we thought we could use it as a model."
"A form of practice? Are you saying you saw a chance to use
the real event in order to rehearse the simulation?" (WN, p.139)
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This is, of course, precisely what they have done. Moreover, the same group
later employ Steffie, one of the Gladney children, to act as a victim in one of
their simulations. This may be the second time that she has played such a
role, as neither Jack nor Babette can be sure whether the medical symptoms
exhibited by the girls at the time of the toxic cloud were genuine or merely
provoked by radio broadcasts which listed possible symptoms. Even Jack's
exposure to the toxic waste has uncertain consequences which destabilise his
own claim to victimhood: in response to the question '"Am I going to die?'" he
receives the answer "'Not as such'" (WN, p.140). In a rather perverse way,
then, the role of victim that Steffie plays for SIMUVAC may be the more
authentic as it can at least be attributed to a "real" simulation and has an
identifiable outcome (Steffie is carried to an ambulance and then goes home).
It has a shape and substance lacking in both the girls' nausea and Jack's toxic
infection.
For Leonard Wilcox, the depiction of society in White Noise is
recognisable from, and comparable to, the analysis of contemporary society
offered by the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard. In a study entitled
'Baudrillard, DeLillo's White Noise and the End of Heroic Narrative' he writes
thus:
The informational world Baudrillard delineates bears a striking
resemblance to the world of White Noise: one characterized by
the collapse of the real and the flow of signifiers emanating from
an information society, by a "loss of the real" in a black hole of
simulation and the play and exchange of signs. In this world
common to both Baudrillard and DeLillo, images, signs and
codes engulf objective reality; signs become more real than
reality and stand in for the world they erase. . . . Moreover, for
both Baudrillard and DeLillo a media-saturated consciousness
threatens the concept of meaning itself.245
245Leonard Wilcox, 'Baudrillard, DeLillo's White Noise and the End of Heroic Narrative',
Contemporary Literature, 32 (1991), pp.346-347.
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It is significant that Wilcox should speak of a 'media-saturated consciousness',
suggesting that those cultural or mass-cultural forms now act as determining
agents of the human psyche itself, an argument that we saw earlier proposed
by Fredric Jameson.
In White Noise, the embodiment of this media-constructed self is the
character of Willie Mink (a.k.a. Mr Gray), sexual blackmailer of Babette and
victim of Jack's gunslinging frenzy. As Wilcox notes, Mink is 'a repository for
the rambling, metonymic discourses of a consumer culture'. At times, for no
reason, Mink will suddenly start spouting random snatches of TV-speak.
"'Some of these playful dolphins have been equipped with radio
transmitters,'" he says. '"Their far flung wanderings may tell us things'" (WN,
p.310). Later: "'Did you ever wonder why, out of thirty-two teeth, these four
cause so much trouble? I'll be back with the answer in a minute"' (WN, p.312).
He claims to have learned English by watching TV, but it would appear that
he has been less educated than fully reconstructed by the Tube.
It is with Mink, too, that Jack witnesses one of the more bizarre side-
effects of Dylar, the drug which is meant to suppress fear of death. Mink
responds to words as though they need no longer correspond to an external
reality but, instead, have themselves replaced that reality. Thus, Jack can cry
out, "'A hail of bullets,"' and Mink dives to the floor; he assumes 'the
recommended crash position' on hearing the words "'Plunging aircraft'". It is
perhaps this latter feature above all, this side-effect, that justifies Wilcox's
analysis that in the world of White Noise meaning itself has been dissipated
and that, in truth, once they've seen the signs, no one need see the barn.
It is not, however, until DeLillo's next novel — Libra — that the theme of
the constructed self becomes the central preoccupation around which the
novel is developed. In White Noise it is necessary for DeLillo first to delineate
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a social milieu and to depict, as convincingly as possible, the modes of
behaviour that such a society encourages or even necessitates; only then can
the means by which the inner-corisciousnesses of men and women are socially
conditioned properly become the book's subject. In Libra, by contrast, the
thematic structure unfolds in precisely the opposite direction. Lee Harvey
Oswald's place in American history is secure; his name is known. Simply by
writing a novelistic account of the life of America's most notorious assassin,
DeLillo indicates that there is something else to know, something beyond the
moment of the assassination itself. From the opening description of the
young Lee Oswald riding the subway, it is clear that the Oswald to be
portrayed in the pages of Libra is to be conspicuously passive, a cipher for
external sensations and influences. In other words, the very subject matter of
Libra implies an interest in the artificiality or constructedness of the self, an
interest elevated to the thematic level by the subsequent treatment of that
subject matter — i.e. the portrayal of a passive Oswald, daily prey to the
whirling babble of voices that leads him to the Texas School Book Depository
and which constitutes the authentic expression of corporate, anti-communist
America. The narrative journey that takes us in White Noise from the heart of
American institutional life to the random mess of media-speak that is Willie
Mink thus finds its reverse mirror image in a plot which follows the life of the
impressionable young Oswald through the travails and neon-lit dreams of
Middle America to the death of an American president and the power games
which dictate the courses of lives.
We shall come in a moment to the haphazard cultural formation of Lee
Harvey Oswald, but it is worthwhile noting that Oswald is far from alone in
Libra in his characterisation as a "false" or "unnatural" self. The unwitting
partner in Oswald's bloody rite of passage, Kennedy himself, is exposed as
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another constructed persona, primarily a photo-fit president. Guy Bannister,
reflecting disgustedly on his president's civil-rights programme, grasps at a
stroke the image-consciousness that is his great political skill: 'You could
photograph a Kennedy all right. That's what a Kennedy was for.'246 Later, on
that fateful day in November, he is again described in terms of his media
"self"; in fact, like the photographic barn in White Noise, the real Kennedy has
long been supplanted by images of himself:
He moved along the fence, handsome and tanned, smiling
famously into the wall of opened mouths. He looked like
himself, like photographs, a helmsman squinting in the sea-
glare, white teeth shining. (L, p.392)
In his essay 'Libra as Postmodern Critique', Frank Lentricchia argues
convincingly that DeLillo's portrayal of America is that of a society in which
one is taught to yearn for a second, transformed self. 'Left with a book more
about Oswald than conspiracy,' he writes,
we learn that the question is not what happened in Dallas on 22
November 1963 — DeLillo gives us a theory about that. The
question is not even, who is this Oswald? It is, who is Lee
Harvey Oswald?247
Oswald, himself, is peculiarly susceptible to the belief that he can constantly
be remade. When Dr Braufels teaches him Russian, he begins to feel that the
very enunciation of these new sounds might have a transformative effect: 'he
could almost believe he was being remade on the spot, given an opening to
some larger and deeper version of himself (L, p.113). And later, when the
dream of entering history via the Soviet Union has faded, Oswald sits alone in
a room in New Orleans and routinely narrates fictitious versions of himself on
the pages of job application forms (L, pp.305-6).
246Don Delillo, Libra (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988), p.141. Further references to this text
will be to this edition and will be marked in the main text, using the prefix L.
247Frank Lentricchia, 'Libra as Postmodern Critique', in Introducing Don DeLillo, ed. Frank
Lentricchia (London: Duke UP, 1991), p.203.
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When the transformation or re-construction of Oswald is completed, it
follows not from his part in the class struggle but from his absorption and
subsequent image-projection by the mass-media. Long before Oswald is to be
classified as a lone, crazed gunman, we, as readers, witness the shock — to
which our own daily experience has numbed us — felt by Oswald's Russian
wife, Marina, as she passes by a department store window and sees herself
and her husband on the TV screen inside. An everyday event, she suddenly
finds, has been made part of the TV world, the world of Racket Squad and
Dragnet, shows that the young Lee Oswald would watch with his mother.
This is an incident which foreshadows what is perhaps the most disturbing
passage of the novel: Oswald's death. As he lies with a bullet in his stomach,
the ambulance speeding toward a hospital, Oswald watches his shooting
replayed on TV:
He could see himself shot as the camera caught it. Through the
pain he watched TV.... Through the pain, through the losing of
sensation except where it hurt, Lee watched himself react to the
auguring heat of the bullet. (L, p.439)
Here, the moment of his murder itself becomes a cultural product, a TV-event,
later to be re-screened countless times.
But if the media-coverage is to destabilise the authenticity of the
moment of his actual murder, it is also responsible for the birth of that new
self of which Lee Oswald had always dreamt and which 'Lee Harvey Oswald'
represents. The time between his arrest for the assassination of President
Kennedy and his own death at the hands of Jack Ruby is a time like no other
for Oswald, a time of new beginnings and uncluttered opportunity. Once
arrested, he is soon given a hint of the full transformation that awaits:
'Whenever they took him down, he heard his name on the radios and TVs.
Lee Harvey Oswald. It sounded extremely strange. .. . No one called him by
that name. Now it was everywhere' (L, p.416). Earlier in the novel, while in
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the Soviet Union, Oswald is given a foretaste of what it might mean to enter
into the official history of notoriety recognised by the media:
It occurred to Oswald that everyone called the prisoner by his
full name. The Soviet Press, local TV, the BBC, the Voice of
America, the interrogators, etc. Once you did something
notorious, they tagged you with an extra name that was
ordinarily never used. You were officially marked, a chapter in
the imagination of the state. Francis Gary Powers. In just these
few days the name had taken on a resonance, a sense of fateful
event. It already sounded historic. (L, p.198)
Now transformed, in Lentricchia's phrase, into 'a triple-named echo of
another media child, "John Fitzgerald Kennedy'", Oswald discovers his true
vocation: he will study the assassination in minute detail, 'vary the act a
hundred ways, speed it up and slow it down, shift emphasis, find shadings,
see his whole life change' (L, p.434). 'His life,' we are told, 'had a single clear
subject now, called Lee Harvey Oswald' (L, p.435).
By the end of the novel, the very means by which Oswald grasps his
own identity are so thoroughly mediated by consumer-cultural forms that it
seems only fitting that his body should be laid to rest under a false name,
'William Bobo', and that the coffin should be carried to the graveside by a
team of journalists. Lee Oswald, now renamed (for the very last time)
'William Bobo', may be dead, but Lee Harvey Oswald lives on.
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Postmodern Forms: Pastiche and Electronic Reproduction
The previous section was intended to demonstrate DeLillo's texts' portrayal
of, and meditation upon, late capitalist society and its attendant 'cultural
logic', postmodernism. It is now necessary to go further and to affirm that
these are texts whose very form implicates them in that same social and
cultural configuration that they are intent on depicting. In more precise
terms, it has become time to note, along with Fredric Jameson, the relevance
to the postmodern novel of the critique of the culture industry contained
within Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. The force of that
critique, as Jameson writes, 'lies in its demonstration of the unexpected and
imperceptible introduction of commodity structure into the very form and
content of the work of art itself.'248 We shall now, therefore, trace those
formal aspects of the texts in question which betray their postmodern status
and, through that, the reflection of late capitalist reification in their very own
inner-structure.
It seems productive and proper to start by identifying at least one of
those formal features associated with the postmodern: namely, a new
depthlessness that repulses or repudiates the sort of hermeneutic enquiry,
based on multitudinous layers of signification, for which the modernist work
of art seemed to cry out. Jameson writes of 'the emergence of a new kind of
flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense,
perhaps the supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms.'249 Alan
Wilde, in Horizons ofAssent, appears to be indicating something similar when
he contrasts 'modernism's characteristically vertical orderings of
248Jameson, 'Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture', p.14.
249Jameson, Postmodernism, p.15.
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disconnection' And the 'allegiance of late modernism to both depth and
surface' with 'postmodernism's reconstitution of a new, horizontal depth: a
"surface," as John Ashbery writes, . . that is not superficial but a visible
core".'250 For Jameson, this new depthlessness (or 'horizontal depth' in
Wilde's more ambiguous phrase) is closely linked to a general crisis in
processes of meaning and signification, of which a transformation in the
nature and uses of irony — the principal feature ofWilde's construction of the
postmodern -- is but one example. First, though, it is worth looking at the
'suspensive irony' that Wilde associates with postmodernism's 'horizontal
depth' and its relation to Jameson's own description of postmodern pastiche.
The relevance of these concepts to DeLillo's White Noise in particular will then
be explored.
The distinction between modernism and postmodernism is also and
primarily, for Wilde, that between 'disjunctive' and 'suspensive' irony.
Contrasting the effects of the latter with the characteristic modernist impulse
to control and to order,Wilde defines 'suspensive irony' as follows:
an indecision about the meanings or relations of things is
matched by a willingness to live with uncertainty, tolerate and,
in some cases, to welcome a world seen as random and
multiple, even, at times, absurd.251
In his Constructing Postmodernism Brian McHale compares Wilde's 'suspensive
irony' to the following definition of the 'post-modern attitude' offered by Max
Apple (in 'Post-Modernism'): "Maybe you could characterize this attitude,'
writes Apple, 'as a mixture of world weariness and cleverness, an attempt to
make you think that I'm half kidding, though you're not quite sure about
what.'252 According to both of these constructions, what is singularly lacking,
250AlanWilde, Horizons ofAssent: Modernism, Post-modernism, and the Ironic Imagination
(London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981), p.3.
251Wilde, p.44.
252Max Apple, 'Post-Modernism', cited in Brian McHale, Constructing Postmodernism (London:
Routledge, 1993), p.21.
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whether in postmodernist 'suspensive irony' or in the 'post-modern attitude',
is a determinate object of irony; we do not know who or what is being
ironized, who or what is the object of the joke, or even indeed if there is one.
I would suggest that, in this fespect at least, neither of these
formulations are too far removed from Fredric Jameson's analysis of a
postmodern pastiche that has replaced the modernist predilection to parody:
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique,
idiosyncratic style, the wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a
dead language. But it is a neutral practice of such mimicry;
without any of parody's ulterior motives, amputated of the
satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that
alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily
borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists.253
Like Wilde's 'suspensive irony', Jameson's pastiche refuses to construct or to
impose an order to which its content might be subjected.
To see how this might operate in postmodern textual practice, we need
look no further than White Noise and certain interpretative difficulties raised
by Jack Gladney's narration. Frank Lentricchia, in 'Tales of the Electronic
Tribe', studies the uses served by DeLillo's choice of first-person narrative in
some depth. Gladney is, in Lentricchia's words, 'the less than self-possessed
voice of a culture that he would subject to criticism and satire.'254 The
implications of Gladney's original satiric intentions need not detain us for
now, but it is important to note, with Lentricchia, that Gladney's narration
must itself be held suspect, saturated as it is by the values and aesthetic
conventions of the society on which it is to reflect. Lentricchia points to a
sentence of Gladney's early in the novel: 'It was a cold bright day with
intermittent winds out of the east' (WN, p.4). 'Straight or deadpan?' he asks:
A joke about the way we talk these days about the weather, with
our voices indentured to the jargon of what is called
253Jameson, Postmodernism, p.26.
254Lentricchia, 'Tales of the Electronic Tribe', p.93.
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meteorology? A joke that stings us for our inability to muster
"real" voice, "real" speech, even about -- or is it especially about?
-- matters so ordinary? Or is the sentence delivered unawares,
just the way Jack talks sometimes, like a weatherman. Self-
parody or a weird, because unconscious, form of "pastiche", a
term whose very meaning assumes an act of deliberation?255
As Lentricchia suggests, we are left here unable to situate either the origin or
object of the irony.
Even when Jack's ironic commentary of the world around him would
appear to be functioning quite normally, the reader can suddenly be jarred
back into a reevaluation of the narrator's relationship to that which he seems
to be subjecting to irony. Another example that Lentricchia offers occurs
when Jack later describes the students' arrival, with which the novel opens, to
his wife Babette. He describes it from the vantage point of an elevated, if
amused, observer:
"You should have been there," I said to her.
"Where?"
"It's the day of the station wagons."
"Did I miss it again? You're supposed to remind me."
"They stretched all the way past the music library and onto the
interstate. Blue, green, burgundy, brown. They gleamed in the
sun like a desert caravan." (WN, p.5)
His ironic tone becomes more pronounced; the more obvious the mockery,
the more distanced from its wealthy objects Jack seems to be:
"They've grown comfortable with their money," I said. "They
genuinely believe they're entitled to it. This conviction gives
them a kind of rude health. They glow a little." (WN, p.6)
The spell is broken by Babette: "'Not that we don't have a station wagon
ourselves.'" Though certainly less radical than the previous example in terms
of preventing the reader from determining precisely who or what is the object
of irony -- Jack himself is surely subjected here to an authorial irony — the
above passage does serve to indicate to the reader a crucial factor in the
255Ibid, p.97.
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novel's construction of further suspensive ironies or examples of pastiche to
add to Jack's meteorological pronouncements; it points to that very
assumption upon which Alan Wilde claims suspensive irony is itself
predicated: namely, 'the ironist's immanence in the world he describes.'
In order to substantiate this point more fully, we shall look at one final
extract from Jack Gladney's narrative — this time unprompted by Frank
Lentricchia. At the end of White Noise Jack describes the sensation of waiting
in line at a supermarket checkout:
And this is where we wait together, regardless of age, our carts
stocked with brightly colored goods. A slowly moving line,
satisfying, giving us time to glance at the tabloids in the racks.
Everything that we need that is not food or love is here in the
tabloid racks. The tales of the supernatural and the extra¬
terrestrial. The miracle vitamins, the cures for cancer, the
remedies for obesity. The cults of the famous and the dead.
(WN, p.326)
We have already been made aware of Jack's weakness for parody and for
ironic put-down; yet, similarly, we have witnessed the falsity underlying that
ironic distance that DeLillo's narrator sometimes attempts to construct (and
which the reader is at times all too willing to presuppose). The passage
quoted above might well parody the "Aristotelianism of bubble gum
wrappers and detergent jingles" which, for Jack, constitutes the work of the
college's popular culture department ('known officially as American
environments'), but by this stage in the novel such confidence and self-
assertion in the use of irony on Jack's part would be unlikely. In fact, the tone
is neither caustic nor satiric, but rather elegiac. The blank content of these
sentences is akin to the message of mass culture triumphalism that Murray
Jay Siskind preaches throughout — the tone of reverence and quasi-religious
awe is the same — but the celebratory fervour that characterises Murray's
sermons is entirely lacking. Instead, there is a placid acceptance, a weary
164
assent to the world as it is. The years consumed by fear of death; the mad,
frantic search for Dylar; the long, slow immersion in the life and writings of
Hitler have all taken their toll. Jack perhaps sees finally that to ape, in a
sincere way, the truths of his friend Murray and of Alfonse (Fast Food)
Stompanato need take no considerable effort and might at least retain an
authenticity to which the cultural satirist, the sardonic parodist, can no longer
pretend.
It is not only, however, in the prevalence of pastiche or suspensive
irony that White Noise betrays itself as formally postmodernist. Earlier, we
noted that Fredric Jameson extends the notion of postmodern depthlessness
beyond the specific example of pastiche or 'blank parody' to include a general
repudiation of meaning and signification. The result is what Jameson calls
'schizophrenic art', an art in which meaning itself (the interlocking
syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance or a
meaning'256) has broken down and what we are left with is 'schizophrenia in
the form of a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers'. The examples which
Jameson offers range from the music of John Cage to Samuel Beckett's novel
Watt and Bob Perelman's poem 'China'. Although DeLillo's White Noise is
nowhere near as extreme as these texts in its disruption of the hermeneutic
process — a disruption that is here periodic rather than constant — we can
nonetheless identify a similar formal feature at work.
Interspersed at various intervals throughout DeLillo's text, we find
mysterious codas or brand names such as the following: 'Dacron, Orion, Lycra
Spandex' (WN, p.52); 'Mastercard, Visa, American Express' (WN, p.100);
'Leaded, unleaded, super unleaded' (WN, p.199); 'Cloters, Velamints,
Freedent' (WN, p.229); 'Random Access Memory, Acquired Immune
256Jameson, Postmodernism, p.26.
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Deficiency Syndrome, Mutual Assured Destruction' (WN, p.303). They
appear, as John Frow observes ('The Last Things Before the Last: Notes on
White Noise '), 'in the midst of the mundane world of novelistic narrative,
detached, functionless, unmotivated . . . without any marker of a speaking
source.'257 The origin of these corporate inscriptions has been the cause of
some dispute: for Michael Valdez Moses ('Lust Removed From Nature'), '[i]t
is clear that these incursions cannot be directly credited to Jack Gladney's
narrative voice';258 while Frank Lentricchia insists that '[i]t is, of course, Jack
who speaks the line[s] because White Noise is a first-person novel, and it could
therefore be no-one else.' 'Jack in these moments is possessed,' adds
Lentricchia, 'a mere medium who speaks.'259 It seems to me that it is
Lentricchia who is right. Valdez Moses associates these 'consumerist mantras'
with 'the "white noise" of postmodern America that envelops the Gladneys
and the inhabitants of Blacksmith', but Lentricchia, I suspect, grasps the
insidious potential of that 'white noise' more fully when he associates these
mantras with Jack's own unconscious self.
This is a notion which also suggests itself to Leonard Wilcox, who writes:
These "eruptions" in the narrative imply the emergence of a new
form of subjectivity colonized by the media and decentered by
its polyglot discourses and electronic networks. They imply the
evacuation of the private spheres of self, in Baudrillardian terms
"the end of interiority".260
Moreover, this interpretation is supported by an incident which occurs while
the Gladneys are spending the night with the town's other evacuees. Sitting
beside his sleeping daughter Steffie, Jack hears her murmuring two initially
incomprehensible words: 'Toyota Celica' (WN, p.155). He realises that she is
257John Frow, "The Last Things Before the Last: Notes on White Noise', in Introducing Don
DeLillo, p.187.
258Michael Valdez Moses, 'Lust Removed from Nature', in New Essays, p.64.
259Lentricchia, 'Tales of the Electronic Tribe', p.102.
260wilcox, p.348.
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chanting in her sleep, the name of a car. 'She was only repeating,' he thinks,
'some TV voice. Toyota Corolla, Toyota Celica, Toyota Cressida.' A
distinction must be drawn, however, between these two examples. Steffie's
nocturnal chants, like the later TV-chatterings ofWillie Mink, are an example
of the novel's representation of the colonisation of the unconscious by the
commodity structure. Jack's own 'consumerist mantras', on the other hand,
actually determine the very form of the narrative surface itself. The novel thus
betrays itself both as a representation and as exemplar of the American
culture industry.
A similarly 'schizophrenic' effect is produced by the scattered,
apparently random and meaningless transcriptions of utterances emitted by
the TV or radio: 'The TV said: "And other trends that could dramatically
impact your portfolio'" (WN, p.61); 'The radio said: "It's the rainbow hologram
that gives this credit card a marketing intrigue'" (p. 122). (Further examples
can be encountered on p.96 and on p.201.) As the narrator of DeLillo's later
Mao II comments on the rush of sensations he experiences while walking
through the (post)modern city, 'Nothing tells you what you are supposed to
think of this' (Mil, p.94). That, of course, is the point. DeLillo's portrait of
contemporary America is, as we have seen, one of a society in which meaning
and signification have been dissipated. The replication of that same sense of
disjointedness in the reading experience of White Noise — an inability on the
part of the reader to see how such snatches of electronic media-speak might
illuminate (perhaps ironically), or at least stand in some meaningful
relationship to, their immediate textual surroundings (see, for a contrasting
example, uses of montage in Malcolm Lowry's late modernist novel Under the
Volcano) — is thus a means of foregrounding this aspect of the novel's social
critique in the mind of the reader, while also allowing the form of that
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critique to be determined by a cultural logic which repudiates and
discourages any attempt cognitively to establish interrelations and to reach on
that basis, determinate conclusions regarding the nature of the social and/or
textual environment in which we find ourselves.
In his Constructing Postmodernism Brian McHale cites, in the midst of an
essay on Umberto Eco's Foucalt's Pendulum, Fredric Jameson's identification of
a trend in postmodern textual production toward 'narratives which are about
the processes of reproduction and include movie cameras, video, tape
recorders, the whole technology of the production and reproduction of the
simulacrum.'261 We have already noted the media saturation of DeLillo's
texts, but it is necessary to go beyond this and to insist that the texts are
themselves at times actually generated by those same 'processes of
reproduction'. Again referring ostensibly to Foucalt's Pendulum, McHale
writes of texts in which 'certain narratological functions that would normally
be carried out by the verbal text have been entrusted to some secondary
medium (movie, television, computer) represented in the verbal text.'262 We
shall now see briefly the relevance of such remarks to DeLillo's Libra and Mao
II.
Although Michael Valdez Moses is surely wrong to associate certain
sections of the narrative in White Noise with the 'white noise' of postmodern
America rather than with Jack Gladney's commodity-saturated consciousness,
his judgement highlights a determination of narrative by media of
reproduction which it is necessary to acknowledge in some of DeLillo's other
novels. In Libra , for instance, a surrogate author figure called Nicholas
Branch is introduced. He has been 'hired on contract' by the CIA to write a
secret history of the Kennedy assassination, a project near enough to that of
261Jameson, Postmodernism, p.37; see also McHale, Constructing Postmodernism, p.181.
262McHale, Constructing Postmodernism, p.182.
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the novel's author to invest Branch's efforts with a certain measure of
analogical significance. Branch researches files, films, tapes and books en
masse; any document that he requires is brought to him by the Curator. His
technique for trying to understand, and to reach conclusions about, the
assassination is described thus:
We shall build theories that gleam like jade idols, intriguing
systems of assumption, four-faced, graceful. We will follow the
bullet trajectories backwards to the lives that occupy the
shadows, actual men who moan in their dreams. (L,p.l5)
The possible elision of the narratorial voice at such moments with that of
Branch and (presumably) those in the CIA who originally issued his
instruction is a topic to which we shall return in a few moments, but for now
we need only note of this passage the way in which it anticipates the
methodology not only of Branch's study, but also of Libra itself. The formal
structure of the novel, then, would appear to be modelled on that of the secret
history of the Kennedy assassination to be found on Nicholas Branch's
computer files.
Moreover, passages in Libra may themselves be direct representations
of Branch's computer text. For example, the chapter in which Branch is
introduced is called '17 April', a date which situates temporally not the
narrative of Branch's study and its progress, but that of a completely new
character,Win Everett, and the genesis of the plot to kill Kennedy. This other
narrative would seem to be generated by Branch's own computer:
He [Branch] enters a date on the home computer the Agency has
provided for the sake of convenient tracking. April 17,1963. The
names appear at once, with backgrounds, connections, locations.
The bright hot skies. The shady street of handsome old homes
framed in native oak.
American kitchens. This one has a breakfast nook, where
a man named Walter Everett Jr. was sitting, thinking — Win, as
he was called -- lost to the morning noises collecting around
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him, a stir of the all familiar, the heart-beat mosaic of every
happy home, toast springing up, radio voices with their intimate
and busy timbre, an optimistic buzz living in the ear. (L, p.16)
The narrative of the conspiracy that Everett instigates certainly follows
chronologically from that of Branch and his studies, and seems in some way
to be prompted by it, but we cannot say with absolute confidence that we are
reading a direct representation of the computer text that Branch has just
called-up on his screen, although it is clearly a suspicion that the novel
provokes. Rather, the start of the Everett narrative can be viewed as a
concrete example, no longer dependent on the reader's recognition of
methodological analogues, of the unsettling complicity of the narrative
structure that is Libra with the secret CIA project on which Branch has
embarked and which is itself a narrated subject. The question of the text's
broader complicity with that which it narrates might also be provoked when
the reader goes on to discover that the Everett narrative is that of the secret
project of ex-CIA operatives, themselves intent, in Everett's words, on
'"script[ing] a person or persons out of ordinary pocket litter'" (L, p.28).
In Mao II, though, matters are somewhat more direct. There, on three
separate occasions, the narrative describes TV news reports as seen by some
of the characters. First it is the disaster at Hillsborough, the football fans
crushed to death (Mil, pp. 32-34):
They show the fence from a distance, bodies piling up behind it,
smothered, sometimes only fingers moving, and it is like a
fresco in an old dark church, a crowded twisted vision of a rush
to death as only a master of age could paint it. (Mil, pp.34)
Later we read the description of the TV coverage of the Tiananmen Square
massacre (Mil, pp. 176-178): 'They show the bicycle dead, a soldier's body
hanging from a girder, the row of old officials in Mao suits' (p.178). Finally,
there is the report of the Ayatollah Khomeini's funeral (Mil, pp.188-193):
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The helicopter landed with the body in a metal casket, which
revolutionary guards carried on their shoulders a short distance
to the grave. But then the crowds surged again, weeping men in
bloody headbands, and they scaled the barriers and overran the
gravesite.
The voice said, Wailing chanting mourners. It said,
Throwing themselves into the hole. (Mil, pl91)
These passages must be distinguished from their counterparts in those novels
by Umberto Eco (Foucalt's Pendulum) and Thomas Pynchon (Vineland) cited by
McHale. Such examples in DeLillo's fiction distinguish themselves by their
relative brevity (the longest is five pages) and also by their frequent
reminders that what we are reading is a literary representation of a TV report.
In fact the narrative shuttles between offering representations of what is on
the screen and descriptions of the character's act of watching that TV-screen.
Yet although these distinctions are necessary, Mao II ought nonetheless to be
counted, along with Libra, among those postmodernist novels in which the
narrative is, at least momentarily, 'entrusted to some secondary medium
(movie, television, computer) represented in the verbal text.'
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Here and Now: Self-Conscious Postmodernism
What we have seen, then, over the last few pages is the expression formally in
DeLillo's fiction of the conventions, values and assumptions of a
postmodernist, consumerist culture and a late capitalist, commodity-saturated
social configuration. This expression comes as a result, as we noted earlier, of
the integration of the commodity structure itself into the very form of the
work of art, now redesigned as a text. In other words, we have been busy
indicating some of the ideological features of the text.
We shall see later, with the help of Paul Cantor, how a self-conscious
recognition of the ideological complicity is expressed in White Noise; for now,
though, we remain with Libra and Mao II in order to indicate the means by
which a similar self-consciousness finds expression there too. A recurrent
figure in DeLillo's novels is that of the author or artist, the 'men in small
rooms' who are also Nicholas Branch's subject. Film-makers figure
prominently in both Americana and The Names; Great Jones Street is the story of
a rock star, Ratner's Star that of a child maths prodigy; in Libra we find
Branch, Everett and Oswald, each in his own way attempting to write (or to
rewrite) certain narratives; Mao II, attaining a new level of explicitness, is
about a novelist. To define Win Everett as some sort of 'author', the creator of
a conspiratorial 'fiction', is also to highlight the double significance that
DeLillo allocates to the word 'plot'. Everett muses on his own plot, secretly
suspecting that what has begun as the simulacrum of an assassination
conspiracy will nonetheless result in a death. 'There is a tendency of plots to
move towards death,' he thinks. 'He believed that the idea of death is woven
into the nature of every plot. A narrative plot no less than a conspiracy of
armed men' (L, p.221). These thoughts match those of Jack Gladney in White
172
Noise (WN, p.26), and offer a further indication of the analogy DeLillo
implicitly draws between the construction of his own fiction and that of
Everett (not to mention Branch).
'Win Everett/ we read,
was at work devising a general shape, a life. He would script a
gunman out of ordinary dog-eared paper, the contents of a
wallet. Parmenter would contrive to get document blanks from
the Record Branch. Mackey would find a model for the
character Everett was in the process of creating. They wanted a
name, a face, a bodily frame they might use to extend their
fiction into the world. (L, p.50)
In a sense, Libra is full of authors. As well as attending to the as-yet-fictional
'other' that he wants to become, Oswald himself plans to write a book and is
somewhat put out when his mother announces her own authorial ambitions
(L, pp.277-278). Yet, really, they are all authors-manques, their own stories
taken over by others and ultimately submerged in the impersonal totalizing
dynamic of late capitalist history and society.
Perhaps an even more extreme case of the author's inability to evade
submersion in the consumerist society of the image or simulacrum is that of
Bill Gray, the novelist, in Mao II. Gray's reclusiveness, the distance he
imposes between himself and the outside world, ironically becomes the
reason for his unintended prominence in the world. He agrees to be
photographed in order to dispel, if only a little, the burdensome mystique that
has developed. His re-entrance into the public world, though, when it
extends to a planned public appearance in support of a kidnapped French
poet, leads eventually to his death. It is curious to reflect on the novel in the
light of Ernst Bloch's remarks on the novel of the artist, a genre to which Mao
IImight reasonably be expected to belong:
That which moves one in the novel of the artist itself ... is the
desire to break new ground, with knights, death, and the devil,
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to head for the envisioned Utopian castle or to that which
corresponds to its formation in shape, sound, or word.263
But Mao II is not really a novel of the artist in Bloch's sense; rather, it is a novel
of both the end of the artist and the mass production of artists, a novel in
which the loss of cultural autonomy has led inevitably to the artist's direct
complicity with, and destruction by, the social forces to which he/she
responds.
To point out these aspects of DeLillo's novels, though, is only to
indicate the presence on the level of thematics or content of that self-conscious
acknowledgement of ideological complicity of which I have been writing.
Perhaps even more significant are the means by which such self-
consciousness is expressed formally, through the narrative, structural and
stylistic techniques the novels employ. In this respect, it is the systematic
nature of DeLillo's novels that is most significant. Often, the texts seem to
foreground the extent to which they, themselves, constitute a totalizing
dynamic, a textual mechanism in which characters -- and even the narrator --
become mere functions of an apparently abstract and impersonal narrative
structure.
In DeLillo's novels characters sometimes seem to merge into one
another; they can become almost indistinguishable in the course of a short
dialogue. Witness, for example, the two Jacks (Karlinsky and Ruby)
discussing Oswald and the death of Kennedy:
"People want to lose him."
"You'll see total rejoice. As things now stand, Jack, what are you
worth to the city of Dallas? You're a Chicago guy to them.
You're an operator from the North. Worse, a Jew. You're a Jew
in the heart of the gentile machine. Who are we kidding here?
You're a strip joint owner. Asses and tits. That's what you
mean to Dallas."
263Ernst Bloch, 'A Philosophical View of the Novel of the Artist', in The Utopian Function of
Art and Literature, p.277.
"Who are we kidding?"
"Who are we kidding here?"
"When I think ofmy mother."
"Exactly what I'm saying."
"My mother went crazy in a big way. I can't describe the horror.
I used to look in her eyes and there was nothing there that you
could call a person. She screamed and raged. That was her life.
My father hit her. He hit us. She hit us. She thought we were
all shtupping each other. Brothers and sisters having constant
sex. I never went to school. I fought. I delivered envelopes for
A1 Capone."
"I'm saying. This is my point. It builds up a pressure that's bad
for us all."
There was a short heavy silence.
"Thank God he's not a Jew."
"Thank God whatever he is, at least he's not a Jew." (L, pp. 431-
432)
Lentricchia is surely right when he writes that '[t]he two Jacks are hard to tell
apart, which is the point.'264 In fact, we find that the whole narrative operates
in this manner. Lentricchia makes much of DeLillo's overall narrative
strategy in the novel: a third-person narration with frequent recourse to free
indirect discourse. He points out that the narrative voice in Libra does not
retain the distinct critical distance from its subject(s) that we might normally
expect. 'For the narrator in Libra is not DeLillo,' he writes, 'but DeLillo in
quotation marks: "DeLillo" as a voice crafted to perform virtuoso changes of
point of view that function as disconcerting repetitions of his characters'
obsessive shifts from first-person to third.'265 The effect is to reduce the
supposedly authoritative voice to the status of another character.
We can see quite clearly what Lentricchia means if we look at the
framing of one ofMarguerite Oswald's monologues:
Marguerite sat on the sofa watching TV.
It griped him to move to New York, which we travelled
all the way in that 1948 Dodge, but that's where John Edward
was stationed with his wife and baby and we are a family that
264Lentricchia, 'Libra as Postmodern Critique', p.213.
265Ibid, p.210.
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has never been able to stay together ... I have made my best
effort to raise my boy in this manner, regardless. Whatever is
said by them, and they are at it all the time, he knows who has
been his main support from the moment I took him home from
the Old French Hospital on Orleans Avenue. I am not the
looming mother of a boy's bad dreams.
George Gobel appeared on the screen, stubby, crew-cut,
with a wholesome smirk, right hand raised to the middle of his
forehead in some kind of fraternal small town salute.
Lee was in his room reading about the conversion of
surplus value into capital, following the text with his index
finger, word by word by word. (L, pp.48-49)
The narrative shifts from a third-person description of what Marguerite is
doing to her own first-person interior monologue and then back again to
the third-person narration without such shifts being marked in any way.
This is quite typical of the text; as Lentricchia notes, '"DeLillo's" voice fades
into his major characters, he becomes Ruby or Oswald, or the crowd
gaping at Kennedy, or Mrs. John Connolly in the limousine speeding to
Parkland Hospital ("those men dying in our arms").'266
In Mao II we see a similar technique at work. Scott's girlfriend, Karen,
is watching a TV programme on physical fitness; the narrator starts to
comment on her reactions:
She took it all in, she believed it all, pain, ecstasy, dog food, all
the seraphic matter, the baby bliss that falls from the air. Scott
stared at her and waited. She carried the virus of the future.
Quoting Bill. (Mil, p.119)
The penultimate sentence of this passage would appear to be an example of
free indirect discourse — the narrative is focalized through Scott — but what
about the last sentence? 'Quoting Bill' may be Scott's own comment on his
mental description of Karen, but it might equally be the narrator's. In a sense,
of course, this is just another instance of suspensive irony; but here it serves to
indicate, albeit subtly - through the reduction of characters and narrator to
266Ibid.
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mere transient functions of an impersonal, totalizing narrative — those social
conditions of systematic absorption and domination upon which the cultural
dominant of postmodernism (and its characteristic textual strategies, such as
suspensive irony) is predicated.
Yet while DeLillo's texts may indicate these social forces, it must be
borne in mind that they do so through their own overt and utterly self-
conscious reflection and expression of them. In other words, the social
critique implicit in the text's mimicry of forms of systematic absorption is here
expressed in terms of a further acknowledgement of the literary text's own
ideological complicity with such forms and processes. Tom LeClair, in In the
Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel, writes in a very different vein of the
systematic construction of DeLillo's texts, preferring to explore the affinities of
those texts with certain, rather hazily-defined 'systems theories'. It seems to
me that there is little of much interest generated by LeClair's particular
approach (other than an extremely diligent and informative chapter on
Ratner's Star). Nonetheless, the extent to which he highlights as a
characteristic feature of DeLillo's texts the absorption of characters into a
larger impersonal structure is, I think, incisive and potentially productive for
more materialist analyses.
Rather than proposing, then, a general preoccupation in DeLillo's
novels with systems and systems theory, I would prefer to interpret that
undoubted interest in terms of a more specific response to the systematic
structures of late or consumer capitalism. Discussing his novel Ratner's Star,
DeLillo, in a rare interview, offers the following comments:
I was trying to produce a book that would be naked structure.
The structure would be the book and vice versa. I wanted the
book to become what it was about. Abstract structures and
connective patterns. A piece of mathematics in short. To do
Ill
this, I felt I had to reduce the importance of people. The people
had to play a role subservient to pattern, form, and so on.267
This is also as far as LeClair takes us, noting of the novel that '[n]arration slips
rapidly and cleanly without transition among the characters, effectively
implying the continuous.'268 Modes of thought and aesthetic forms are,
however, intimately related to social and economic formations. We have
already seen how, in White Noise and Libra, characters are portrayed as the
haphazard constructions of dominant and ubiquitous social forces. It is
precisely these social conditions of which the subservience of character to
abstract pattern and form in DeLillo's texts -- extending beyond Ratner's Star
to Libra and to Mao II — is expressive. That Ratner's Star itself follows through
the logic of its own formally expressed domination of characters should be
evident from the attempt by the scientist Cheops Feeley to convince the
fourteen-year-old maths prodigy Billy Twillig to have implanted in his brain a
device that will help the business cartel which Feeley represents to
manipulate the international money curve, but which has the added side-
effect of allowing Billy only to experience and to perceive things in abstract
terms.269 Mathematical or scientific abstraction (which the text itself attempts
to mimic) thus serves to reinforce man's subservience to a global capitalist
network; or, as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer write in Dialectic of
Enlightenment, "The more the machinery of thought subjects existence to itself,
the more blind its resignation in reproducing existence.'270
Adorno and Horkheimer insist repeatedly on the relation — which is an
expressive one — of abstract, scientific, or enlightened categories of thought to
'the corresponding conditions of social reality — that is, of the division of
267Tom LeClair, 'An Interview with Don DeLillo', Contemporary Literature, 23 (1982), p.27.
268Tom LeClair, In the Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press,
1987), p.121.
269See Don DeLillo, Ratner's Star (London: Vintage, 1991), pp.243-247.
270Adorno & Horkheimer, p.27.
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labour.'271 The common feature they share, as DeLillo's texts also attest, is the
domination of the specific or individual by general or abstract categories or
forms. 'What is done to all by the few,' write Adorno and Horkheimer,
always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many:
social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a
collective. It is this unity of the collectivity and domination . . .
which is expressed in thought forms.272
While recognising that this is the form in which social domination commonly
manifests itself, it must equally be borne in mind that 'even the threatening
collective belongs only to the deceptive surface, beneath which are concealed
the powers which manipulate it as an instrument of power.'273 What
ultimately concern here both the authors of Dialectic of Enlightenment and
DeLillo are methods of reification, that process by which, in the words of
Georg Lukacs, 'a relation between people takes on the character of a thing.'274
In order to grasp substantially the means by which such a concept
might illuminate DeLillo's work, it is necessary to understand the complex
and mystificatory forms that social domination (and, subsequently,
reification) takes. The logic, therefore, of the last two quotations from
Dialectic of Enlightenment might be adequately synthesised in the following
passage:
It is not merely that domination is paid for by the alienation of
men from the objects dominated: with the objectification of
spirit, the very relations ofmen — even those of the individual to
himself — were bewitched.275
Although the human subject might appear to be the dominating agent —
whether through the application of rational abstraction or technology, or in




274Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', p.83.
275Adorno & Horkheimer, p.28.
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same structures of domination. It is in the figure of the crowd that DeLillo
demonstrates this in his novels.
The opening pages of White Noise depict one of DeLillo's many crowd
scenes. The families file to the College-on-the-Hill in their station wagon,
each bearing the products and belongings that identify their owners as
sharers in the good life. As Jack Gladney reflects,
This assembly of station wagons, as much as anything they
might do in the course of the year, more than formal liturgies or
laws, tells the parents they are a collection of the likeminded
and the spiritually akin, a people, a nation. (WN, pp.3-4)
Like those who assemble in their local supermarkets, the students' parents
became a crowd (or late-capitalist community) as a result of commodity
consumption. The same is also true of the Gladney family. According to
Thomas J. Ferraro ('Whole Families Shopping at Night!'), what DeLillo
demonstrates in his depiction of the Gladneys is 'the way the colonization of
the home by mass-culture achieves this effect of a "close-knit nuclear family"
without the ties of marriage and blood that, at least theoretically, grounded
such families.'276 Instead, the family is united through a shared experience of
commodity and image consumption. The family nights in front of the TV and
the communal shopping expedition are, in White Noise, enough to forge and to
maintain a familial bond.
The first chapter in Mao II, depicting a mass wedding of Moonies, ends
portentously: 'The future belongs to crowds.' But in the course of the novel
there are no more crowd-scenes. Instead, there are descriptions of characters
watching crowds on TV. For the most part these characters witness violence
and destructiveness, which the crowds are sometimes responsible for and at
other times are subjected to. Just as important as the crowds on the screen,
however, is the other crowd -- that of voyeurs — that the text implies. In Libra,
276Thomas J. Ferraro, 'Whole Families Shopping at Night!', in New Essays, p.20.
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Beryl Parmenter, watching the replay of Oswald's murder on TV, is
convinced that Oswald looks straight into the camera just before his death
and that he seems now to be staring at her out of the screen. She thinks that
this in some way unites Oswald with the viewers, that they all somehow form
a crowd. If they do, it is surely the modern (or postmodern) form of the
'baiting crowd' of which Elias Canetti writes in Crowds and Power. Canetti's
crowd is one of newspaper readers, but its features remain broadly applicable
to the tube-watching populace of DeLillo's texts:
Disgust at collective killing is of very recent date and should not
be over-estimated. Today everyone takes part in public
executions through the newspapers. Like everything else,
however, it is more comfortable than it was. We sit peacefully
at home and, out of a hundred details, can choose those to linger
over which offer a special thrill. We only applaud when
everything is over and there is no feeling of guilty connivance to
spoil our pleasure. We are not responsible for the sentence, nor
for the journalists who report its execution, nor for the papers
which print them. None the less, we know more about the
business than our predecessors, who may have walked miles to
see it, hung around for hours, and, in the end, seen very little.
The baiting crowd is preserved in the newspaper reading
public, in a milder form it is true, but, because of its distance
from events, a more responsible one. One is tempted to say that
it is the most despicable and, at the same time the most stable
form of such a crowd. Since it does not even have to assemble,
it escapes disintegration; variety is catered for by the daily
reappearance of the papers.277
Through the mass consumption of images, then, as much as through that of
Waffelos and the Mystic mints (a distinction which, in the age of simulacra, is
no longer particularly necessary), the characters of DeLillo's texts are drawn
into the structures and thought patterns of the crowd. Thus these characters
are reified both on the level of narrative technique by their overt absorption
into an abstract, impersonal narrative structure (especially in novels such as
277Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power, trans. Carol Stewart (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973),
pp.59-60.
181
Ratner's Star, Libra and Mao II) and on the level of narrative content by their
individual submersion in the crowd of commodity/image consumers.
Yet, as members of a crowd ~ and particularly of the (post)modern
form of the baiting crowd ~ the characters of DeLillo's novels must at least
appear, albeit symptomatically, as agents as well as victims of domination.
Canetti notes, in connection with such crowds, the following reflection:
The threat of death hangs over all men and, however disguised
it may be, and even if it is sometimes forgotten, it affects them
all at the time and creates in them a need to deflect death onto
others. The formation of baiting crowds answers this need.278
Jack Gladney, in the course of a seminar he shares with Murray, comes to a
near identical conclusion:
Crowds came to form a shield against their own dying. To
become a crowd is to keep out death. To break off from the
crowd is to risk death as an individual, to face dying alone.
Crowds came for this reason above all others. They were there
to be a crowd. (WN, p.73)
To be part of a crowd is to be dominated, reified, but it is also to attempt to
dominate death and may therefore take the form of a need to displace death
through the murderous domination of others. The taking of Dylar, then, the
consumption of a medication that dispels one's fear of death, works in the
novel as a metaphor for any form of consumption (the means by which one
becomes part of a crowd).
When Jack finds that Babette's supply of Dylar has been extinguished,
he is led to carry out the extreme logic of the equation between the
suppression of fear of death that the consumption of Dylar offers and the
displacement of death resulting from the violent domination of others: he
decides to kill Willie Mink and to steal his stash of Dylar. In doing so, Jack is
living out the theoretical speculations of his friend Murray:
278Ibid, p.56.
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I believe, Jack, there are two kinds of people in the world.
Killers and diers. Most of us are diers. We don't have the
disposition, the rage, or whatever it takes to be a killer. We let
death happen. We lie down and die. But think what it's like to
be a killer. Think how exciting it is, in theory, to kill another
person in direct confrontation. If he dies, you cannot. To kill
him is to gain life-credit. The more people you kill, the more
credit you store up. It explains any number of massacres, wars,
executions. (WN, p.290)
He continues:
It's a way of controlling death. A way of gaining the ultimate
upper hand. Be the killer for a change. Let someone else be the
dier. Let him replace you, theoretically, in that role. You can't
die if he does. He dies, you live. See how marvelously simple.
(WN, p.291)
Murray's ideas are borrowed directly from Canetti's Crowds and Power, where
they are discussed in the chapter on 'The Survivor'. In Canetti's portrayal the
survivor usually manifests himself as a murderous psychopath for whom
killing becomes a passion; the unspoken exemplar of such a figure, haunting
Canetti's book as he does more overtly White Noise, is of course the subject of
Jack Gladney's study: Adolf Hitler.
Where these lead Jack - the conspiring forces of consumption and
domination — is to the motel room of Willie Mink and there to the very brink
of murder. It is at this point in the novel, though, that DeLillo depicts the
inter-relation of those forces and the loss of cultural autonomy that we noted
earlier providing both the cultural context and subject matter of White Noise.
It is worth looking closely at the scene of the shooting:
I fired the gun, the weapon, the pistol, the firearm, the
automatic. The sound snowballed in the white room, adding on
reflected waves. I watched blood spurt from the victim's
midsection. A delicate arc. I marveled at the rich color, sensed
the color-causing action of non-nucleated cells. The flow
diminished to a trickle, spread across the tile floor. I saw
beyond words I knew what red was, saw it in terms of
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dominant wavelength, luminance, purity. Mink's pain was
beautiful, intense. (WN, p.312)
The violence is experienced by Jack in terms of its aesthetic features: he notes
the blood's colour, its viscosity, the 'delicate arc' in which it spurts; to Jack, his
victim's pain is beautiful. In a sense, then, the side effect of Dylar that forces
Mink to react to words as though they were their own referents is merely a
more acute reflection of the state of mind that Jack has adopted as a side-effect
of commodity reification and the dialectical inter-penetration of the object and
cultural realms — an association which offers yet further evidence of the
function Dylar plays in the novel as a metaphor for commodity/image
consumption, and therefore for participation in late capitalist society in
general.
In Libra we see a similar process, although the emphasis is placed on
the actual ramifications of this aestheticization of violence. Preparing himself
for the forthcoming assassination attempt, Frank Vasquez, one of the hired
hit-men, muses on his time in Cuba with Castro:
On his fourth day with Castro he shot a government scout,
aiming through a telescopic sight. It was uncanny. You press a
button and a man drops dead a hundred meters away. It
seemed hollow and remote, falsifying everything. It was a trick
of the lenses. The man is an accurate picture. Then he is upside
down. Then he is right side up. You shoot at a series of images
conveyed to you through a metal tube. The force of a death
should be enormous but how can you know what kind of man
you've killed or who was the braver or stronger if you have to
peer through layers of glass that deliver the image but obscure
the meaning of the act? War has a conscience or it's ordinary
murder. (L, p297-298)
The terrible thing about this violence is that it is an indifferent violence,
nonchalant and meaningless, a depthless form of violence for a depthless,
postmodern age. For another of the conspirators, the planned assassination
itself begins to resemble a movie:
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It hit Wayne Elko with a flash and roar that this was like Seven
Samurai. In which free-lance warriors are selected one at a time
to carry out a dangerous mission. In which men outside society
are called on to save a helpless people from destruction.
Swinging those two-handed swords. (L, p.178)
In the 'Culture Industry' chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno
and Horkheimer insist on the violence that is a consequence of the culture
industry. That violence exists essentially in the role played by the culture
industry in carrying out its ideological function and ensuring that the
individual 'wholly identifies himself with the power which is belaboring
him.'279 In order to do this, it attempts to impose and to enforce the false
identity of the individual and society; all, of course, in the service of the
dominant order or class. It is in this 'miracle of integration' that Adorno and
Horkheimer find the roots of the culture industry's essential likeness to the
barbaric culmination of bourgeois enlightenment: namely, fascism.
Where the culture industry differs from previous -- and similarly
ideological ~ cultural manifestations of the superstructure is in its loss of
autonomy. Whereas the great bourgeois artworks of the past embodied a
negative Utopian moment in their professed autonomy from economic life,
the culture industry 'can pride itself on having energetically executed the
previously clumsy transportation of art into the sphere of consumption.'280
Consequently, the pleasure that the culture offers is, in Adorno's and
Horkheimer's words, that of flight: 'not, as is asserted, flight from a wretched
reality, but from the last remaining thought of resistance.'281 Loss of cultural
autonomy thus marks a new stage in the history of ideological domination,
one in which the relation between the cultural realm (now redesignated the
'culture industry') and other areas of the social totality, such as the economic




and the political, has undergone such a transformation that the sinister
aestheticization of social conflict that Walter Benjamin associated in The
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' with fascism is regularly
accepted as the daily, democratic norm.
The association of the culture industry, or a cultural realm that no
longer claims for itself the autonomy it once did, with forces of domination
and terror is one that is distinctly recognisable from the pages of DeLillo's
fiction. In Mao II this takes the form of a kidnap which is staged from the very
outset as a media event. Rather more indirectly, it is an association that might
be inferred from the discussions between Bill Gray, the novelist, and George
Haddad, the academic spokesperson for the group responsible for the kidnap.
George asks Bill whether he uses a word processor; Bill does not. George
recommends one: '[T]he machine helps me organise my thoughts,' he says,
'gives me a text susceptible to revision' (Mil, pp.137-8). Later he brings the
subject up again: 'I'm still convinced you ought to get one. Instant corrections
... the text, is lightweight, malleable. It doesn't restrict or inhibit' (Mil, p.161).
The text, he says, 'is lightweight, malleable'; 'the machine helps me organise
my thoughts.' What thoughts are these? George goes on to speak of Mao:
Mao the poet, Mao the cult. The novelist replies:
The question you have to ask is, How many dead? How many
dead during the Cultural Revolution? How many dead after the
Great Leap Forward? And how well did he hide his dead? This
is the other question. What do these men do with the millions
they kill? (Mil, pl63)
On the one hand, there are lightweight, malleable texts; on the other: violence,
mass murder. In White Noise this same juxtaposition is achieved through the
figures of Elvis and Hitler.
What Fredric Jameson has called 'the relief of the postmodern' --
lightweight texts, art as commodity — is placed side by side with the icons of
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terror. The particular question of the juxtaposition in White Noise of Elvis and
Hitler has provoked somewhat troubled musings among DeLillo's critics. It is
therefore worth looking briefly at two diametrically opposed critical
responses while noting that both are quite breathtakingly wide of the mark.
Both, in fact, proceed from the same, fatally flawed premise: namely, that
Elvis and Hitler represent two alternatives in direct opposition to one another.
For Bruce Bawer ('Don DeLillo's America'), DeLillo posits contemporary, late
capitalist America as the destroyer of man's natural, savage state. 'In DeLillo's
overly diagrammatic world,' he writes, 'savagery is the only alternative to
depersonalization by means of sensory overload; only through a pure, brutal
physicality can one reclaim one's selfhood.'282 Speculating on the ubiquity of
Hitler throughout DeLillo's oeuvre, Bawer writes, 'The reason is obvious:
Hitler is the ultimate example of twentieth-century man reverting to
primitivism.' DeLillo's point, therefore, is equally obvious (or 'unmistakable'
in Bawer's words): 'Hitler was just like us. We are all Hitler.' For Bawer, then,
DeLillo's fiction can be summed up in the following terms: 'A craving for
primitive destructiveness dwells deep in all our hearts ... it is what makes us
human.' Given the choice of Elvis or Hitler, Bawer seems in little doubt that
DeLillo would plump for the greater authenticity of the latter.
Frank Lentricchia, in 'Tales of the Electronic Tribe', comes to precisely
the opposite conclusion. Referring to the periodic note of awe and sense of
mystery in Jack's voice as he speaks of those commodity cultural forces that
bind his family and community together ~ principally the supermarket and
the TV — Lentricchia contends that DeLillo offers us the choice of consumer
culture or authoritarian terror:
Would we prefer that Jack give up the supermarket, the mall,
his family, the nights gathered around the TV, for another,
282Bruce Bawer, 'Don DeLillo's America', The New Criterion, 3, No. 8 (1985), p.35.
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chilling guarantor of community, who lurks in the background
of White Noise, as in the background of a number of modernist
literary monuments — the specter of the totalitarian, the gigantic
charismatic figure who triggers our desire to give in, to merge
our frightened selves in his frightening authority? Hitler,
another kind of epic hero, voice of national solidarity, is the
other object of Jack's awe.283
Lentricchia's DeLillo, like that of Bawer, juxtaposes the figures of Elvis and
Hitler primarily in order to contrast them, to posit one as the other's contrary
alternative. In truth, of course, DeLillo does nothing of the sort. That these
two critics should reach opposite conclusions is therefore relatively
unimportant; somewhat more significant, instead, is their unwillingness to
grapple with the far more troubling and more complex relationship
constructed in DeLillo's fiction — and particularly in White Noise -- between
the contemporary American culture industry and German Nazism.
This is a relationship treated with rather more attentiveness in a study
called "Adolf, We Hardly Knew You" by Paul Cantor.284 Cantor points to
certain problems with Bawer's thesis, particularly to the difficulty of claiming
that DeLillo implicitly associates Hitler with a vision of human authenticity in
relation to which Elvis and the inauthentic American consumer culture stand
in unflattering contrast. Nazi Germany, he writes, is shown to have been just
as much a facade as contemporary America. He cites Jack's comments on
Albert Speer:
I told Murray that Albert Speer wanted to build structures that
would decay, gloriously, impressively, like Roman Ruins. No
rusty hulks or gnarled steel slums. He knew that Hitler would
be in favor of anything that might astonish posterity. He did a
drawing of a Reich structure that was to be built of special
materials, allowing it to crumble romantically ~ a drawing of
fallen walls, half columns furled in wisteria. The ruin is built
into the creation, I said, which shows a certain nostalgia behind
283Lentricchia, 'Tales of the Electronic Tribe', p.112.
284Paul Cantor, "'Adolf, We Hardly Knew You'", in New Essays, pp.39-62.
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the power principle, or a tendency to organize the longings of
future generations. (WN, pp.257-8)
'We see here,' writes Cantor, 'that the Nazis were themselves imitating a
model of earlier greatness, namely, ancient Rome (a pattern even clearer in
the Italian brand of fascism).'285 The aesthetic side of Nazism was, he says, 'a
derivative aesthetic'. Thus it is the inauthenticity of the Hitler figure upon
which DeLillo dwells, contrary to Bawer's interpretation. This should not be
surprising, as the inclination of fascist movements toward imitation had
already been noted by Adorno and Horkheimer:
The carefully thought out symbols (which are proper to every
counterrevolutionary movement), the skulls and disguises, the
barbaric drum beats, the monotonous repetition of words and
gestures, are simply the organized imitation of magic practices,
the mimesis of mimesis.286
It would also be appropriate to bear in mind at this point John Dos Passos's
prescient remark, as early as 1934, that '[William Randolph] Hearst is
handsome Adolph's schoolteacher.'
Nevertheless, if DeLillo's text is to offer a proper critique of fascism
and the fascist impulse, it must surely note the inauthenticity of the
movement while simultaneously insisting on its savagery and barbarism.
This White Noise is conspicuously unable to do. For all Jack's bluster about the
terrifying phenomenon that Hitler represents, the Hitler of White Noise
remains a curiously domesticated figure, easily assimilated into a university
curriculum:
Advanced Nazism, three hours a week, restricted to qualified
seniors, a course of study designed to cultivate historical
perspective, theoretical rigor and mature insight into the
continuing mass appeal of Fascist tyranny, with special
emphasis on parades, rallies and uniforms, three credits, written
reports. (WN, p.25)
285Ibid, p.55.
286Adorno & Horkheimer, p.185.
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When he introduces the delegates to the Hitler conference, Jack says,
I talked mainly about Hitler's mother, brother and dog ... I
made many references to Wolf, many more to the mother and
brother, a few to shoes and socks, a few to jazz, beer and
baseball. (WN, p.25)
No one seems to think this strange. Jack and Murray interweave biographical
details of Hitler and Elvis as though there are no necessary distinctions to be
made between the two; for Jack, the differences are of scale rather than of
pathology; he knows that the association of Hitler with Elvis can do nothing
but good to the prospects of 'Elvis Studies'.
In one of DeLillo's earlier novels, Running Dog, we find another
transformation of the Hitler figure. In this novel, a number of different
groups are searching for a film reportedly made in Hitler's bunker in Berlin
just before the end. There are rumours that the film is pornographic.
Eventually it is found:
The camera is trained on the man's face. Again it moves,
coming in for a medium close-up.
Eyes blank.
Little or no hair alongside his ears.




Head shaking, he acknowledges the presence of the
camera. It pulls back. The man moves forward, walking in a
screwy mechanical way. Here the camera pans the audience.
As the man enters the room, the adults show outsized delight,
clearly meant to prompt the children, who may or may not be
familiar with Charlie Chaplin.287
Hitler is doing a Chaplin impersonation. Citing this passage, Jack's cinema-
influenced musings on Attila the Hun in White Noise, and his meeting with
the postmodern nuns who hold to a mere simulacrum of faith, Cantor points
287Don DeLillo, Running Dog (London: Picador, 1992), p.235.
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to DeLillo's inability 'to keep postmodernism delimited.' 'As its name
indicates,' he writes,
postmodernism must be defined in contrast to something else,
what came before it. But like many others today, DeLillo keeps
wanting to extend the range of postmodernism, above all to
keep pushing it farther and farther back into the past, until it
threatens to lose all meaning as a distinctive term. This process
seems to be the logical outcome of the very concept of
postmodernism.288
Consequently, for Cantor, (in one of the most perceptive comments yet
written on DeLillo):
DeLillo himself seems unable to break out of the postmodern
circle and offer a convincing alternative to its diminished reality.
In short, he can give us a vision of the inauthentic but not, it
seems, of the authentic. DeLillo is sufficiently distanced from
postmodern existence to want to be able to criticize it, but
sufficiently implicated in it to have a hard time finding an
Archimedean point from which to do the criticizing.289
In a sense, then, DeLillo's position might be compared to that of Jack Gladney
once he has finished his monologue on the phenomenon and function of the
crowd: 'People gathered round, students and staff, and in the mild din of half
heard remarks and orbiting voices I realized we were now a crowd' (WN,
p.74).
Central, though, to Cantor's argument is an understanding of the
postmodern as a historical stage which repudiates the very concept of history
and historical specificity itself. The inability of DeLillo 'to keep
postmodernism delimited' ought then to be seen as an example of this
dismissal of history in much the same way as we might understand the
nonchalance with which Jack and Babette discuss their choice of
pornographic reading material: 'Pick your century' (WN, p29). The crucial




the work of art of its transformed relation to the commodity sphere. Adorno,
in an essay called 'The Schema of Mass Culture', notes the following:
History is extruded from tales which have become cultural
commodities, even and especially there where historical themes
are exploited. History as such becomes a costume identified
with the individual concealing the frozen modernity of
monopoly and state capitalism.290
This ahistoricism, which DeLillo's texts both represent and embody, can be
traced in the Adornian formulation to the dissipation of that conflict with
economic life which art had previously retained in its radical autonomy and
its disavowal of social utility. Thus in the same essay, Adorno goes on to
write of 'the emergence of that false reconciliation, the absorption of every
negative counter-instance by an omnipotent reality, the elimination of
dissonance in the bad totality.'291 Yet while it is only with this surrender to an
utter conflictlessness that art 'turn[s] completely into the lie to which it has
always contributed its part in the past', to Adorno the preservation of conflict
in the work of art would represent an indefensible lie, 'transfiguring] the
world into one in which conflict is still possible rather than revealing it as one
in which the omnipotent power of production is beginning ever more
obviously to repress such a possibility.'292 This argument leads to an impasse;
or, at least, so it would appear. It is time to see, in the concluding section of
this chapter, which routes or strategies, if any, might provide an escape to
something other than passive acceptance or blind delusion.




DeLillo: From Modernism to Postmodernism
The evolution of cultural forms and its relation to the historical situation is
speculatively sketched out by Fredric Jameson in The Political Unconscious:
[T]he relationship of the ... historical situation to the text is not
construed as causal (however that might be imagined) but
rather as one of a limiting situation; the historical moment is
here understood to block off or shut down a certain number of
formal possibilities available before, and to open up determinate
new ones, which may or may not ever be realized in artistic
practice.293
Jameson's formulation can be to some degree rebuked, however, by Raymond
Williams' notion of 'residual' and 'emergent' forms which are always to be
seen in a dynamic relationship with the 'dominant'.294 As it appears in The
Political Unconscious, Jameson's conception of the permissibility or otherwise
of artistic forms and techniques does not allow adequate scope for such
conflicts, apparently denying at least the validity of 'residual' forms unless
they are to be seen as nostalgic deception. In Postmodernism, however, he
insists on the need to picture the postmodern as 'the force field in which very
different kinds of cultural impulses — what Raymond Williams has usefully
termed "residual" and "emergent" forms of cultural production make their
way.'295
The slight, but nonetheless significant, confusion of these two passages
appears, in the light of Jameson's book on Adorno (Late Marxism: Adorno, or,
The Persistence of the Dialectic), to be mainly the product of Jameson's reading
of the latter's Aesthetic Theory. Jameson writes that Adorno's conception of the
New is that it originates in the exclusion of older forms or ideas:
293Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p.148.
294See Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977), pp.121-127.
295Jameson, Postmodernism, p.6.
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. . . what is new about the Novum is less the work itself ... than
these new prohibitions, about which it would therefore be better
to say, not that they tell you what not to do, but rather that they
spell out what is no longer to be done; what you cannot do any
more.296
Clearly it is from this model that Jameson takes his own in The Political
Unconscious. However, Adorno's construction is not, in truth, quite as steel-
clad as Jameson's gloss on it (through an interesting omission) would suggest.
Having stated precisely what Jameson represents him as doing, Adorno goes
on to qualify this:
It would be a mistake ... to hypostatize historically grown
prohibitions as though they were irrevocable. To do so is to
provoke a reaction that is prevalent in Cocteau's brand of
modernism and which consists of a favourite slight of hand
whereby the prohibited quality is all of a sudden magically
pulled out of a hat and presented as though it were brand new ~
a modernism that gets its kicks from breaking the taboos of
modernism. What is valid in this otherwise reactionary
modernism is the implicit assumption that taboos are not
forever. However, this return of the tabooed should not take the
form of a harking back to unproblematic categories and
solutions; rather, what may legitimately return are past
problems.297
The example to which Adorno points is Schonberg's remark that harmony is
'out of the question for the time being'. Denying that this indicates the
possibility of a return to triple-chords, Adorno suggests, instead, that it is 'the
general question of simultaneity in music' that remains open, making possible
a future working out-of this question which might involve the development
of a new form of harmony, itself intimately related to a transformed historical
situation. As we shall see, this return of 'past problems' is precisely what
functions, in a revealing and determinedly historically-specific way, as the
Utopian feature of the internal dialectic of Don DeLillo's postmodernist
296Fredric Jameson, LateMarxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso,
1991), p.192.
297Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp.53-54.
194
fiction, thereby producing the potential of that 'alternative or even
oppositional relation to the dominant culture' which Raymond Williams
associates with certain 'residual' cultural forms.298
Before going on to examine how this operates in textual practice, it is
worth acknowledging the importance to a proper reading of DeLillo of the
subtle distinction between Art in general (particularly as it is grasped
abstractly through the construction of a cultural dominant) and the individual
text which situates itself in relation to Art and its cultural dominant. Of
course, this is my intention throughout this work; in the specific instance of
DeLillo, however, it is necessary to go further and to identify that relation,
along with Fredric Jameson and Theodor Adorno,299 as one of dialectical
conflict in which the individual work of art 'works on' the guilt (that is, the
ideological complicity) of Art while remaining unable ever to disassociate
itself from that same guilt of social and class domination.
To demonstrate how this form of critique, whose subject is both the
cultural dominant of postmodernism and the individual texts themselves,
manifests itself in DeLillo's fiction shall, then, be our chief preoccupation in
the brief reminder of this chapter. For Frank Lentricchia the issue is clear cut;
he concludes his 'Introduction' to New Essays on 'White Noise' with the
following judgement:
Impulses aesthetic and critical have ~ classically — stood in
starkest opposition, but they go together in the modernist idea
of literature, perhaps no more seamlessly than in Don DeLillo,
last of the modernists, who takes for his critical object of
aesthetic concern the postmodern situation.300
298Williams, p.122.
299See Jameson, LateMarxism, p.130. This theme will be discussed more fully, and in more
theoretical terms, in the final chapter.
300Lentricchia, "Introduction', in New Essays, p.14.
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Lentricchia's DeLillo, 'last of the modernists', achieves his critical distance
unproblematically, through the subjection of a postmodern historical (and
historico-cultural) situation to the rigorous scrutiny of modernist critical
aesthetics. The whole tenor of Lentricchia's essay on Libra ('Libra as
Postmodern Critique') also conforms to this assumption. Yet, as we have
seen, there are both formal and thematic features of the texts that would
contradict this all too comfortable conclusion, situating DeLillo's texts firmly
within what for Jameson is the 'force-field' of postmodernism rather than
seeking some elevated or external aesthetic space that the unsullied modernist
might occupy and from which his/her unflinching stare might be trained on
contemporary cultural degradation.
The somewhat mistaken conclusion to which Frank Lentricchia holds
does, however, highlight one of the most important aspects of DeLillo's texts:
namely, the relationship which they establish between modernist and
postmodernist aesthetics. Focusing on this same issue, Noel King, in 'Reading
White Noise: Floating Remarks', asks the sort of question that seems to
underlie Lentricchia's comment:
What exactly is the relation of White Noise to the category of the
postmodern? Is it to be called a postmodern novel because it
talks about postmodern sunsets, semiotics and simulacra? Is it
postmodern in the sense that the novels of Pynchon, Gaddis and
Coover are termed postmodern?
Or is it, rather, a slyly modernist meditation on
postmodern themes?301
Although he draws on certain of Fredric Jameson's analyses of the
postmodern and alludes once or twice to Walter Benjamin, King's essay is
only superficially materialist in approach, evading questions of ideology and
seeking to establish a privileged position for what he calls the 'ficto-critical',
under whose banner he wishes to situate White Noise. As King depicts it,
301Noel King, 'Reading White Noise: Floating Remarks', Critical Quarterly, 33 (1991), p.69.
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White Noise offers provisional, hesitant critique, discovering some form of
positive worth in a hazy ambivalence of which King himself offers no
analysis. While identifying the same dilemma that provokes Lentricchia's
remarks, King does not in actual fact ever get around to addressing it in any
serious fashion, allowing it instead to float away harmlessly out of sight.
If we are to see a proper engagement of the issue, whose conclusion
might be juxtaposed with that of Lentricchia, it is necessary to turn once again
to Leonard Wilcox. In 'Baudrillard, DeLillo's White Noise and the End of
Heroic Narrative', Wilcox identifies Jack Gladney, the narrator of White Noise,
as 'a modernist displaced in a postmodern world'. Even the flight from a
threatening external world to a secure, if besieged, inner-consciousness is no
longer an option for Gladney, whose own subjectivity, as we have seen, has
itself been thoroughly saturated by the white noise of advertising slogans and
commodity brand names. Of crucial significance, however, is the step by
which Wilcox extends his argument:
Moreover, for Baudrillard and DeLillo the dissolution of a
modernist subjectivity in the mire of contemporary media and
technology is integrally connected to another issue: the passing
of the great modernist notions of artistic impulse and
representation, the demise of notions of a "heroic" search for
alternative, creative forms of consciousness, and the idea of art
as specially endowed revelation.302
It is, then, as we have already noted, precisely that desire, in Ernst Bloch's
words, 'to head for the envisioned Utopian castle or to that which corresponds
to its formation in shape, sound, or word' of which DeLillo, as a
postmodernist novelist, no longer has any proper means of expression.
However, moving closer to Lentricchia's position, Wilcox points to a
certain ambiguity in DeLillo's work. 'DeLillo's novels,' he writes:
302wilcox, p.348.
197
engage historical and political issues; they do not exhibit the
ahistoricism and pastiched depthlessness often associated with
postmodernism. If his works exhibit the postmodern concern
with the unstable nature of subjectivity and textuality, with
representation and narrative process, his postmodernism retains
the legacy of the modernist impulse to explore consciousness
and selfhood and to create an imaginative vision that probes
and criticises its subject matter.303
Attempting to justify such a claim - a claim which insists on DeLillo's ability
to evade those very features of the postmodern (principally ahistoricism and
depthlessness) by which we have seen him so firmly constrained — Wilcox
invokes DeLillo's 'belief that fictional narrative can provide critical distance
from and a critical perspective on the processes it depicts.'304 A detailed
reading, however, as Paul Cantor has shown us, reveals that it is precisely the
absence of such a critical distance and the inability to escape from a
postmodernist ahistoricism that White Noise itself represents. As we are about
to see, though, there is a hitherto unsuspected sense in which Lentricchia,
Wilcox and Cantor are all in fact correct.
During the course of an interview with Tom LeClair, DeLillo was
asked about his literary influences:
The books I remember and come back to seem to be the ones
that demonstrate the possibilities of fiction. Pale Fire, Ulysses,
The Death of Virgil, Under the Volcano, The Sound and the Fury -
these come to mind. There's a drive and a daring that go
beyond technical invention. I think it's right to call it a life-drive
even though these books deal at times very directly with death.
No optimism, no pessimism. No homesickness for lost values
or for the way fiction used to be written. These books open out
into some larger mystery. I don't know what to call it. Maybe
Hermann Broch would call it "the word beyond speech."305
There is, here, that same attachment to art as mystery thatWilcox emphasises,





recognition of the power of that which cannot be expressed, that to which at
present there is no aesthetic access. In the case of Don DeLillo's fiction, that
which can never quite struggle to expression — and whose non-expression
renders the texts complicit with those social forms of which they seek to offer
a critique — is a meaningful sense of history and historical conflict.
To that extent, Paul Cantor is entirely correct: DeLillo's representations
of the postmodern remain determined by the ideology of the postmodern
itself. However, it is revealing to view this inability of the texts to oppose
such determination in the light of their continual — perhaps, at times, even
excessive — meditations upon the transformed relation, and its implications,
of the contemporary cultural realm to the political and economic: namely,
upon that corner-stone of postmodern ideology, the loss of cultural
(semi)autonomy. In the Adornian formulation, as we have seen, it is that loss
of autonomy which perverts any aesthetic representation of history. What
actually occurs, then, in DeLillo's excessive preoccupation with the
interpenetration of the cultural and the economic is a self-conscious
meditation upon the ideological forces of the postmodern -- from which his
texts cannot escape — and the necessary complicity of cultural documents
with such forces. This is a form of self-critique. Or, rather, it is not quite so
yet. Such a claim remains unjustified until it can be shown that DeLillo's
texts, through the self-consciousness of their ideological function and its
determining conditions, are able to achieve an internal reflection of the
conflicts and contradictions of historical processes; in other words, to achieve
a properly historical internal dialectic.
As we saw in chapter one, following the arguments of Adorno and
Peter Burger, the coming to self-consciousness of ideological complicity --
often expressed as artistic guilt — is essentially a feature of modernist art and
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aesthetics. The resurrection of such concerns in DeLillo's fiction is, then,
somewhat anachronistic. In fact, though, it is precisely through this
anachronism that DeLillo justifies, in a curious sense, Frank Lentricchia's
definition of him as a modernist. Unable to employ in a plausible way
modernist aesthetic strategies of historical representation, DeLillo instead
reinvokes modernism in the return of a 'past problem', that of the problematic
and ideological relation of the work of art to dominant social forces. His very
inability, then, to find an adequate force of opposition to the ideology of the
postmodern, the incapacity to retain an inner-conflict which would not be
mere nostalgic delusion, results -- through a process of 'working on' that same
guilty incapacity of the aesthetic sphere in general ~ in the reinscription in
DeLillo's texts ofprecisely such a force, this time envisaged as the internal conflicts of
modernism to zvhich the postmodern itself as the ahistoric pastiche of the avant-garde
that zve witnessed in chapter one, comes as a false resolution.
Just as in White Noise the American culture industry (in the figure of
Elvis) is juxtaposed, though necessarily unsuccessfully, with the terrifying
manipulation of totalitarian forces (Hitler), the cultural moment of the
postmodern is silently brought face to face with its no longer representable
origins in the internal contradictions of modernism. Whereas the attempt to
establish a critical relationship between Hitler and Elvis must end in failure,
through the text's incapacity to represent the former as anything other than a
postmodernist cultural construct, the establishment of a paradoxical
relationship between modernism and postmodernism is both successful to
and to some extent liberating — expressing, as it does, the dialectical process
of historical transition in a way that is critical of, because rendered
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impermissible by, the cultural dominant of postmodernism and its necessary
economic correlative, late capitalism.306
There is also, as Frank Lentricchia writes, a similar relationship being
evoked in Libra:
One of Libra's more uncanny effects is anachronistic: DeLillo's
wager is that we will read the book out of the political history
that Watergate and Iran-Contra has made, as if Watergate and
Iran-Contra preceded 22 November 1963, as if the novel's
narration of the events of twenty-five years past made that day
in November contemporaneous with its retelling.307
Thus, Lentricchia continues:
The book's cultural logic encourages us to read JFK as a
postmodern figure and Ronald Reagan, the actor who was
known to gloss affairs of state with lines from his old movies, as
the president we had to have, the chief executive of
postmodernism.308
The point is made through something of an exaggeration, but is no less valid
for that. What DeLillo continually attempts to portray are the dialectical
processes of historical development, whereby relations between historical
and/or historico-cultural eras might be shown in terms both of their causal
progression and of their radical difference, retaining throughout a sense of the
inner contradictions of each era which might lead to either or both of these
possible forms of relation. In White Noise that attempt necessarily fails; there
is no narrative recourse to the pre-postmodern. In Libra the failure is less
palpable, more muted; its representation of history depends, as Lentricchia
concedes, on an acknowledgement that cannot be voiced of the text's status as
one rooted in the Reagan 1980s. Never fully present, the relationship that the
text implicitly establishes between the 1960s (Kennedy) and the 1980's
306For a discussion of historical transition as a 'contradiction which symbolically preoccupies
much of modern historiography' see Fredric Jameson, 'The Existence of Italy', in Signatures of
the Visible, pp.155-229; and, in particular, pp.225-229.
307Lentricchia, 'Libra as Postmodern Critique', pp.200-201.
308Ibid, pp.206-207.
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(Reagan) can never achieve the proper gradations of a historical
understanding, implying instead a steel-clad causal relationship that is more
justificatory than analytic. In this respect, Lentricchia unwittingly highlights
the very problem: 'The book's cultural logic encourages us to reread . . .
Ronald Reagan... as the president we had to have.'
Yet DeLillo's novels do eventually yield that conflict with the
postmodern that is necessary to affirm their inner dialectic. The dilemmas of
modernism return in these postmodernist texts both to be absorbed by
postmodernist conflictlessness and simultaneously to subject that
postmodernist conflictlessness to the historicizing critique of the modernist
aesthetic. Historically speaking, the modernist dilemmas through which that
critique is expressed became in part, as I suggested in Chapter One, the
precondition of the postmodernist aesthetic, which itself in turn ruled such
critique impermissible. In a recognisable move, then, it is the impossibility of
that critique which becomes in DeLillo's texts its necessary precondition.
Thus DeLillo comprehends history in terms of a Benjaminian Jetztzeit, 'a past
charged with the time of the now which [is] blasted out of the continuum of
history,'309 while recognising that the now can only be understood in terms of
its inheritance from the thought and conditions of the past. For as Marx
writes:
It will then become plain that our task is not to draw a sharp
mental line between past and future but to complete the thought
of the past. Lastly, it will become plain that mankind will not
begin any new work, but will consciously bring about the
completion of its old work.310
309Walter Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Ilnuminations, trans. Harry
Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken, 1969), p.261.
310Karl Marx, Letter to Arnold Ruge, September 1843, in Early Writings, trans. Rodney
Livingstone & Gregor Benton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992), p.209.
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DeLillo's texts occupy an uneasy and critical position somewhere between the
now that rewrites its past and the past that will become the now, while
simultaneously — and critically — dramatising the inter-dependence of these
two apparently contradictory stances.
Chapter Four
Salman Rushdie: No Place Like Home
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'I am getting interested in making religious pictures for people who have no god.'
Aurora Zogoiby
'If books and films could be made and consumed in the belly of the whale/
wrote Salman Rushdie in 1984,
it might be possible to consider them merely as entertainment,
or even, on occasion, as art. But in our whaleless world, in this
world without quiet corners, there can be no easy escapes from
history, from hullabaloo, from terrible, unquiet fuss.311
The concluding paragraph of Midnight's Children, with its image of the
individual subject's inescapable and destructive engagement with history —
'sucked into the annihilating whirlpool of the multitudes' -- indicates a similar
acceptance of the implausibility of social or aesthetic transcendence, though
here with a quite different, melancholy inflection. The status of his texts as a
form of public discourse would seem then to be implicitly acknowledged by
Rushdie, a point made perhaps more readily apparent by those texts' own
ideology critique of a European literary tradition, generated (as we shall see)
through a pattern of intertextual allusion.
The following chapter traces the analytical self-consciousness in some
of Rushdie's texts of their own ideological location(s). It develops from this
the argument that Rushdie's fiction enacts certain ideological features of the
postmodern while attempting to establish, in a way that neither Amis nor
DeLillo ever really do, a sense of Utopian release from the condition of
postmodernity, the construction of a Utopian perspective from which the
311Salman Rushdie, 'Outside the Whale', in Imaginary Homelands: Essays 1981-1991 , 2nd edn.
(London: Granta, 1992), p.101.
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postmodern can already be imagined as past. As before, this argument
proceeds from the standpoint of a Western Marxist understanding of
postmodernism. In this particular case, though, it is worth acknowledging
that Rushdie's writing has already been the subject of a well-known Marxian
confrontation with postmodern aesthetics: Aijaz Ahmad's In Theory: Classes ,
Nations, Literatures. This chapter will, then, extend the discussion of a
Marxian approach to postmodern fiction not only with specific reference to
the work of Salman Rushdie, but initially through a brief engagement with
Ahmad's own reading of Rushdie, an engagement whose critical points will
be developed throughout the course of the entire chapter.
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Aijaz Ahmad on Rushdie and the Postmodern
Ahmad is principally concerned with Rushdie's novel Shame, but uses a
number of the conclusions to which his analysis leads on which to base a
more general critique of Rushdie's fiction. However, in order to follow
Ahmad's reading of Rushdie, it is necessary first to acknowledge the literary
and political contexts in which he situates the novels' production and
reception.
According to Ahmad, the crucial contextual factor for Rushdie's
writing is the Three Worlds Theory. As a politico-geographical concept, the
Third World is, he argues, hazy and ill-defined at best; at worst, at its most
nakedly ideological, it is a recognisably postmodern child of capitalist
imperialism. The origins of the Three Worlds Theory are most commonly
associated with the Bandung Conference of 1955. Yet, citing the absence of
representatives from the Latin American nations, the attendance of
representatives from China ('the world's largest communist country') and
from Pakistan ('despite their military alliance with the United States'), Ahmad
insists on viewing these origins as mythical and mystificatory:
None of the senses in which the term 'Third World' is now used
— non-alignment, a global space other than capitalism and
socialism, the tricontinent — would apply to this event.312
What Ahmad wishes to reveal is the ideological force of the Three Worlds
Theory. He accuses both Fredric Jameson and Edward Said (in both cases, it
seems to me, quite unfairly313) of falling prey to the 'false knowledge of
imperialism' offered by the Theory and of subsequently seeking to posit
312Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso, 1992), p.294. Further
references to this text are to this edition and will be marked in the main text, using the prefix
IT.
313For a defence of Jameson in light of Ahmad's criticism, see Clint Burnham, The Jamesonian
Unconscious: The Aesthetics ofMarxist Theory (London: Duke UP, 1995), pp.156-160. See also,
for Said's acknowledgement of the maintenance of class domination in post-colonial societies,
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), p.269.
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nationalism as the dialectical opposite of imperialism, a role that he identifies
solely with socialism (see IT, pp.290-291). The result of the propagation of the
Three Worlds Theory is, for Ahmad, the absence of any recognition of the
need to promote the social liberation of those oppressed within today's post-
colonial states. Thus:
The mystificatory function of this false knowledge resides in
concealing the fact that in sovereign post-colonial societies,
imperialism functions through the national-bourgeois state
itself, and in its claim, instead, that the role of the national-
bourgeois state is to resolve the contradiction between
imperialism and the masses of the imperialized formation in
favour of the latter. (IT, p.342)
The principal ideological force of the Theory, for Ahmad, lies in its pretences
to radicalism. It is these pretences that have afforded it such prominence in
the metropolitan cultural sphere. The irony of this institutional popularity of
anti-colonial nationalism does not escape Ahmad:
To the extent that it [the Three Worlds Theory] invoked the
ideology of anti-colonial nationalism, its most striking feature
was that the invocation came at a historical juncture and from
particular countries when, and where, the revolutionary content
of that anti-colonial ideology — namely, decolonization ~ had
already been achieved. (IT, p.292)
The Three Worlds Theory thus offers no concrete social transformation
toward which praxis might be directed; yet it tantalisingly seems to promise
something else as compensation: the surface glamour of radical chic. It is this
promise that Ahmad identifies as the siren call to so many intellectuals: 'This
lack of an articulated central doctrine,' he writes,
and the generality of an anti-colonial stance in the post-colonial
period gave to the so-called Theory the character of an open-
ended ideological interpellation which individual intellectuals
were always free to interpret in any way they wished, which in
turn made the Theory particularly attractive to those
intellectuals who did not wish to identify themselves with
determinate projects of social transformation and determinate
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communities of political praxis, retaining their individual
autonomies yet maintaining a certain attachment to a global
radicalism. (IT, pp292-293)
This is to be at the heart of Ahmad's criticisms of Rushdie. In the postmodern
and post-colonial era, he argues, intellectuals in the capitalist, developed
nations of the West have all too readily embraced a pseudo-radicalism, the
faded reflection of a past struggle that can now be used to avoid facing the
necessity of new struggles.
Ahmad identifies the chief manifestation of this process as the
development and growth of the academic study of Third World Literature.
He argues that, for example, this development meant that the teaching of
Black and African literatures in American universities that had been the
achievement of the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s could later be
assimilated into the teaching of a new, homogenous 'Third World Literature',
'pushing the focus of thought not into the future but into the past' (IT, p.68).
It is as a prominent part of this newly canonised and homogenised
'Third World Literature' that Ahmad insists on situating Rushdie's texts. If
the creation of this particular area of study is itself to be seen as a post-
colonial, late capitalist ideological manoeuvre, as Ahmad indicates, then it
should come as no surprise to find that the ideology critique that he offers of
Rushdie's Shame should take the form of 'a symptomatic reading of an
ideological location which makes it possible for Rushdie to partake, equally,
of the postmodernist moment and the counter-canon of "Third World
Literature'" (IT, p.125). For Ahmad, the two are of course inextricably
entwined, so that no matter how focused on "Third World" matters and the
experience of (de)colonization such newly canonised texts might be, they
remain abundantly complicit with the forms of reading currently favoured by
what Ahmad calls 'the metropolitan critical avant-garde'. 'Third World
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Literature' here takes on the appearance of another form of cultural
colonization, though one that is more overtly bourgeois capitalist than
nationalist in origin.
Rushdie's prominence within this canon is, for Ahmad, a result of the
extent to which his texts are appropriable to a bourgeois, predominantly
Western intelligentsia. As Ahmad sees it, this ideological complicity is
betrayed through Rushdie's texts' own postmodernist qualities. The emphasis
Rushdie places on ideas of cultural eclecticism and the experience of
migrancy, in particular, is thus to be interpreted as the celebration of a
postmodern cultural condition, a further reflection of the reification of culture
into so many consumerist choices. In an essay entitled 'The Location of Brazil'
Rushdie describes the effect of migrancy on the construction of the individual
subject in terms that might, from Ahmad's perspective, be interpreted as a
form of escapism from the complexities and political intensities of specific
historical and cultural experiences:
The effect of mass migrations has been the creation of radically
new types of human being: people who root themselves in ideas
rather than places, in memories as mush as in material things;
people who have been obliged to define themselves — because
they are so defined by others — by their otherness; people in
whose deepest selves strange fusions occur, unprecedented
unions between what they were and where they find
themselves. The migrant suspects reality: having experienced
several ways of being, he understands their illusory nature. To
see things plainly, you have to cross a frontier.314
This notion of migrancy and the simultaneous elevation of the status of the
migrant himself are central to Rushdie's writing. But in the centrality of these
themes and in the wide-ranging cultural eclecticism by which they are given
formal expression Ahmad sees echoes, intentional or not, of some of
314Salman Rushdie, 'The Location of Brazil', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.124-125.
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Rushdie's Anglo-American literary predecessors. These echoes incite perhaps
his most caustic remarks:
How very enchanting, I have often thought, Rushdie's kind of
imagination must be for that whole range of readers who have
been brought up on the peculiar 'universalism' of The Waste Land
(the 'Hindu' tradition appropriated by an Anglo-American
consciousness on its way to Anglican conversion, through the
agency of Orientalist scholarship) and the 'world culture' of
Pound's Cantos (the sages of Ancient China jostling with the
princely notables of Renaissance Italy, with Homer and
Cavalcanti in between, all in the service of a political vision
framed by Mussolini's fascism). One did not have to belong,
one could simply float, effortlessly, through a supermarket of
packaged and commodificd cultures, ready to be consumed.
(IT, p.128)
Market ideology is here explicitly associated with the imperial,
colonising mentality. In the era of High Modernism, however, this 'sense of
cultural excess' is accompanied by the artist's sense of alienation, itself the
result of capitalist reification. 'In none of the major modernists,' writes
Ahmad, 'was the idea of a fragmented self, or the accompanying sense of
unbelonging, ever a source of great comfort; it came, usually, with a sense of
recoiling, even some terror' (IT, p. 129). For Ahmad, it is this second aspect
that is conspicuously absent in postmodernism:
The terrors of High Modernism at the prospect of inner
fragmentation and social disconnection have now been stripped,
in Derridean strands of post-modernism, of their tragic edge,
pushing that experience of loss, instead, in a celebratory
direction; the idea of belonging is itself seen now as a bad faith,
a mere 'myth of origins', a truth effect produced by the
Enlightenment's 'metaphysics of presence'. (IT, p.129)
It seems to me that this description of postmodernism cannot realistically be
applied to Rushdie's fiction (for reasons to be discussed later). For now,
though, we need only note that Ahmad suggests the similarity of this
intellectual migrancy to the supposed 'excess of belongings' of multinational
or transnational firms, whose countries of origin, whither the profits are
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speedily transported, are depicted as entirely irrelevant. Ahmad is here, of
course, employing a rather crude reflectionist model of the relation of literary
form to economic forces in order to identify this feature of Rushdie's writing
principally as an ideological expression of late capitalism.
It is not only, however, in the celebration of 'migrancy' that Ahmad
depicts Rushdie's work as ideologically saturated. Ahmad claims that the
social world dramatised in Shame is one in which political resistance is
impossible; such, he continues, is the prevalent political temper of all
Rushdie's writing. Using an argument similar to that which Rushdie himself
applies to George Orwell's 1984 in 'Outside the Whale', he insists that the
severity of the limitations of Rushdie's political vision in Shame is such that it
bespeaks of a fundamental flaw in the novelist's understanding and portrayal
of social relations, and that this has implications for Rushdie's work way
beyond the specific instance of Shame.
It is first then to Ahmad's analysis of Shame that we turn, in order to
picture more fully that 'ideological location' in which he depicts Rushdie
writing. Ahmad confronts Rushdie's text with two accusations: firstly, the
drama of the ruling classes is accorded an undue and misleading
representative function; and secondly, the sole members of an oppressed or
socially excluded group to be portrayed in the novel — the women — are
shown to be incapable of ever effecting a transformation in their social status.
As we shall see, these two principal complaints are complemented by a
number of additional points — in particular, the choice of metaphors with
which Rushdie represents the effect on the women of their subjugation at the
hands of patriarchal society — but it is on the basis of these two criticisms that
Ahmad's case against Shame must stand or fall.
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Though distinct in themselves, these two points of criticism outlined
above are of course intimately related to the earlier critique of 'migrancy'.
Ahmad refers to the passages in Shame in which Rushdie appears to be
directly assuming the narrative voice in order both to describe and to justify
his narrative and structural techniques. In one of these passages Rushdie
writes:
Although I have known Pakistan for a long time, I have never
lived there for longer than six months at a stretch ... I have
learned Pakistan by slices ... however I choose to write about
over there, I am forced to reflect that in fragments of broken
mirrors ... I must reconcile myself to the inevitability of the
missing bits.315
The fact that Rushdie can have only a migrant's eye-view is used to justify the
limited scope of the society to be depicted in the novel; it is, as it were, the
defining feature of Rushdie's own "geometry", by which he draws, in a
Jamesian sense, the enclosed circle of relations that the novel is to include. It
is with the nature of the political vision that is to result from Rushdie's
"geometry", from his migrant's perspective, that Ahmad takes issue.
The problem for him is really the ease with which the novel's 'missing
bits' can be ignored:
If one has 'known Pakistan for a long time' and yet, because of
circumstance, 'learned' it only 'by slices', the question naturally
arises: which slices has one chosen to 'learn'? For, if we do not
choose our own 'bits' of reality, those 'bits' will then be chosen for
us by our class origin, our jobs, the circuits of our friendships
and desires, our ways of spending our leisure time, our literary
predilections, our political affiliations — or lack of them. There
are no neutral 'bits', not even of not-knowing. (IT, p.138)
Rushdie, claims Ahmad, is one whose class origin has allowed him
tremendous insight into 'the history of the corruptions and criminalities of
Pakistani rulers', but little else. To this limited spectrum of familiarity is
315Salman Rushdie, Shame (London: Picador, 1984), p.69; cited in Ahmad, p.133.
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added the postmodernist celebration of the migrant's perspective, the
untroubled learning 'by slices' that leads to what for Ahmad is an
unacceptable and unearned elevation of the experiences of one segment of
society to representative status:
The main difficulty does not arise in his portrayal of this
structure of power and cruelty at the apex; this he accomplishes,
on the whole, superbly. The difficulty arises when this ferocious
fable of the state is elided, again and again, in his own recurrent
rhetoric throughout the book, with a society which is declared to
be coterminous with the state structure, equally deformed and
irretrievably marked by its purported civilisation (Islam) and its
genetic origin (the Partition), more catastrophically wounded
even than Naipaul makes out India to be in A Wounded
Civilisation. The rulers and the ruled seemed to be joined
together, each mirroring the other, in a Satanic compact. (IT,
pp.140-141)
In his search for some centre of resistance to this enclosed state apparatus,
Ahmad turns to Rushdie's representation of female characters. The absence
of any male figures who might represent 'the oppressed and oppositional
strata' is so complete, he writes, that it is only in the female characters , and
quite particularly in the person of Sufiya Zinobia, that one might realistically
hope to find 'some determinate energies of an emancipatory project'.
Ahmad's quest is, however, a forlorn and ultimately embittering one. It is not
that the novel's women are passive victims, quietly accepting their allotted
social roles. Rather, Ahmad identifies what is perhaps a more sinister
tendency: at no point is such resistance shown to be capable of effecting a
productive transformation; instead, it breeds only a savage and destructive
violence. Women are depicted as grotesque victims who come to resemble
more and more a series of misogynist stereotypes. The sexless Arjumand,
known as the 'Virgin Ironpants', is joined in this way to her opposite, Sufiya
Zinobia, who has become, for Ahmad,
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the oldest of the misogynist myths: the virgin who is really a
vampire, the irresistible temptress who seduces men in order to
kill them, not an object of male manipulation but a devourer of
hapless men. (IT, p.148)
This is too much for Ahmad to take; here, he suspects, is to be found a
disregard ~ indeed, intellectual contempt ~ for the basic longing to create a
better life. Rushdie's is, he states, an Orwellian vision, complete with all the
lovelessness, 'permanence and pervasiveness of betrayal' and conviction that
resistance can only exacerbate one's torments that is the hallmark of
postmodernist, anti-utopian ideology.
It seems to me that criticisms of the Three Worlds Theory and of the
unambivalent celebration of 'migrancy' are both apposite and necessary.
Likewise, the way in which Ahmad demonstrates how these features lead
logically, in Shame, to the abandonment of faith in the very possibility of an
'emancipatory project' offers quite an impressive example of how the hidden
ideological threads of a text can be teased out for analysis and critique.
However, when Ahmad attempts to broaden the relevance of his critique —
which adopts a fairly consistent Lukacsian perspective -- to all Rushdie's
writing, up to and including The Satanic Verses, the limitations of his analysis
become more and more apparent.
Only two of Rushdie's writings other than Shame are discussed at any
notable length; these are two of his essays, 'Giinter Grass'316 and 'Outside the
Whale'.317 These essays, claim Ahmad, show Rushdie to be complicit with
precisely the same quietist ideology that he explicitly castigates in Orwell.
This is not the place for a defence of those essays, though such a defence
could, I suspect, do worse than to begin by offering a proper
recontextualization of the passages extracted by Ahmad for analysis. Rather,
316Salman Rushdie, 'Giinter Grass', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.276-281.
317Salman Rushdie, 'Outside the Whale', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.87-101.
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it is my purpose here to note, and to a limited degree to accept, the
accusations of ideological complicity that Ahmad levels at Rushdie's writing.
These accusations extend also to the novel with which I am principally
concerned, The Satanic Verses; for it is clear that the postmodernist features of
fragmentation and mutation, whose appearance in Shame was so to provoke
Ahmad, are thought by him to be no more productive, no more appropriable
to a Utopian discourse when they reappear in Rushdie's next novel:
What this excludes -- 'the missing bits' to which he must
'reconcile' himself -- is the dailiness of lives lived under
oppression, and the human bonding of lives lived under
oppression, and the human bonding — of resistance, of decency,
of innumerable heroisms of both ordinary and extraordinary
kinds — which makes it possible for large numbers of people to
look each other in the eye, without guilt, with affection and
solidarity and humour, and makes life, even under oppression,
endurable and frequently joyous. Of that other kind of life his
fictions, right up to The Satanic Verses, seem to be largely
ignorant; what his imagination makes of the subsequent
experiences we shall find out only from later work. (IT, p. 139)
On this point I disagree sharply with Ahmad. In fact, later we shall see that
The Satanic Verses, though thoroughly steeped in late capitalist ideology, is
also profoundly Utopian, a searchlight in the long night of Thatcherite Britain,
unremittingly seeking the New. The case for the expression of a Utopian
impulse in Rushdie's fiction will be made below. First, though, I want to look




There is one other point to be conceded in terms of the ideological elements of
Rushdie's work (and perhaps of The Satanic Verses in particular). What must
be acknowledged is the extent to which Rushdie's writing seems unable to
escape the discourse of Orientalism. Ahmad draws attention to the claim
made by the narrator of Shame that his novel is to be his 'last words on the
East',318 a claim that assumes, as the Orientalists of the Western Imperialist
powers have always done, that there is a homogenous entity called the East
(or 'the Orient") about which it might be possible to say a few 'last words'. In
Saleem Sinai's introduction of his "grandfather", too, we find something of a
flirtation with Orientalist discourses:
One Kashmiri morning in the early spring of 1915, my
grandfather Aadam Aziz hit his nose against a frost-hardened
tussock of earth while attempting to pray. Three drops of blood
plopped out of his left nostril, hardened instantly in the brittle
air and lay before his eyes on the prayer-mat, transformed into
rubies. Lurching back until he knelt with his head once more
upright, he found that the tears which had sprung to his eyes
had solidified, too; and at that moment, as he brushed diamonds
contemptuously from his lashes, he resolved never again to kiss
earth for any god or man. This decision, however, made a hole
in him, a vacancy in a vital inner chamber, leaving him
vulnerable to women and history. Unaware of this at first,
despite his recently completed medical training, he stood up,
rolled the prayer-mat into a thick cheroot, and holding it under
his right arm surveyed the valley through clear, diamond-free
eyes.319
It is important to note the way in which this family history — which is to run
parallel to a national history ~ begins with a loss of faith. However, the
318Rushdie, Shame, p.28; cited in Ahmad, p.133.
319Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children (London: Picador, 1983), p.10. Further references to
the text will be to this edition and will be marked in the main text, prefixed by the
abbreviation MC.
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expression of this preference for doubt remains itself in some sense
ambivalent. The "grandfather" who loses his faith is called Dr Aziz, a name
borrowed from E.M. Forster's A Passage to India (1924). In fact, Rushdie's
representations lean quite heavily on the literature of Imperialism, on
Western, Imperial representations of India.320 The religious doubt that
Aadam Aziz experiences is, then, also associated with the forces of Empire
and European Enlightenment. (For example, much is made of his scientific
training, his stay in Europe and his European friends.) The problematic
notion of migrancy, noted above, is thus connected to a further problem of
ideological representation.
It is precisely the question of the reflection in The Satanic Verses of
Orientalist attitudes toward Islamic culture and history that Edward Said
identifies as the principal objection to the novel in Muslim circles. He puts
that objection thus:
Why must a Moslem, who could be defending and
sympathetically interpreting us, now represent us so roughly, so
expertly and so disrespectfully to an audience already primed to
excoriate our traditions, reality, history, religion, language, and
origin? Why, in other words, must a member of our culture join
the legions of Orientalists in Orientalizing Islam so radically and
unfairly?321
Probably no one has written as extensively and perceptively on questions of
Orientalist ideology as has Said. However, when we look at how he has
defined Orientalism, it is apparent how ill-suited to The Satanic Verses such
descriptions are; it is as though (to borrow a metaphor from Shame) The
Satanic Verses were to exist at a slight angle to Orientalist practice, neither
quite fitting-in nor fully divorced. Take, for example, Said's insistence on the
320For a discussion of these elements of Rushdie's fiction see Timothy Brennan, Salman
Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp.79-117.
321Edward W. Said, in Lisa Appignanesi & Sara Maitland, eds., The Rushdie File (London:
Fourth Estate, 1989), p.176.
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Orientalist's exteriority to 'the Orient'. The Orientalist, he writes, 'is never
concerned with the Orient except as the first cause of what he says.' Said
continues:
What he says and writes, by virtue of the fact that it is said or
written, is meant to indicate that the Orientalist is outside the
Orient, both as an existential and as a moral fact.322
Such exteriority clearly does not apply to Rushdie himself who, as a migrant,
can be confidently defined neither as outside nor as within; the basic
categories on which Orientalism depends do not somehow seem appropriate
to Rushdie's situation. In fact, the relation of The Satanic Verses to Orientalist
ideology can better be understood in terms of the novel's exploration, through
the dramatised predicaments of its characters, of what Said identifies as 'the
main intellectual issue raised by orientalism': 'Can one divide human reality,
as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different
cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the
consequences humanly?'323
In the context of situating these novels as narrative "explorations", it
might also be useful to view Rushdie's fiction (and particularly Midnight's
Children) in relation to the genre of the "Historical Novel", first fully
developed by Sir Walter Scott in the early nineteenth century. Georg Lukacs,
in his study The Historical Novel, argues that this is a form of writing that can
only appear when a 'rational' (i.e. historical) understanding of society, society
seen as the product of human agency, has displaced the 'irrational' view of
society as Divinely ordered. In Lukacs's reading, the historians of the mid-to-
late eighteenth century laid the ideological groundwork for the French
Revolution; and the experience of the French Revolution in turn helped pave
322Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge, 1978; rpr.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p.21.
323Ibid, p.45.
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the way for the historical novels of Scott.324 Rushdie's fiction, though,
attempts to absorb that genre, to offer -- simultaneously — a critique and a
reworked expression of it. Thus, Midnight's Children might be seen as quite a
good example of Hutcheon's genre of 'historiographic metafiction'. These are
novels which are historical novels and yet make quite overt their differences
from the more traditional (and, quite crucially, European) examples of the
genre; particularly in terms of their representation of the irrational, the
magical. In the same way that the secular rationalism of Aadam Aziz is held
slightly suspect, the fantastical elements of Rushdie's fiction allow it both to
associate itself with, and maintain a form of critical distance from, the
"Historical Novel" of nineteenth-century European, imperial cultures. Thus, it
is as critical explorations rather than as mere reflections that both Midnight's
Children and The Satanic Verses demand to be read. It is necessary to
acknowledge the existence in these novels of elements that are perhaps
oppositional to those ideological aspects that we have thus far noted (with
reference to both Ahmad and Said).
The sort of oppositional, anti-ideological reading of the novel that I am
suggesting is one that involves an acceptance that The Satanic Verses offers
representations of not only Islamic but also ofWestern, late capitalist society.
Sara Suleri's essay 'Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie and the
embodiment of Blasphemy' is of particular interest in this regard, as it
proposes a dialectical reversal of the arguments of those who have attacked
the novel as a blasphemous and deeply offensive attack on the Islamic faith
launched by the culture industry of a decadent, faithless West. Suleri reads
the novel, instead, in terms of its opposition to postmodernist rather than
Islamic culture. 'The author well knows that faith is obsolete to its discourse,'
324See Lukacs, The Historical Novel, pp.19-63.
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she writes, 'but must struggle to explain why the betrayal of faith should be
so necessary to an unbelieving, postmodern narrative.'325 Rather than a
disavowal or mockery of religious belief, a narrative demonstration of
postmodern incredulity toward metanarratives, The Satanic Verses is, she
claims, 'a deeply Islamic book' about the nature and even possibility of
blasphemy in the postmodernist, late capitalist West. Such a reading, of
course, turns upside-down the usual assumptions made about the book:
If one of the integral concerns of the text is the question of how
blasphemy can be articulated in a secular world, the term
blasphemy itself must be reread as a gesture of reconciliation
toward the idea of belief rather than as the insult that it is
commonly deemed to be.326
We are here offered The Satanic Verses as betrayer of the postmodernist anti-
faith, as an act of apostasy from contemporary secularism.
Suleri's interpretation seems to me misleading only in its lack of
appreciation of the extent to which Rushdie's text is undoubtedly
ideologically complicit. The reading of the novel that she provides is a
welcome and necessary rejoinder that posits the text as other or more than
mere ideology and yet takes some account of the cultural and historical forces
at work in the production of the text. Nevertheless, this is ultimately as
limited an understanding of the novel as that implicit in Aijaz Ahmad's more
general criticisms of Rushdie's writing. What is needed instead, is an
acceptance of both the ideological and the Utopian elements of the text, and a
historicizing analysis of their dialectical conflict.
325Sara Suleri, 'Contraband Histories: Salman Rushdie and the Embodiment of Blasphemy',
The Yale Reviezv, 78,1989, p.607.
326Ibid.
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An Incompetent Puppeteer: The Artifice of Authority in Rushdie
If we are to see how The Satanic Verses might accommodate a dialectical
reading, by offering a properly Utopian opposition to its own formal
expression of a condition of postmodernity, it is first necessary to confront
Rushdie's depiction and critique of forms of authority. In common with most
contemporary authors whose novels might be described as characteristically
postmodern in their formal, technical features, Rushdie continually lays bare
the artifice of his art. It has also become something of a commonplace for
novels to attempt to render problematic the question of textual authority. This
functions as a reminder that authoritative forms, both textual and social, are
mere constructs, devoid of any "natural" justification. Thus, when Saleem
Sinai in Midnight's Children notes of his tendency to narrative digression that
'like an incompetent puppeteer, I reveal the hands holding the strings' (MC,
p.65), he implicitly draws our attention to the hands of more accomplished
puppeteers.
It is not, of course, with questions of mere textual authority that such
moments in Rushdie's novels are exclusively, or even primarily, concerned.
The critique of authority that is central to Rushdie's writing is not simply a
formalist manifesto decrying all practitioners of non-self-conscious fiction.
Rushdie's object of critique extends far beyond the assumptions of realist
aesthetics, in opposition to which we have already seen Linda Hutcheon
portray such 'historiographic metafiction'. Rather, Rushdie attempts to
provoke analysis of all structures of authority, through repeated insistences
that such structures, mystificatory as they often are, are nonetheless
manufactured with determinate interests in mind — that is to say, that all
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authority is political. The importance of such a project is pertinently stated by
Edward Said:
There is nothing mysterious or natural about authority. It is
formed, irradiated, disseminated; it is instrumental, it is
persuasive; it has status, it establishes canons of taste and value;
it is virtually indistinguishable from certain ideas it dignifies as
true, and from traditions, perceptions, and judgements it forms,
transmits, reproduces. Above all, authority can, indeed must,
be analyzed.327
Here Said's principal target is quite specific: the historical construction of the
authority of Orientalist discourse. In Rushdie's writing, though, the thematic
interest in the problematic construction of authoritative forms is intimately
connected to his historical subject matter. Rushdie started writing Midnight's
Children during the Emergency (1975), which was begun as an attempt by
Indira Gandhi to evade conviction for electoral fraud. During this time,
Gandhi suspended political opposition and pushed through social policies
such as enforced sterilisations and the compulsory 'relocation' of minority
communities of Muslims, the same communities her father had persuaded to
stay in India rather than move to Pakistan after partition. Questions of the
validity of political authority are quite clearly raised by this event. The other
major tragic event to hit the Indian subcontinent in the 1970s was the Indo-
Pakistan war of 1971, which led to the foundation of Bangladesh. In Pakistani
elections of 1970 East and West Pakistan voted almost exclusively for
different parties. The Awami League (East) won the election but Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto refused to accept the result. The civil unrest which this provoked in
East Pakistan led to the Pakistani army — made up almost exclusively of
citizens ofWest Pakistan — being sent to forcibly quell the population. Here,
too, the question of the establishment of political authority is central. The
formal preoccupation with questions of authority in Rushdie's fiction is used
327Said, Orientalism, pp.19-20.
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to suggest issues raised by key events in the history which, in Midnight's
Children, is Saleem's raw material for his storytelling.
This has been a constant thematic preoccupation throughout Rushdie's
writing. The controlling metaphor of Midnight's Children — the perforated
sheet -- can be seen to represent a number of different ways of approaching
this question. In the first instance, it represents a way of perceiving things
piecemeal (of learning by slices, as it were), just as Saleem's grandfather (who
isn't his grandfather) comes to know his grandmother (who isn't. . . etc.): 'So
gradually Doctor Aziz came to have a picture of Naseem in his mind, a badly-
fitting collage of her severally-inspected parts' (MC, p.25). This would seem
an aversion to the category of totality quite recognisable from modernist
writing, the implicit suggestion that fragmentary perception itself illustrates a
form of historical truth. The hole in the sheet might also, though, be seen in
more mimetic terms as the frame of a movie-camera, capturing only a
fragment at a time, denying access to a picture of the whole.
It is also the hole inside. Aadam Aziz develops a god-shaped hole,
'leaving him vulnerable to women and history' (MC, p.10). It is not that the
centre has fallen apart, but that Rushdie dramatises (in metaphoric form) the
inability of any one discourse of authority any longer to occupy that centre;
the competing worlds of history or politics and of private sensuous pleasure
compete to take its place. The comparison of the hole in the sheet to the frame
of a movie camera invites us to consider the identity and intentions of the
figure controlling the camera, manipulating the sheet. Of course, that is
precisely what Ahmad does with regard to Shame; but there Ahmad fails to
take into account that the subject of Rushdie's writing — though, admittedly,
this is less overt in Shame than in either Midnight's Children, The Satanic Verses
or The Moor's Last Sigh -- extends beyond the novels' ostensible narrative
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content and the power struggles they describe to the means by which the
narrative authority of these accounts is constructed. In other words, the focus
of Rushdie's novels is carefully balanced between the hole though which we
catch slices of narrative action and the hole — i.e. the site of ideological
struggle and formation — that poses as the authority behind the novel's
construction. It is not simply that the narrative of India's history in Midnight's
Children is subordinate to Saleem's consciousness, but that that very
subordination becomes the subject of the novel: the construction of Saleem's
identity is consistently held to be as significant a theme as the construction of
post-Independence Indian society. Thus, the list of social aspects that Ahmad
says contribute to individual consciousness includes precisely the sort of
things in relation to which we see Saleem, the narrator of Midnight's Children:
class origin, jobs, friends. The way in which all of these things circulate and
come into conflict in the 'hole inside' suggests that Rushdie's novels already
pre-empt criticisms such as those of Ahmad.
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Narrative Authority in The Satanic Verses
The principal site of authority in The Satanic Verses, for us readers, is the
novel's narrator, the voice that leads us through the tales of devils, angels,
prophets and even of ordinary humans. It is this voice on whom we must
rely, whose intentions and motives we must take into account; above all, it is
this voice whose origin we must first attempt to identify.328 'Who am I?' he
asks us almost immediately, having recounted only the start of Saladin and
Gibreel's miraculous fall. It is a rather presumptive question, indicating a
measure of self-importance, but perhaps also hinting that his identity might
affect our interpretation of the story to be told. 'Who else is there?' is not the
most helpful of answers. The question of with whom we, as readers, are
dealing is thus a source of not only initial but also continuing vexation.
This is not, of course, new in Rushdie's writing. Saleem Sinai begins by
offering a precise, if rather embarrassed, account of his time and place of
birth; yet it is many pages before we discover who his parents are, only to be
told later that they were not in fact his parents. The narrator of Shame, though
certainly less of a riddle than his counterpart in The Satanic Verses and less
328See also James Harrison, Salman Rushdie (New York: Twayne, 1992), pp.112-116. Harrison
argues that the narrative intrusions identify the narrator quite firmly as Shaitan (with
frequent shifts 'into and out of first-person interior monologue'). The status of the narrator,
for Harrison, is of fairly minor importance; indeed, he brushes off anything that might
complicate his claims with a telling dismissiveness:
For the greater part of the book, where the narrator is unidentifiable, the tone
of the writing neither is nor readily could become either recognizably or
appropriately satanic. At a first reading, indeed, the instances cited above
seem to be vestiges of an apparently promising but short-lived bright idea.
And that in fact may be the explanation, (p.114)
He later adds, 'The device is less than perfetly worked out and executed, and it is too
infrequently used to establish a clear function for itself (p.115). I shall be arguing, to the
contrary, that the indeterminacy of the narrator's status is crucial to the text — not a flaw of
inconsistency in the novel to be tidied up, but a narrative strategy which integrates Rushdie's
thematic concern with the construction of forms of authority into the novel's structure itself.
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dedicated to obfuscation than Saleem, nonetheless insists that he exists 'at a
slight angle to reality'. The identities of Rushdie's narrators have always been
difficult to fix firmly in the mind, but the implication is present early in The
Satanic Verses, as never before, that the inability of the reader to situate the
narrative voice might perhaps have crucial consequences. Here, it somehow
seems to matter more.
Hints of the narrator's identity are scattered throughout the text. The
two questions quoted above appear to indicate the possibility that the words
we read are divine words, that the narrator is God. 'Who am I?' might not
unreasonably be seen as a Divine pre-emption of the kind of interrogation to
which Moses is said to have subjected a burning bush. The accompanying
answer, (quoted above), is, in retrospect, no more mystifying or evasive than
the reply that the leader of the Israelites reportedly received on that same
occasion. The novel's title, though, points toward a less exalted narrative
authority: the Father of Lies himself, Satan or Shaitan. It is these two opposed
possibilities with which the narrator continually teases us. Once Saladin and
Gibreel have finally floated down to England, having fallen from heaven or
been reborn of a big bang, the narrator pauses to comment on the event and
on himself:
I know the truth, obviously. I watched the whole thing.
As to omnipresence and -potence, I'm making no claims at
present, but I can manage this much, I hope. Chamcha willed it
and Farishta did what was willed.
Which was the miracle worker?
Of what type — angelic, satanic — was Farishta's song?
Who am I?
Let's put it this way: who has the best tunes?329
A miracle, we are told, has taken place; but it is one that seems to have been
produced by a song, unrecognised by its singer, whose 'type' — angelic or
329Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (London: Viking, 1988), p.10. Further references to the
text are to this edition and will be marked in the main text, prefixed by the abbreviation SV.
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satanic — is uncertain. This miracle itself therefore becomes questionable, not
as a narrated fact, but rather in terms of how we ought to react to it — with
reverence? or with horror?
The situation becomes more complicated still when the narrator
returns to his initial question about his identity. His answer this time is a
clear pointer to his diabolic status, yet falls far short of outright confirmation.
If he is Shaitan, as he seems to be hinting, we can presume that his purpose is
one of mischief, that he intends to deceive us. Are the doubts that he plants in
the reader's mind concerning the miracle and Gibreel's song an example of his
mischief making? He may be trying to make us suspicious or doubtful of
clear evidence of Divine power and compassion. The possibility that the
narrator is the devil raises yet another question in relation to this first scene: is
the entire account — the fall and the miracle, life lost and regain'd -- a
complete lie? For, as he reminds us himself, he is our only authority
concerning this fantastic event.
If, however, the narrator is not Shaitan, what then? If he is God ~ he
claims, after all, to be omniscient; and although he does not confirm his
'omnipresence and -potence', nor does he deny them - then it would appear
that, contrary to popular idiom, it is the Almighty whose tunes are best and
also that each of his teasing questions are to be seen either as tests of faith or
as holy proddings to be wary of the wiles of the Deceitful One. The
implications of either of these possible identities are open to analysis only
when we presume, for the sake of hypothesis, that one of the two — first
Shaitan, then God — can definitely be attributed to the narrator. However,
outwith the realms of hypothesis these elaborations tell us little, for it is the
fate of the reader of The Satanic Verses to be never quite certain on the basis of
which identity to hypothesise. Were the narrator to shift between the two, the
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matter would be infinitely simpler, but unfortunately he remains, with an
almost admirable obstinacy, never quite either.
Later in the novel, the narrator deigns to join the action himself.
'Gibreel Farishta saw God,' we are told. The vision is not, as he readily
admits, quite as spectacular or awesome as might be supposed. In fact, the
Deity is here described in terms not at all ill-suited to an approximation of the
physical attributes of Salman Rushdie:
He saw, sitting on the bed, a man of about the same age as
himself, of medium height, fairly heavily built, with salt-and-
pepper beard cropped close to the line of the jaw. What struck
him most was that the apparition was balding, seemed to suffer
from dandruff and wore glasses. This was not the Almighty he
had expected. 'Who are you?' he asked with interest. (SV, p.318)
Thankfully, Gibreel is not forced to suffer the interminable hints and teases
thrown the way of the reader with regard to precisely this same question:
'"Ooparvala," he is told, "'The Fellow Upstairs.'" At this stage, the reader
cannot yet be certain that Gibreel's apparition and the novel's narrator are
indeed one and the same — a further 90 pages must elapse before this is
confirmed ~ but he/she is rather likely to harbour suspicions. "'How do I
know you're not the other One,"' retorts the film star, "'Neechayvala, the guy
from Underneath?"' Gibreel, it seems, has reached the same state of vexation
as has the reader.
Or has he? It should be remembered that the story of Gibreel's
encounter with the Fellow Upstairs (Who might, he suspects, be the Guy from
Underneath) not only reflects the reader's complicated encounter with the
narrator, but is itself contained within it. Likewise, the narrator's claim to be
the subject of Gibreel's interrogation might also be doubted. There are, then,
the initial complications and ambiguities of the meeting with the apparition;
added to these is the uncertainty over whether the narrator of the scene (who
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could be either God or Shaitan) really is the same figure who claims in that
meeting to be God (but whom Gibreel suspects to be Shaitan); and
encompassing all of these features of indeterminacy is the reader's abject
inability to be confident of the narrator's degree of reliability or nature of
intention concerning any point at all in his narration.
Keeping this confusion in mind, it is not then surprising that the book's
obvious 'blasphemy' should provoke such divergent reactions as those
evinced by its monotheistic critics and by Sara Suleri. Analyses of the novel's
treatment of the whole question of blasphemy — of the denial of, or
intellectual challenge to, orthodox notions of an absolute authority — have
focused, for understandable reasons, on the dream sequences in which
Gibreel imagines himself as the angelic messenger to a series of prophet-like
figures: Mahound, the Imam, and Ayesha. Unfortunately, however, it is rare
for these analyses to engage with the complexity of the narrative structure of
which these dreams are a part; they deal all too often, therefore, with a text
that is not really The Satanic Verses but a crude, sensationalised, bastardised
version of it, whose author is not Salman Rushdie, but rather the political and
ideological interests that the critic him/herself represents.
Gibreel has blasphemed. Like Aadam Aziz before him, he loses his
belief in God: 'And to prove to himself the non-existence of God,' writes the
narrator, 'he now stood in the dining hall of the city's most famous hotel, with
pigs falling out of his face' (S V, p.30). The tone of this description is, of
course, one of ironic mockery — Gibreel does, after all, look ridiculous — but
there is also here implicit a more cunning and subversive side to the mockery.
Part of the irony to which Gibreel is subjected in this scene relates to the
absurdity of his belief that the non-existence of God can be proven by him
surviving an unspecified number of ham slices. Behind this irony there might
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be detected the faint whisper of blasphemous temptation: "Does Gibreel really
think that God cares what he eats?" it seems to ask; "We, my friend, are not so
naive," it flatters us. "God most certainly exists. Have another ham
sandwich." Is it Gibreel's irreverence and blasphemy that are being ridiculed?
Or is it possible that the narrator himself undermines the gravity or validity of
those very same religious doctrines and conventions against which Gibreel so
crudely transgresses?
The dreams that follow Gibreel's blasphemy have, we are told, a
specific function: '. . . after he ate the pigs the retributions began, a nocturnal
retribution, a punishment of dreams' (SV, p.32). It is Gibreel Farishta's
religious doubts that are to achieve full dramatisation in his dreaming mind
and on the page. To be haunted by such dreams is, the narrator implies, the
fate of those who turn away from God. Clearly, though, the dreams also
serve another purpose: they suggest to the reader, in the manner of Saleem
Sinai's account of the Emergency in Midnight's Children, certain alternative,
unorthodox, iconoclastic reinterpretations of history. Rushdie's own sources
for the dramatisation of incidents from the life of Muhammad are not here the
issue, though it is worth noting that Malise Ruthven points to the accounts of
early Islamic history by Ali Tabari as Rushdie's probable source material.330 It
is simply worth reinforcing the point that the events described in the novel
that cast doubt on the absolute authenticity of the Koran as the Word of God
are not merely the result of postmodernist tabulation, but do have some
documented historical basis.331 Of greater significance, in terms of a
meaningful analysis of the novel, is the necessary recognition, that I have
been trying to suggest, of the complex, contradictory forces at work in the
330Malise Ruthven, A Satanic Affair. Salman Rushdie and the Rage of Islam (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1990), p.35.
331See also W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman (Oxford: Oxford UP,
1974).
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reader's response to these dream sequences, which emerge as a result of
his/her confusion with regard to both the narrator's reliability and intentions
and to the dreams' status as, simultaneously, 'nocturnal retribution' and
provocative reimagining of history.
The blasphemous stories recounted in Gibreel's dreams of Jahilia can
be seen as, at once, the psychological manifestations of the actor's lack of faith
(concerning both religious and amatory attachments) and, if we presume for a
moment that the narrator is Shaitan, a deceptive misrepresentation of the
origins of Islam, intended to mislead the reader and tempt him/her to doubt,
like Gibreel, the absolute truth of religious faith. This latter interpretation can
also be given a yet more specific, political slant: the irreverence of these scenes
might be viewed as part of a Western, Orientalist plot to ridicule and
undermine the very foundations of Islamic society; as such, it would be a plot
overseen by the Great Satan, as Islamic fundamentalists commonly refer to
the United States. That these two functions that the dreams carry out are
contradictory should come as no great surprise. In either case, the reader's
interpretation of how he/she is to account for the dreams' blasphemy must
presuppose a stable, identifiable authority responsible for the dreams (whose
motives and interests, moreover, are clearly definable) of precisely the type
that is so markedly absent in this novel. In other words, The Satanic Verses is
supported by a narrative structure that appears to lead the reader to make
moral or political evaluations of both narrated acts and those acts' narration
that are based on culturally conditioned assumptions about the nature of the
authority invoked as their justification, (e.g. if the narrator is God, the dreams
are a punishment; if Shaitan, they are a blasphemous temptation), while that
same narrative structure simultaneously thwarts the reader's attempt to reach
conclusions on the basis of such assumptions by constructing the aporia of
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two possible identities of the source of narrative authority that the reader has
been conditioned to accept as contradictory. As the exemplar of the migrant,
the narrator can have no properly identifiable point of origin.
The fact that the dreams themselves, as well as the main narrative
which they punctuate, are explicitly concerned with questions of how cultures
or societies establish authoritative conventions of reverence and
demonization confronts the reader with yet another challenge to his/her
understanding of, and reliance upon, voices of authority. The mental
contortions required of any reader who, first struggling with the
indeterminate theological status (and, therefore, reliability) of the narrator,
must then consider the political construction of the whole notion of the holy
and the blasphemous (and, therefore, the very validity of his/her struggles at
narratorial identification) are only to be imagined. A demystificatory analysis
of the ideological construction of political and social authority thus
complements a confusion of narrative identity and authority, leaving in the
novel the uncanny resemblance of a god-shaped whole.
A repeated motif in The Satanic Verses is that of the confidence trickster.
In "'Being God's Postman Is No Fun, Yaar": Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses' Srinivas Aravamudan describes in some detail Rushdie's use in the
novel of the number 420 and explains to the Western reader how Rushdie can
confidently expect 'his readership on the Indian Subcontinent' to recognize
the number as an indication that a trick is being played.332 The song sang by
Gibreel as he and Saladin tumble through the air at the novel's outset comes
from the Hindi film Shri Charsazvbees (Mr. 420), (otherwise known as Shree
420). Having drawn our attention to this fact, Aravamudan goes on to point
332Srinivas Aravamudan, "'Being God's Postman Is No Fun, Yaar": Salman Rushdie's The
Satanic Verses', Diacritics, 19.2,1989,3-20.
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out that the two men fall from the aeroplane AI-420. To most this might
signify little, but Aravamudan insists that those readers with an awareness of
Indian history can hardly fail to notice what are consistent (if hardly
intrusive) allusions to Section 420 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
originally imposed by British imperialist forces in the form of the Indian
Penal Code but later retained by post-colonial Indian governments. Section
420, for which the simple numeral 420 serves as a common abbreviation, deals
with the offences of fraud, cheating and confidence trickery. Normally, writes
Aravamudan, the Indian press cites Section 420 in relation to cases of petty
fraud; 'however, in the popular imagination, the scope of "420" extends to the
more significant villainy of politicians and businessmen.'333
It is to frauds on this larger scale that The Satanic Verses seems at times
on the verge of comparing accounts of religious revelation. The question of
the Divine authenticity of the messages of Mahound and, later, of Ayesha
constitutes one of the novel's major concerns. Rushdie himself identifies it as
such and points to its more general thematic function as an enquiry into the
nature of revelation:
I set out to explore, through the process of fiction, the nature of
revelation and the power of faith. The mystical, revelatory
experience is quite clearly a genuine one. This statement poses a
problem to the non-believer: if we accept that the mystic, the
prophet, is sincerely undergoing some sort of transcendent
experience, but we cannot believe in a supernatural world, then
what is going on?334
The application of the term "confidence trick" to either of the prophets'
revelations would, as a result of the ambivalent critical stance that is to be
found in the novel and that Rushdie explains above, effectively redefine not
only the notion of revelation but also that of fraud, of trickery: the former is in
333Ibid, p.7.
334Salman Rushdie, 'In Good Faith', in Imaginary Homelands, p.408.
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some sense sullied, tarnished with the ideological dirt of political interests
and manipulation; the latter, however, can be seen to have been elevated, to
have been conceded the hitherto denied possibility of sincere (and perhaps
Utopian) intentions. In fact, both are identified with, and made to occupy the
same site of ideological and Utopian dialectical struggle as, the degraded yet
still potentially luminous literary text.
The confidence trickster himself has a long and distinguished literary
pedigree. From the wily heroes and villains of the Thousand and One Nights to
Gogol's Chichikov (Dead Souls); from the predatory passengers of Melville's
steamboat, the Fidele, (The Confidence-Man) to Thomas Mann's Felix Krull and
Angela Carter's rombustuous Fevvers (Nights at the Circus) the con-(wo)man
has undergone countless reincarnations. The narrator of The Satanic Verses
may well be another trickster to add to that long and illustrious list. But, as
we have seen, it may well be that he is not and that the real con-man is the
author who makes us doubt a thoroughly reliable narrator. Of all the literary
con-men of the past, the one that he most resembles is the Cosmopolitan who
dominates the second half of Herman Melville's The Confidence-Man. The
Cosmopolitan, whose name would have obvious appeal to Rushdie, initially
appears to be the novel's eponymous fraud in the latest of his many guises.
He is, though, a more fully rounded character than the others, significantly
less mercenary and apparently more interested in the degree to which others
will place their confidence in him than in the extent to which he might then
profit from that confidence. He seems at times, as Stephen Matterson
suggests, more Christ-like than diabolic: 'It is possible,' writes Matterson, 'that
Goodman is actually Christ, come down to test the survival of Christian
values in the world, making the novel's theme the gulf between Christian
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idealism and worldly action.'335 Reflecting on this same feature of Melville's
novel, John Bryant concludes: 'The confidence man may br God, Devil, or
Man, or any two, or all three. Eventually the reader's mind short circuits.'336
This is also, it seems to me, precisely what happens to the reader of The
Satanic Verses.
The impossibility of deciding conclusively whether the narrator is a
confidence man (Shaitan) or whether he is actually God, or even anything in
between, forces the reader of The Satanic Verses to discard the whole idea of
making moral and political evaluations on the basis of his/her culturally
determined response to an identifiably responsible authority — an idea that
the novel itself provokes. The excessive complexity of the construction of
narrative authority in the novel leads to the impotence and irrelevance of that
authority, from whose shackles the reader is consequently liberated. On the
one hand, this offers a narrative demonstration of postmodern anti-
foundationalism; on the other, though, it may be the formal analogue to a
novelistic plot-line that begins with a fall and ends with an affirmation of the
Utopian longing.
If the reader of The Satanic Verses is set free to respond to the stories
that make up the novel, unencumbered by the need constantly to redefine
his/her response by subjecting it to cultural assumptions concerning the
origin of those stories, he/she is nonetheless still confronted with the
ideological nature of the stories themselves. The criticisms of Aijaz Ahmad
and the charges of Orientalism summarised by Edward Said have still to be
properly confronted. What we have seen, however, is that, in its narrative
structure at least, The Satanic Verses develops a subtle and ultimately
335Stephen Matterson, 'Introduction', in Herman Melvile, The Conficence-Man, ed. Stephen
Matterson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p.23.
336John Bryant, 'Allegory and Breakdown in The Confidence-Man: Melville's Comedy of
Doubt', Philological Quarterly, 65,1986, p.116.
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oppositional analysis of the ideological entrapment that Ahmad argues is so
sinisterly reflected in our reliance on narratorial authority in Shame. It is
possible, though, that this might be a false Utopian moment, a pseudo-
liberation that serves only to offer the novel's author a mechanism with which
to erase in the text itself any trace of its ideological origins and function.
What remains, then, is the need to demonstrate how the novel's stories
themselves, now experienced without continual cross-reference to the status
of the narrator, might depict a longing for, and insist on the possibility of, a
properly Utopian transformation. It is with such a goal inmind that I propose
to interpret The Satanic Verses as a novel about the entrance into the world of
the New.
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The Satanic Verses and The New
In an essay entitled 'Is Nothing Sacred?' Rushdie describes the role of
literature in terms which identify it with some form of religious longing:
What appears plain is that it will be a very long time before the
peoples of Europe will accept any ideology that claims to have a
complete, totalized explanation of the world. Religious faith,
profound as it is, must surely remain a private matter. This
rejection of totalized explanations is the modern condition. And
this is where the novel, the form created to discuss the
fragmentation of truth, comes in. . . . The elevation of the quest
for the Grail over the Grail itself, the acceptance that all that is
solid has melted into air, that reality and morality are not givens
but imperfect human constructs, is the point from which fiction
begins. This is what J.-F. Lyotard called, in 1979, La Condition
Postmoderne. The challenge of literature is to start from this
point, and still find a way of fulfilling our unaltered spiritual
requirements.337
The desire to represent imaginatively something which might challenge a
postmodern incredulity toward grand narratives seems to be one of the prime
features of Rushdie's writing. We have just seen how, in The Satanic Verses, a
narrative technique can be made to mimic the anti-foundationalist stance of
the postmodern condition, short-circuiting the application of more
conventional assumptions of narrative (un)reliability. We will now look at
some of the ways in which Rushdie's novel attempts to compensate for this by
the depiction of characters coming to terms with a residual faith in Utopian
grand narratives, a desire to reconstruct some notion of the New.
The New, in The Satanic Verses, is asked two specific questions: 'What
kind of idea are you?' and 'What kind of idea are you at the moment of
triumph?' For the most part, the critical focus on Rushdie's interrogation of
the New has been principally directed at his depiction of the origins of
337Salman Rushdie, 'Is Nothing Sacred?', in Imaginary Homelands, p.422.
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'Submission', the fictional shadow of Islam. There are, though, at least two
other exemplars of the New included in The Satanic Verses : Thatcherism and
Marxism (though the latter is present not in its East European or Chinese
variants — what Rushdie calls 'Actually Existing Socialism' — but in the form
of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) which, as Aijaz Ahmad reminds
us, was the first Communist Party to come to power through democratic
elections). 'Islam is, after all, one of the greatest ideas that ever came into the
world,' says Rushdie. 'I suppose that the next idea of that size would have
been Marxism.'338 The claims of Thatcherism to the status of the New are
made not by Rushdie in interview, as with the other two, but by one of the
characters of The Satanic Verses: Hal Valance, the 'personification of philistine
triumphalism'. 'What she wants,' he tells Saladin Chamcha,
What she thinks she can fucking achieve - is literally to invent a
whole goddamn new middle class in this country. . . . It's a
bloody revolution. Newness coming into this country that's
stuffed full of fucking old corpses. (SV, p.270)
The novel, though, is more concerned with the violence that Thatcherism
brings — in particular, the racially-motivated violence of the security forces.
Valence is right: Thatcher's is 'a bloody revolution'; and if the death of Dr.
Uhuru Simba is anything but the 'million-to-one shot' that the police insist
(and let's face it...), the prison cells at least, if not the country itself, may well
be 'stuffed full of fuckiung old corpses.' The terms of Valance's description of
Thatcherism provide, rather unwittingly, a hint of the carnage that its neo-
imperialist delusions eventually unleash.
But if Thatcherism, with its repressiveness and its violence, is an
example of the New, what does this say of the novel's social and political
vision? It might be tempting to see this as a continuation into The Satanic
Verses of the postmodern despair, the ideological insistence on the
338Salman Rushdie, in The Rushdie File, p.28.
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inescapability of violence and repression, that Ahmad points to in Shame.
However, to do so would be wrong. Just as Saladin's manipulation of Gibreel
is only 'the echo of tragedy', a pale and distorted imitation of Iago's
manipulation of Othello, Thatcherism is a version of the New that is perfectly
attuned to 'our degraded, imitative times' (SV, p.424). In fact, it is only a
pseudo-Novum, an appropriation by conservative and reactionary forces of
the rhetoric of the New for ideological purposes. What The Satanic Verses
offers in response to this is the embodiment of a vision of the possibility of the
New in the novel itself.
Rushdie writes:
The Satanic Verses celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling,
the transformation that comes of new and unexpected
combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas politics, movies,
songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of
the Pure. Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is
hozv newness enters the world, and I have tried to embrace it. The
Satanic Verses is for change-by-fusion, change-by-conjoining. It
is a love-song to our mongrel selves.339
Of course, this vision of transformation remains open to the charge made by
Aijaz Ahmad that such faith in cultural mutation and hybridization is merely
a symptom of the assimilation into late capitalist culture of the post-colonial
bourgeoisie, in which he squarely situates Rushdie. Yet there is surely
something here beyond the purely ideological. Edward Said writes that
there is no pure, unsullied essence to which some of us can
return, whether that essence is pure Islam, pure Christianity,
pure Judaism or Easternism, Americanism, Westernism.
Rushdie's work is not just about the mixture, it is that mixture
itself.340
Said, too, can be identified as part of that bourgeoisie for which Ahmad
demonstrates such distaste, but the point that he and Rushdie are making
339Rushdie, 'In Good Faith', p.394.
340Said, in The Rushdie File, p. 177.
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here cannot be so easily dismissed. It would be ridiculous to pretend that the
mass migrations to which Rushdie refers above did not take place. Moreover,
this is not a phenomenon that exclusively affected the upper-middle class; the
young people who, in The Satanic Verses, visit the Hot Wax nightclub
represent a generation of young British blacks and Asians who actually exist.
But the novel's celebration of mutation refers also to Indian society, at least
insofar as it is expressed through the views of Zeeny Vakil:'... for was not the
entire national culture based on the principle of borrowing whatever clothes
seemed to fit, Aryan, Mughal, British, take-the-best-and-leave-the-rest?' (SV,
p.52). Here, too, it would seem that a valid point is being made, which does
not seek to elevate to representative status the experiences of a privileged,
cosmopolitan intelligentsia.
The New, though, cannot be portrayed in terms of its actual, concrete
realization. Instead, as Adorno explains, it can only be properly depicted as a
longing for that which is absent:
.. . the new is the longing for the new, not the new itself. This is
the curse of everything new. Being a negative of the old, the
new is subservient to the old while considering itself to be
Utopian. One of the crucial antinomies of art today is that it
wants to be and must be squarely Utopian, as social reality
increasingly impedes Utopia, while at the same time it should
not be Utopian so as not to be found guilty of administering
comfort and illusion.341
Thus the aesthetic of the New consists not in the New itself but in its
anticipation. For that reason, The Satanic Verses must unmask its Utopian or
transcendent moments as illusory, while simultaneously insisting on the urge
to which such illusions are a response. The emphasis in the novel is not, then,
so much on the achievements and rewards of the New as on the struggle that
'the longing for the new' entails. More specifically, The Satanic Verses
341Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.47.
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investigates and, as Said notes, itself embodies the struggle even to envisage
or to anticipate a New, a Utopian possibility, that is not merely a late capitalist
ideological appropriation of a Utopian discourse.
As a number of critics have noted, and as Rushdie himself has
repeatedly insisted, The Satanic Verses is a novel preoccupied by questions of
race and gender.342 The treatment of Saladin Chamcha at the hands of the
police and immigration authorities is only one of the novel's more overt
examples of the racist abuse which, it suggests, is a common feature of the
experiences of Britain's non-white population. Rushdie's novel concentrates
perhaps less on the physical and verbal abuse to which the characters are
intermittently subjected than on the psychological effect of such abuse, a point
to which we shall later return. It suffices, for the moment, however, merely to
acknowledge the fact that The Satanic Verses attempts to offer some indication
of the sense of continual conflict, both psychological and physical, that
Rushdie identifies with the predicament or situation of Asians and blacks in
Britain.
The treatment of questions of gender in the novel is rather more
unusual. Much of the novel's engagement with these issues has hitherto been
obscured by attacks on two of the chapters in which they are explored most
persistently -- 'Mahound' and 'Return to Jahilia' — as either Orientalist or
"blasphemous". The reimagining of early Islamic history through the dreams
of Gibreel Farishta deliberately foregrounds the position allocated to women
in Islamic culture. Rushdie is well aware of the constructedness of authority,
and it is the conspicuousness of that awareness which makes some scenes
appear so shocking. Stripped of the glow of a natural, God-given authority,
342See, for example, Brennan, pp.143-166.
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some of the actions of the most esteemed figures in religious history appear
rather less admirable:
In ancient time the patriarch Ibrahim came into this valley with
Hagar and Ismail, their son. Here, in this waterless wilderness,
he abandoned her. She asked him, can this be God's will? He
replied, it is. And left, the bastard. From the beginning men
used God to justify the unjustifiable. (SV, p.95)
Likewise, Mahound's eventual retraction of 'the satanic verses' is based, at
least in part, on the gender of the deities in question: "'Shall He have
daughters and you sons?" Mahound recites. "That would be a fine division!"'
(SV, p.124). From this thinking, suggests Rushdie, sprout those Islamic laws
which allow a widow to inherit only an eighth of her husband's estate, which
give to sons twice as much inheritence as to daughters, and which, in legal
matters, allocate to the evidence of female witnesses only half the worth of
male witnesses.343 To deny the validity of such a critique by dismissing those
chapters as merely Orientalist is to construct a hierarchy of ideological
repression that is interesting in itself.
It is not necessary to chronicle here the further examples of this sort to
be found in Gibreel's dreams of Jahilia -- Rushdie's own 'In Good Faith' does
this — but it is worth insisting equally on the critique that The Satanic Verses
offers of the permeation of British culture by similarly patriarchal values and
assumptions. In this respect, both Pamela Lovelace and Allie Cone assume
almost representative roles. The name of Chamcha's wife, with its echoes of
Richardsonian assumptions of female sexuality, indicates the complicity of
the British literary and cultural tradition in the male colonization of female
sxuality and the male definition of a woman's "place" in society.344 The
Orientalist mentality that Edward Said identifies in Marx's comment, 'They
343See Rushdie, 'In Good Faith', p.400.
344Pamela's name, as James Harrison suggests, is also a coded reference to Rushdie's first
wife: Clarissa Luard. See Harrison, pp.6-7.
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cannot represent themselves; they must be represented', might here be seen in
parallel with the cultural structures of sexism that allow women, too, to be
represented and defined.
The power of these culturally enforced gender assumptions is
demonstrated in the predicament of Allie Cone, who must painfully guard
the secret of her fallen arches because such a disclosure would tarnish her 'ice-
queen' image. The most difficult and significant part of her ascent of Mount
Everest, the fact that she did it while suffering excruciating pain, must
therefore remain hidden, while the fact that she did it as a woman (and a good-
looking one at that!) is the source of her celebrity and fortune. Her gender
rather than her achievement remains her most defining feature. Perhaps even
more extreme, though, is the case of Baby, Hal Valance's wife. This 'wasted
child', we are told, is 'maybe one third' Valance's age; her 'spectral look' is the
perfect visual contrast to the body of her husband, which, he confesses, is "'in
training to be Orson Welles'". As she has been stripped of any possible sense
of worth or identity, it should come as no surprise that Chamcha 'couldn't
remember the infant's name.'
The struggle against dominant social forces is also key to the tale of
Mahound and the establishment of Submission. In this regard, the wrestling
bouts in which Mahound and Gibreel engage on the mountain assume a
symbolic significance — though, as we shall see, this is equally as true for
Gibreel as it is for Mahound. It is the intensity of the struggle that the prophet
must undergo, the constant mockery and vilification, that tempts him to reach
a compromise: "'Sometimes I think I must make it easier for the people to
believe,"' he says (SV, p. 106). The point, though, is that he doesn't. Like the
Christ of Dostoevsky's 'The Grand Inquisitor', Mahound ultimately refuses to
cut the deals that might make his creed seem more attractive. His revolution
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remains one 'of water-carriers, immigrants and slaves' because he is unwilling
to reach a business-like compromise with the leader of Jahilia's conservatives,
the Grandee. Mahound's project, then, shares certain affinities with that of
Rushdie in The Satanic Verses: both remain tied to ideological forms
(Mahound, after all, is a businessman, and one who is less than attuned to
notions of gender equality); but both are also sincerely attempting to offer an
alternative vision to the values and conditions of the present, and are
therefore potentially Utopian.
It should not be forgotten, though, that the struggles of Mahound are
framed within, and are part of, the psychological turmoil experienced by
Gibreel Farishta. Without necessarily ascribing to the dreams some form of
didactic, moral (or immoral) intent, which would have to rely on a clear
understanding of the intentions of the narrator, it nonetheless remains
important to acknowledge them as Gibreel's unconscious attempt to discover
a reconstituted religious or transcendent sense, to fill up the god-shaped void.
As such, the struggle of Gibreel's that is manifested in these dreams is, even
more than is the struggle of Mahound, a reflection of Rushdie's own
wrestlings with ideological entrapment and the Utopian urge. What Gibreel's
dreams demonstrate, perhaps above all else, is the difficulty of grasping a
vision of the transcendent that is unsullied by predominant social forces.
The tales of the two prophets, Mahound and Ayesha, of whom Gibreel
dreams are clearly inspired by a combination of social forces and more
private experiences and traumas. Early in the novel, we are told that
[f]rom his mother Naima Najmuddin he [Gibreel] heard a great
many stories of the Prophet, and if inaccuracies had crept into
her version he wasn't interested in knowing what they were.
(SV, p.22)
At the start of his career, before fame had chosen to alight upon him, Gibreel
would sit in his room and study tales of metamorphasis, the alleged incident
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of the satanic verses, 'and the surrealism of the newspapers, in which
butterflies could fly into young girls' mouths, asking to be consumed' (SV,
p24). All of these experiences are to play their part in the dreamy torment
that the novel describes. Gibreel's amatory anxieties regarding the fidelity of
Allie also have a formative influence. Malise Ruthven, in A Satanic Affair,
points to the significance of the name of the mountain on which Mahound
receives his revelations: Mount Cone, he writes:
The place of revelation bears the name of the beloved. The
collapse of religious certainty symbolised by the affair of the
Satanic Verses mirrors the betrayal experiences by Gibreel in his
waking life, as he becomes increasingly, obsessively jealous.345
Perhaps most of all, though, Gibreel's religious dreams are shaped by the
movies. In Midnight's Children, Saleem Sinai tells ofMary Pereira's account to
a young priest of the violent exploits of Joe D'Costa. He begins to speculate
on the priest's reactions:
Will he, in fact, ask Mary for Joseph's address, and then reveal...
In short, would this bishop-ridden, stomach-churned young
father have behaved like, or unlike, Montgomery Clift in I
Confess? (Watching it some years ago at the New Empire
Cinema, I couldn't decide.) (MC, p.105)
Gibreel, the film star, has reached a significantly more advanced state than
Saleem; he even dreams cinematically. It is perhaps strange that the films into
which the dreams are later developed turn out to be so unsuccessful,
considering that they were essentially films to begin with. The experience of
dreaming is described as akin to that of watching or making a film.
Sometimes, we are told, Gibreel's point of view is 'that of the camera and at
other moments, spectator':
. . . mostly he sits up on Mount Cone like a paying customer in
the dress circle, and Jahilia is his silver screen. He watches and
weighs up the action like any movie fan, enjoys the fights
345Ruthven, p.25.
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infidelities moral crises, but there aren't enough girls for a real
hit, man, and where are the goddamn songs? (SV, p.108)
The manifestations of Gibreel's crisis of faith take on their very form from the
culture industry that has contributed to that crisis. It is not particularly
surprising that Gibreel's religious visions are so degraded, even trashy or that
he should be taken over so completely by delusions of grandeur, given the
nature of the environment in which his religious sense and his sense of self
have been shaped: Greta Garbo and Grace Kelly ('Gracekali') are described as
goddesses; Gibreel's own fame gains him the social status of the mock-divine;
he wins that fame by impersonating gods in 'the theological movies'.
What Rushdie expresses through the plight of Gibreel is the tragic
struggle to discover a vision of the New that is not entirely formed by the
predominant social forces of the present ~ in the case of Gibreel, this being the
pervasiveness in his immediate environment of 'Bollywood' kitsch. Here, as I
have said, is a reflection of Rushdie's own artistic struggle in The Satanic
Verses. Gore Vidal's novel Live from Golgotha replays the scene of Christ's
crucifixion as though it were a television "event".346 This, suggests Vidal, is
what TV evangelists have done to the Christain myths; taken over and
repackaged by the culture industry, this is what those myths have become.
The dream sequences of The Satanic Verses tell us something similar with
regard to the Indian movie industry and the origins of Islam.
Were Aijaz Ahmad rather more consistent, he might well have
acknowledged precisely this point. Defending Dante from the onslaughts of
Edward Said, he insists on the need to interpret the Inferno with an awareness
of the historical conditions at work in the production of the text. 'The literary-
critical point I am making,' he writes, 'is that one cannot read the passage
about Muhammad outside this whole range of enormous complexity' (IT,
346Gore Vidal Live from Golgotha (London: Abacus, 1993).
246
p. 189). Yet, referring to The Satanic Verses, Ahmad writes of 'the book's heresy
and its direct representation of the Prophet of Islam and his family in the most
vulgar fashion possible' {IT, p.214) while almost completely ignoring those
literary and historical complexities on which he has previously placed such
emphasis. Rushdie's novel is pictured in relation to its historical moment
only to the extent that it can be shown to collude with the Orientalizing
tendency in the British cultural sphere. This is inadequate. The ideological
location from which Rushdie is forced to write, and the extent to which it
forms and limits imaginative possibilities, gradually becomes the subject of
his writing. It is the recognition of this fact that is so singularly lacking in
Ahmad's analysis.
Earlier, I suggested that The Satanic Verses offered a critique as well as a
reflection of Orientalism. It is now time to pursue this thought a little further.
According to Said, Orientalism raises the following question:' Can one divide
human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into
clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and
survive the consequences humanly?' Rushdie's novel explores this question
through its portrayal of social and cultural demonization, the establishment of
a feared and demonized other. This is achieved most overtly through the
metamorphoses of Gibreel and Saladin into respectively, an angel and a devil.
Despite their appearances, neither turn out to be wholly good nor wholly evil;
even so, the reactions of others are, for the most part, determined by Saladin's
hooves and Gibreel's halo. The novel insists that the creation of an other, who
is to be feared and hated, remains one of the most significant and powerful
mechanisms at work in the construction of cultures and societies.
The process of demonization, of the transformation of men and women
into terrifying, inhuman creatures, is really one of description — or so the
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manticore explains to Chamcha: '"They have the power of description, and we
succumb to the pictures they construct'" (SV, p.168). The way to combat this
is to wrest back the power of self-definition, and that is exactly what The
Satanic Verses tries to do. Rushdie's essay 'In Good Faith' includes an
obviously wearied and frustrated attempt to explain how important this act of
reclamation is to the novel:
The very title, The Satanic Verses, is an aspect of this
attempt at reclamation. You call us devils? it seems to ask. Very
well, then, here is the devil's version of the world, of 'your'
world, the version written from the experience of those who have
been demonized by virtue of their otherness. Just as the Asian
kids in the novel wear toy devil-horns proudly, as an assertion
of pride in identity, so the novel proudly wears its demonic title.
The purpose is not to suggest that the Qur'an is written by the
devil; it is to attempt the sort of act of affirmation that, in the
United States, transformed the word black from the standard
term of racist abuse into a 'beautiful' expression of cultural
pride.347
The naming of Mahound, too, is an example of the transformation of a term of
abuse into a sign of pride and a symbol of the possibility of overcoming that
abuse. The novel's rewriting of Islamic history in terms that highlight the
oppression of women, and the later story of the female prophet who conquers
even the last unbeliever are both Utopian attempts to reclaim Islamic
narratives from a feminist perspective. Not even Enoch Powell's "river of
blood" speech remains sacrosanct: "'In our very bodies, does the river of blood
not flow?' . . . Reclaim the metaphor, Jumpy Joshi had told himself. Turn it;
make it a thing we can use' (SV, p.186).
347Rushdie, 'In Good Faith', p.403.
Imagining Utopia: The Land of Oz
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Ernst Bloch, pursuing the subject of art's Utopian function in 'Art and
Utopia',348 writes of art and literature as the 'not-yet-conscious', by which he
means that art is able to embody a 'productive presentiment' that is 'openly
aware of itself, particularly as something not-yet-conscious.'349 As Bloch
continues his explication of art as the not-yet-conscious, his terms of
description come more and more to resemble the terms that we have been
using to analyse the coming to self-consciousness of the longing for the New
in The Satanic Verses:
The look forward becomes even more powerful the
brighter it becomes aware of itself. . . . The not-yet-conscious
itself has to become conscious of its own doings; it must come to
know its contents as restraint and revelation. And thus the point
is reached where hope, in particular, the true effect of
expectation in the dream forward, not only occurs as an emotion
that merely exists by itself, but is conscious and known as the
Utopian function.350
The 'not-yet-conscious' becomes conscious of itself, then, not as that which
can presently be realized, but as what Bloch calls the 'anticipatory
illumination' [Vor-Schein ], the imaginative force that might reform
consciousness in such a way that the existing facts of the present can be
carried 'toward their future potentiality of the otherness, of their better
condition in an anticipatory way.'351
This 'anticipatory illumination', offered by art, that might foreshadow a
form of political praxis and eventual, Utopian liberation is at the very heart of
what Rushdie attempts to achieve as an artist. In a sense, the god-shaped hole
that permeates Rushdie's fiction, both thematically and structurally, can be





properly filled only by those same works of fiction themselves, and then only
as the anticipatory illumination of a liberating potentiality. When Rushdie
asks,
Can art be the third principle that mediates between the
material and spiritual worlds; might it, by 'swallowing' both
worlds, offer us something new — something thatmight even be
called a secular definition of transcendence?352
it seems to me that he is groping toward a definition of the possibilities of art
that is similar to Bloch's, and that seeks to situate in the place now vacated by
faith in an Absolute an imaginative demonstration of the future potentiality of
radical, social transformation. That it is the tragic misfortune, yet dialectical
necessity, of such a demonstration that it must nonetheless remain tied in
some way to the ideological needs of the present is a point that we must also
bear in mind.
The creation of an independent India, as accounted for by Saleem Sinai
in Midnight's Children, is a result of just such a transformation of reality by the
powers of the imagination. India, he tells us, is 'a mythical land, a country
which would never exist except by the efforts of a phenomenal collective will
- except in a dream we all agreed to dream (MC, p.112). In this respect, the
example of Giinter Grass is quite crucial. Earlier, I mentioned the fact that
Aijaz Ahmad points to Rushdie's essay on Grass as evidence of his lack of
faith in the possibility of a Utopian transformation. We can now look again at
that essay, to see if we cannot find a dialectically opposite impulse at work
there. Here is Rushdie on Grass's novel The Meeting as Telgte:
Grass's subject is how German writers responded to ruination;
how, after Hitler, German pens re-wrote Genesis to read: After
the end was the word. How they tore their language down and
rebuilt it anew; how they used words to assault, excoriate,
352Rushdie, 'Is Nothing Sacred?', p.420.
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accept, encompass and regenerate; how the pheonix poked its
beak out of the fire. 353
Surely, what this tells us of Rushdie's response to Grass's writing is that it is
primarily a response to the regenerative powers of art, to its capacity to make
reality anew. When Ahmad writes of the despair that is evident in the phrase
'night is drawing in', he forgets to temper his judgement with the
acknowledgement that Rushdie sees Grass's great achievement in somehow
transforming that gloomy darkness into something that is luminous and,
above all, hopeful. In fact, he forgets the very first sentence of The Satanic
Verses itself: "'To be born again," sang Gibreel Farishta tumbling from the
heavens, "first you have to die'" (SV, p.3).
The Satanic Verses, like the novels of Grass, reflects not only its author's
desire to see a transformed social realm, but also his belief that the powers of
the imagination, as exercised through the novel's creation and through its
interaction with its readers, have a necessary and significant part to play in
that process of transformation and liberation. Rushdie has acknowledged the
influence on the novel of Mikhail Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita, in
which, he says, 'the Devil descends upon Moscow and wreaks havoc upon the
corrupt, materialist, decadent inhabitants and turns out, by the end, not to be
such a bad chap after all.'354 Bulgakov's novel is also significant, and clearly
influential, in another way. As the book draws to an end, the demonic
Woland points out to the Master, who is a writer, that Pontius Pilate, a
character in the Master's book, is seated forlornly in his garden, hoping to see
a path of moonlight that he might climb in order to meet again the prisoner
Ha-Nozri, the novel's Christ-figure. The text continues:
Woland turned once more to the Master and said: "Well, now
you can finish your novel with a single phrase!"
353Rushdie, 'Giinter Grass', in Imaginary Homelands, p.273.
354Rushdie, 'In Good Faith', p.403.
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The Master seemed to have waited for this as he stood
motionless and looked at the sitting Procurator, He folded his
hands at his mouth and shouted so that the echoe leapt up and
down the deserted treeless cliffs:
"You are free! You are free! He waits for you!"
The mountains transformed the Master's voice into
thunder, and the thunder destroyed the mountains. The
accursed rocky walls collapsed, leaving only the mountaintop
with the stone chair. On the black abyss that swallowed the
walls there gleamed a vast city crowned with glittering idole
above a garden grown to wild luxuriance during thousands of
moons. The moonlit path so awaited by the Procurator
stretched directly into his gardenm, and the first to run out on it
was the sharp-eared dog.355
It is art that is here depicted as an emancipatory force, a force that is able to
make material reality conform to the wishes of men and women (rather than
to the fickle whims of market forces). As we shall soon see, Rushdie's
digestion of Bulgakov's masterpiece involves both an appropriation of that
basic affirmation of art's liberationary potential and a provisional rejection of
the relative ease and automatic success with which that potential is seen to be
fulfilled.
Instead, Rushdie acknowledges the difficulty of the struggle in which
he is engaged. Sara Suleri, whose emphasis on The Satanic Verses as 'a deeply
Islamic book' is entirely commendable, moves close to the crux of the matter
when she remarks of the need to understand the novel in terms of its cultural
background that '[hjere, the crucial context of Islamic secularism requires
close attention.'356 For the attempt to create a new way of understanding that
so profoundly problematic relation of the migrant to his/her cultural origins
becomes simultaneously, for Rushdie, the attempt to establish a worthwhile
and valid notion of Islamic secularism. In an interview published in the
German newspaper 'Die Zeit', Rushdie says:




What I am trying to make a case for is the development of a
secular tradition within Islam similar to that which Judaisn, for
example, has developed. There are a lot of people who would
call themselves secular Jews, who would say that Jewish culture,
Jewish history and Jewish tradition are very important to them
but that they do not accept the theology.357
Where Rushdie sees hope for ideas such as his is in the largely ignored
heterogeneity of Islam. As early as 1981, Rushdie was chastising V.S. Naipal
for the misleading picture he portrays in Among the Believers of a unified,
homogenous 'Islamic world'.358 More recently he has pointed to Fouad
Zakariya's Laicite ou Islamisme as an example of the modern and modernizing
currents of contemporary Islamic thought in which he has tried to play a
part.359 The fact that Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia took the opportunity, in
the wake of the political furore over The Satanic Verses, to announce a jihad or
holy war on literary and philosophical modernism is only one of the more
overt signs that what has happened to Rushdie since the publication of The
Satanic Verses may have had little, in fact, to do with the specific case of that
one novel and, rather, been the manifestation of a political conflict that is
taking place within Islamic culture itself.
When Fadia A. Faqir writes that '[m]ost of the sixty-six Arab
intellectuals blacklisted recently by a Saudi Islamic group who announced the
holy jihad on Modernism live either in London or Paris,' and ends by asking,
'Is exile the only answer to the resurgence of Islam?'360 he is, I think,
illuminating the issue without quite grasping it fully, Rushdie and other
migrants with Islamic cultural origins have attempted, and are attempting, to
discover a new form of discourse, a new set of self-descriptive terms, that
357Salman Rushdie, Interview in Die Zeit, 11-16 March 1992, p.69. Translation by Andrea
Heilmann.
358Salman Rushdie, 'Naipaul Among the Believers', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.373-375.
359Salman Rushdie, 'One Thousand Days in a Balloon', in Imaginary Homelands, p.436.
360Fadia A. Faqir, in The Rushdie File, p.238.
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might embody the fusion of an Islamic cultural inheritance with a doubt-
ridden, modernist, demystifying consciousness. Exile (or migrancy) may well
be as much a cause as an effect of the bitter struggle which the jihad against
modernism indicates, and in which Rushdie and others have long been
engaged. The Anglo-Saxon "Right" has, of course, like the Islamic
fundamentalists, been quick to recognise the danger of such a struggle. 'Why
do you think,' asks Christopher Hitchens, 'that Peregrine Worsthorne, Paul
Johnson and Auberon Waugh are, pro-tem, in favour of the mosque against
secular, brown activists of the Rushdie type?'361
It remains now only to indicate the means by which this particular
struggle, which is the sum total of those other struggles that we have already
noted, finds expression in The Satanic Verses as the longing to envisage the
New. There are, essentially, two Utopian conclusions to the novel. The first is
the moment of religious epiphany, dreamt by Gibreel Farishta, in which the
prophetess Ayesha finally converts Mirza Saeed Akhtar:
He was a fortress with clanging gates. — He was drowning. —
She was drowning, too. He saw the water fill her mouth, heard
it begin to gurgle into her lungs. Then something within him
refused that, made a different choice, and at the instant that his
heart broke, he opened.
His body split apart from his adam's-apple to his groin,
so that she could reach deep within him, and now she was open,
they all were, and at the moment of their opening the waters
parted, and they walked to Mecca across the bed of the Arabian
Sea. (SV, p.507)
The conversation of Mirza Saeed takes a form similar to that of the torture of
Muhammad in Dante's Inferno. He is cleft in two like Muhammad in a
passage that serves to reaffirm Islamic faith rather than to attack it, thereby
transforming, once again, a form of abuse into a symbol of affirmation. The
361Christopher Hitchins, 'Siding with Rushdie', in For the Sake ofArgument: Essays and
Minority Reports (London: Verso, 1993), p.296.
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parting of the Arabian Sea and the crossing to Mecca is a return to the
pilgrims' spiritual homeland. The racism and sexism that the novel portrays
are here dissolved in a singularly Islamic Utopian vision to which the faithful
have been led by a female prophet. Doubt is overwhelmed by the powers of
religious belief; the temptations of secular consumerism are discarded in
favour of submission to a God-sent authority. It is a vision, though, that
exists only in the form of a dream or a film.
'The Parting of the Arabian Sea' is ultimately too reactionary a vision to
be properly Utopian. Implicit in The Satanic Verses is the suggestion that a true
Utopian yearning must do more than merely point nostalgically to the past,
denying the onward rush of History in the manner of a Khomenei362 or a
Thatcher.363 Instead, as we have already seen Ernst Bloch insist, it must 'carry
on the existing facts toward their future potentiality of their otherness, of their
better condition in an anticipatory way.' A renewal of religious piety would
hardly offer migrants such as Rushdie a new means of comprehending their
cultural formation. At the novel's conclusion, Saladin Chamcha (who is, by
then, Salahuddin Chamchwala) sees through the false Utopia that such a
renewal would offer:
He stood at the window of his childhood and looked out at the
Arabian Sea. The moon was almost full; moonlight stretching
from the rocks of Scandal Point out to the far horizon, created
the illusion of a silver pathway, like a parting of the water's
shining hair, like a road to miraculous lands. He shook his
head; could no longer believe in fairy-tales. Childhood was
over, and the view from this window was no more than an old
and sentimental echo. To the devil with it! Let the bulldozers
come. If the old refused to die, the new could not be born. (SV,
pp.546-547)
362See Rushdie, 'In God We Trust', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.383-384.
363See Rushdie, 'Outside the Whale', p.92.
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The echoes of Bulgakov's novel seem deliberate. The path of moonlight,
however, must be rejected; easy answers that fail to take into account the
complexities and contradictions of the present can no longer be trusted.
The Satanic Verses ends with the homecoming of Saladin Chamcha and
his discovery that he is really Salahuddin Chamchawala. This is the novel's
true Utopian conclusion and its true spiritual homecoming. In his conclusion
to The Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch offers a description of the New in terms
which would seem to validate the authenticity of the Utopian longing in
Rushdie's novel:
True genesis is not at the beginning but at the end, and it starts to
begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e. grasp
their roots. But the root of history is the working, creating
human being who reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once
he has grasped himself and established what is his, without
expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in
the world something which shines into the childhood of all and
in which no one has yet been: Heimat.
Bloch's reappropriation of the Nazi term "Heimat" (homeland), with which to
represent the basic Utopian goal, is clearly comparable to the strategy of
narrative reclamation that is at the heart of Rushdie's novel.365 But it is the
longing for that homeland itself — the homeland that is new; in which the
distinction between self and other has begun to lose its sharpness, its capacity
to govern thought — that The Satanic Verses so thoughtfully, so movingly
expresses.
In an essay on the film The Wizard of Oz, Rushdie turns finally to the
series of sequels that Frank L. Baum wrote to the children's book from which
the film was adapted. He notes that in the sixth book Auntie Em, Uncle
Henry and Dorothy all eventually move to the Land of Oz:
364Ernst Bloch, The Principle ofHope, vol. 3, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul
Knight (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.1375-1376.
365por Rushdie's own comments on the literary reappropriation of "Heimat", see Salman
Rushdie, 'Siegfried Lenz', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.285-287.
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So Oz finally became home; the imagined world became the
actual world, as it does for us all, because the truth is that once
we have left our childhood places and started out to make up
our lives, armed only with what we have and are, we
understand that the real secret of the ruby slippers is not that
'there's no place like home', but rather that there is no longer
any such place as home: except, of course for the home we make,
or the homes that are made for us, in Oz: which is anywhere,
and everywhere, except the place from which we began.366
Home (or "Heimat") is that which we make anew; and that is why, at the end
of The Satanic Verses, though Salahuddin has come home, he is not yet home.
Rushdie's novel depicts no realization of the New. Instead it remains faithful
to Adorno's dictum that it is only 'the longing for the new' that art can
plausibly offer.
What is left, and what represents that longing for the New that is the
artistic New itself, is the continuing necessity of political struggle. Having
returned to Bombay to see his father die, Salahuddin Chamchawala takes part
in a demonstration organised by the Communist Party of India (Marxist).
'CPI (M) observers,' we are told,
reported an unbroken chain of men and women linking hands
from top to bottom of the city, and Salahuddin, standing
between Zeeny and Bhupen on Muhammad Ali Road, could not
deny the power of the image. Many people in the chain were in
tears. (SV, p.541)
Later, Salahuddin discovers that the demonstration is to be almost completely
ignored by the media: "'It's a Communist show,"' Zeeny tells him. "'So
officially, it's a non-event'" (SP, p.542). Here, in Bombay, it is the Communist
Party that is demonized.
In his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' Walter Benjamin writes,
'Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be
366Salman Rushdie, The Wizard ofOz (London: BFI Publishing, 1992), p.57.
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settled cheaply.'367 The fusion of an Islamic cultural heritage and a modern,
socialist political vision does not come easily. In Rushdie's depiction there is a
home to be found, but it is one for which we must be prepared to struggle, 'to
turn insults into strengths', to envisage 'in an anticipatory way' that which we
have learned does not exist. With neither a path of moonlight to follow nor a
dry sea-bed on which to walk, the trek homeward can be hazardous. That The
Satanic Verses should nonetheless insist that that journey is worthwhile, that
no easier option can be trusted, is a sign of its profoundly Utopian political
perspective. This is a perspective from which the legacy of a cultural past or
the limitations of a postmodern present might seem less immutable. The
Satanic Verses asks us to accept the transience of the present state of things,
suggesting the possibility of a time and place in which existing truths might
be swept away — in which we might accept that "the Orient" and "the
Occident" were man-made, not God-given, and that the devil might not be
quite so bad after all. 'And we,' as Rilke wrote,
who always think
of happiness rising
would feel the emotion
that almost startles us
when a happy thing falls.368
367Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Illuminations, p.254.
368Rainer Maria Rilke, 'Tenth Elegy', in Duino Elegies, trans. David Young (London: Norton,
1978), p.94.
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Postscript: Vou Must Remember This
In 'The Harmony of the Spheres', one of the short stories collected in East,
West, the narrator Khan describes his memories of Eliot Crane, a friend who
has recently killed himself. Eliot, he explains, had been mentally unbalanced
for some time, suffering from paranoid delusions provoked by his interest in
the occult: 'What human mind could have defended itself against such a
Babel, in which Theosophists argued with Confucians, Christian Scientists
with Rosicrucians?'369 Rushdie uses Eliot's paranoia to aim an easy jibe at
those "concerned" about immigration:
Eliot had elaborated a conspiracy theory in which most of his
friends were revealed to be agents of hostile powers, both
Earthly and extra-terrestrial. I was an invader from Mars, one of
many such dangerous beings who had sneaked into Britain
when certain essential forms of vigilance had been relaxed.
(HoS, p.127)
On hearing of Eliot's death, Khan goes to see his widow Lucy; she asks him to
read through his dead friend's papers. 'There were,' he comments, 'only
ravings.' For the most part, these seem ridiculous occultist tracts or self-
pitying, autobiographical speculation. 'Harder still to read,' adds Khan,
were his fantasies about us, his friends. These were of two
kinds: hate-filled and pornographic. There were many virulent
attacks on me, and pages of steamy sex involving my wife Mala,
'dated', no doubt to maximise their auto-erotoc effect, in the
days immediately after our marriage. And, of course, at other
times. The pages about Lucy were both nasty and lubricious.
(HoS, p.144)
369Salman Rushdie, 'The Harmony of the Spheres', in East, West (London: Cape, 1994), p.142.
Subsequent references to the textwill be to this edition and marked in the main text, using the
abbreviation, HoS.
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At the end of the story Khan tells his wife about Eliot's hurtful sexual
fantasies. '"Those weren't fantasies," she said' (HoS, p.146).
'The Harmony of the Spheres' is a rewriting of a passage from 'The
Angel Azraeel' section of The Satanic Verses. Saladin Chamcha tortures the
fanatically jealous Gibreel, in a multitude of different voices, claiming sexual
knowledge of his girlfriend Allie Cone:
. . . superb Byronic aristocrats boasting of having 'conquered
Everest', sneering guttersnipes, unctuous best-friend voices
mingling warning and mock-commiseration, a zvord to the wise,
how stupid can you, don't you know yet what she's, anything in
trousers, you poor moron, take it from a pal. (SV, p.444)
Here the claims are, of course, false; they are part of Saladin's revenge for
Gibreel's earlier abandonment of him. Rushdie, though, integrates quite
specific echoes of this episode into his short story. Before he begins his hoax
calls, Saladin visits Gibreel and Allie in their Scottish retreat. Allie tells him
something of Gibreel's neurosis:
"He can't get very far without transport, but you never know,'
she explained grimly. 'Three days ago he stole the car keys and
they found him heading the wrong way up an exit road on the
M6, shouting about damnation. (SV, p.432)
Khan visits Eliot and Lucy (this time travelling to Wales) in similar
circumstances:
'You'd better come,' Lucy had called to say. 'They found him
going the wrong way on the motorway, doing ninety, with one
of those sleep-mask things over his eyes.' (HoS, p.127)
The story reverses two significant aspects of the passage from the
novel: here it is the madman who makes the accusations, and they turn out to
be true. What principally interests me, though, is the act of Rushdie's
rewriting itself. His fiction often seems predicated on the need continuously
to revise and to reassemble narratives, absorbing and reworking an English
and European cultural tradition while simultaneously engaging in a process
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of self-revision. This suggests both the multiplicity of narrative possibilities
(the multiplicity of ways of understanding the world) and the fleeting
transience of each. Rushdie compensates for the absence of grand narratives
(the 'god-shaped hole') by offering, instead, a succession of often inter-related
fictions. In the remaining pages of this chapter, we shall be looking at how
this aspect of Rushdie's writing informs his portrayal of self and, through
that, the construction of social formations. Above all, we shall see how this
postmodern emphasis on the contingency of each of these historical narratives
is used to suggest the ultimate contingency and historicity of that condition of
postmodernity itself.
'I have been a swallower of lives,' says Saleem Sinai, 'and to know me, just the
one of me, you'll have to swallow the lot as well' (MC, p.9). The telling of
stories, the construction of a multitude of fictions, is tied inextricably in
Rushdie's novels to the construction of a self: Saleem Sinai exists almost as the
amalgam of the stories he tells of his family's and his country's past. The
Moor's Last Sigh is the next of Rushdie's novels to make consistent use of a
first-person narrator. Moraes Zogoiby, in a manner not dissimilar to that of
Saleem, claims: 'On the run, I have turned the world into my own pirate map,
complete with clues, leading X-marks-the-spottily to the treasure of myself.'370
The creation of the fictions, those of Saleem and Moraes (known as 'Moor'),
are an act of self-assertion — or, more properly, of self-discovery. And yet at
the same time these characters exist in and through the telling of their stories:
so while the narrators' stories lead 'X-marks-the-spottily' to the treasure of
themselves, that treasure ~ those selves — exist only through the act of
370Salman Rushdie, The Moor's Last Sigh (London: Cape, 1995), p.3.
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aestheticization. Here art is self-expression, but that self is "itself" shown to be
yet another artistic construct.
In fact, in both Midnight's Children and The Moor's Last Sigh it is made
clear that the narrators tell these stories as an attempt to keep hold of some
unified self, as a method of survival. Early in Midnight's Children Saleem
compares himself to Sheherazade of The Thousand and One Nights, spinning
out fictions to stretch out a life expectancy. In The Moor's Last Sigh, too,
Moor's survival in Vasco Miranda's fortress is to last the precise duration of
the time he takes to write the story of his life. At the same time, that self —
which survives only by the construction of successive fictions — is seen as
inextricably and intimately tied to a national destiny: 'I had been mysteriously
handcuffed to history,' says Saleem, 'my destinies indissolubly chained to
those of my country' (MC, p.9). Saleem Sinai's physical fragmentation is
offered as a reflection of the Indian subcontinent: the initial partition of East
and West Pakistan; and the subsequent division of East and West Pakistan,
after the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, into Bangladesh and Pakistan. We find
something very similar in The Moor's Last Sigh. Moraes Zogoiby is living his
life at twice the speed he should; when he ought to be in his prime, he is
already old and weakened: like post-Independence Indian democracy, he has
aged far too quickly. So Rushdie constructs a triple analogy: the narrator's life
reflects that of the state, but the narrator is also constructed by his form of
narration . Both Saleem and Moor, in their ever more desperate attempts to
make their narratives cohere, raise the question of the coherence or viability of
the Indian state as a single political entity. The work of art itself, then, the
very construction of these fictional narratives becomes another reflection of
social contruction. Self exists as an act of aestheticiztion, and that self is also a
figure for the nation.
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The series of narratives, through which the construction of both self
and nation are invoked, is formed by a mish-mash of influences: some Indian,
some European. While the open, free-ranging structure is intended to reflect
an Indian oral tradition of epic storytelling, the novel also mimics certain
European literary models: the significance of Saleem's nose and birth-date
point to Tristram Shandy; I've already referred to A Passage to India; Giinther
Grass's The Tin Drum is another influence. And while Saleem's pickles recall
Oskar Mazerath's drum playing in Grass's novel, they also point to Marcel's
madelaine in A la recherche.... It is in The Moor's Last Sigh, though, that the
narrative's construction as a tissue of other (principally European) narratives
is at its most overt:
I have lost count of the days that have passed since I fled the
horrors of Vasco Miranda's mad fortress in the Andalusian
mountain-village of Benengeli; ran from death under cover of
darkness and left a message nailed to the door. And since then
along my hungry, heat-hazed way there have been further
bunches of scribbled sheets, swings of the hammer, sharp
exclamations of two-inch nails. Long ago when I was green my
beloved said to me in fondness, 'Oh, you Moor,' you strange
black man, always so full of theses, never a church door to nail
them to.' (She, a self-professedly godly un-Christian Indian,
joked about Luther's protest at Wittenberg to tease her
determinedly ungodly Indian Christian lover: how stories
travel, what mouths they end up in!) Unfortunately, my mother
overheard; and darted, quick as snakebite: 'So full, you mean, of
faeces.' Yes, mother, you had the last word on that subject, too:
as about everything.
'Amrika' and 'Moskva', somebody once called them,
Aurora my mother and Uma my love, nicknaming them for the
two great super-powers; and people said they looked alike but I
never saw it, couldn't see it at all. Both of them dead, of
unnatural causes, and I in a far off country with death at my
heels and their story in my hand, a story I've been crucifying
upon a gate, a fence, an olive-tree, spreading it across this
landscape of my last journey, the story which points to me. On
the run, I have turned the world into my pirate map, complete
with clues, leading X-marks-the-spottily to the treasure of
myself. When my pursuers have followed the trail they'll find
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me waiting, uncomplaining, out of breath, ready. Here I stand.
Couldn 't've done it differently. (MLS, p.3)
References to Vasco da Gama, The Tempest, Luther and Don Quixote litter the
first few paragraphs. This is a playful celebration of cultural hybridity —
which, on the one hand, stresses the textual status of the world of the novel (it
is, after all, a book made from other books); and also suggests the plurality of
elements in cultural construction: 'was not the entire national culture based on
the principle of borrowing whatever clothes seemed to fit, Aryan, Mughal,
British, take-the-best-and-leave-the-rest?' asks Zeeny Vakil in The Satanic
Verses. (Reappearing in The Moor's Last Sigh, Zeeny characterizes Aurora
Zogoiby's painting as the expression of that very hotch-potch.)
This mish-mash of infuences, the juxtaposition of the European and the
Indian can be said to represent a form of multiculturalism, absorbing the
historical and cultural forces of West European literary culture on coloniseds
societies. In this sense it can be interpreted as quite a realistic portrayal of the
construction of a post-colonial culture. On the other hand, as was suggested
at the very outset of this chapter, it might seem remarkably akin to Jean-
Francois Lyotard's playful account of the eclecticism of contemporary,
postmodern culture. But it seems wrong to me to insist, as Aijaz Ahmad
does, that Rushdie's writing can also be identified with a postmodern
aesthetic through its adoption of a celebratory stance toward 'inner
fragmentation and social disconnection'. In The Moor's Last Sigh, though,
Uma Sarasvati (Moor's beloved) is the exemplar of the protean, postmodern
subject. Uma appears to everyone exactly as they would wish her to be - only
Moor's mother, Aurora, remains unseduced. And yet it is Uma, the paragon
of pluralism, who turns out to be faithless and destructive: 'in the matter of
Uma Sarasvati,' says Moor,' it had been the pluralist Uma, with her multiple
selves, her highly inventive commitment to the infinite malleability of the
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real, her modernistically provisional sense of truth, who had turned out to be
the bad egg' (MLS, p.272). Likewise, for all the regenerative possibility
suggested by narrative fragmentation in Midnight's Children, it remains
difficult to witness the gradual destruction of Saleem and of Nehru's vision of
a secular Indian state without detecting a deeply felt sense of loss and regret.
The fragmentary structure of Rushdie's novels is, of course, a mimetic
device, reflecting (and not necessarily celebrating) other forms of
fragmentation. However, Rushdie's historical narratives of the subcontinent
also hint at their interconnection; (like his characters, they bleed into one
another, 'like flavours'). In Midnight's Children Saleem's son, Aadam Sinai, is
depicted as a member of a new, hardier generation, perhaps better able than
Midnight's Children to ensure the survival of a secular, democratic India. He
reappears in The Moor's Last Sigh; there he is an agent of destruction. Zeeny
Vakil also reappears (from The Satanic Verses); she, as the voice of a vigilant
multiculturalism and keeper of Aurora Zogoiby's paintings, is murdered.
Textual coherence is suggested. Rushdie seems to be trying to construct a
continuum from Midnight's Children, The Satanic Verses and The Moor's Last
Sigh. This hints toward but never quite delivers that goal of totality which is
the bedrock of Lukacsian ideas of Realism. And yet this ideal of totality, of
wholeness (for which both Saleem and Moor yearn), remains illusory, the
construct of textual correspondances between works of imaginative literature,
and the readiness of the reader to remember what has gone before. What this
leads to, it seems to me, throughout Rushdie's writing, is a profound sense of
longing, of the desire to make thing anew, but the fear that it might be
hopeless. The creation of the fiction becomes then simultaneously lament and
wish-fulfillment, both the evocation of that Mother India which to Rushdie is
now lost and the recognition that any such evocation is transient and illusory.
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In this respect reminiscent of much modernist writing, Rushdie's work also
bears a great similarity to that of the young Aurora who paints an entire room
as an expression of her loss after her mother's death :
Only God was absent, for no matter how carefully
Camoens peered at the walls, and even after he climbed a step-
ladder to stare at the ceiling, he was unable to find the figure of
Christ, on or off the cross, or indeed any other representation of
any other divinity, tree-sprite, water-sprite, angel, devil or saint.
And it was all set in a landscape that made Camoens
tremble to see it, for it was Mother India herself, Mother India
with her garishness and her inexhaustible motion, Mother India
who loved and betrayed and ate and destroyed and again loved
her children, and with whom the children's passionate
conjoining and eternal quarrel stretched long beyond the grave;
who stretched into great mountains like exclamations of the soul
and along vast rivers full of mercy and disease, and across harsh
drought-ridden plateaux on which men hacked with pickaxes at
the dry infertile soil; Mother India with her oceans and coco-
palms and rice fields and bullocks at the water-well, her cranes
on tree-tops with necks like coat-hangers, and high circling kites
and the mimicry of mynahs and the yellow-beaked brutality of
crows, a protean Mother India who could turn monstrous, who
could be a worm rising from the sea with Epifania's face at the
top of a long and scaly neck; who could turn murderous,
dancing cross-eyed and Kali-tongued while thousands died; but
above all, in the very centre of the ceiling, at the point where all
the horn-of-plenty lines converged, Mother India with Belle's
face. Queen Isabella was the only mother-goddess here, and she
was dead; at the heart of this first immense outpouring of
Aurora's art was the simple tragedy of her loss, the unassuaged
pain of becoming a motherless child. The room was her act of
mourning. (MLS, pp.60-61)
By the end of The Moor's Last Sigh, Moor has lost his family and his
treachorous beloved. Most of Aurora's paintings have been destroyed, and
Moor himself has narrowly escaped from the murderous Vasco Miranda. He
leaves Benengeli and travels to the Alhambra, monument to Boabdil, last
Moorish ruler of Spain. Benengeli is the name of the fictional author of
Cervantes' Don Quixote, whose work the novel's narrator claims merely to
have translated: Cide Hamete Benengeli, a Moor. Like Don Quixote, Moor
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turns the land over which he travels into a fictional environment: he nails the
pages of his narrative to trees, gates, to whatever he can find. The world that
has colluded in his destruction is one he, like Saleem Sinai, transforms into
the story of himself; but the literary allusions tell us not to take it too
seriously. Rushdie's most recent novel dramatizes the destruction of art, but
seems to show art triumphing in the end, transforming the real world around
it.371 It is also, though, reminding us of the fact that the same Christian,
Spanish civilisation which gave Europe the novel (in the form of Cervantes'
Don Quixote) was also that which expelled and slaughtered the Muslims who
had made their homes there. For all its textual playfulness, Rushdie's writing
retains this sense of didactic purpose, constantly patching up the holes in our
historical memory.
And yet there is also something else. Another of the stories in East, West is
called 'Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain Consummate
Their Relationship (Santa Fe, AD 1492)'. This provides a further subtext to The
Moor's Last Sigh: responsible for the Moors' expulsion from Spain, Isabella is
also a key figure in Europe's discovery of the New World. The idea of a "new
world" -- an imaginary homeland, the Land of Oz — is a potent one in
Rushdie's fiction. The conclusion of The Moor's Last Sigh contains an explicit
allusion to American literature:
At the head of this tombstone are three eroded letters; my fingertip
reads them for me. RIP. Very well: I will rest, and hope for peace.
The world is full ofsleepers waitingfor their moment of return: Arthur
sleeps in Avalon, Barbarossa in his cave. Finn MacCool lies in the
Irish hillsides and the Worm Ouroboros on the bed of the Sundering
Sea. Australia's ancestors, the Wandjina, take their ease
371 For Rushdie's critical comments on a less ambivalent treatment of this same theme, see
Salman Rushdie, 'Christoph Ransmayr', in Imaginary Homelands, pp.291-293.
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underground, and somezuhere, in a tangle of thorns, a beauty in a glass
coffin azvaits a prince's kiss. See: here is my flask. I'll drink some
wine; and then, like a latter-day Van Winkle, I'll lay me down upon
this graven stone, lay my head beneath these letters RIP, and close
my eyes, according to our family's old practice offalling asleep in
times of trouble, and hope to awaken, renewed and joyful, into a better
time. (MLS, pp.433-434)
Despite this closing reference to American literature, it would be naive of us
to assume for even a moment that the subtext of the New World in The Moor's
Last Sigh is unproblematically one of celebration. The history of racial
exploitation in the United States is of too close a proximity to Rushdie's
habitual themes for any such assumption to be credible. In fact, that history
of exploitation is subtly integrated into The Moor's Last Sigh itself, though
Rushdie is clearly interested less in the experience of slavery and subjugation
than in its imaginative rendering: Rushdie's latest novel is a coded homage to
Black American literature.
'Columbus,' writes Rushdie, 'the invisible man who dreams of entering
the invisible world.'372 The Moor's Last Sigh constructs a number of narrative
parallels and intertextual allusions to Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man.373 'I've
illuminated the blackness of my invisibility,' claims Ellison's narrator,'— and
vice versa.'374 'Placed beyond the Pale,' suggests Moor in a near echo, 'would
you not seek to make light from the Dark?' (MLS, p.5). Ellison's nameless
narrator submerges his identity in the Stalinist 'Brotherhood' just as Moor is
coerced into Raman Fielding's neo-Stalinist 'Mumbai's Axis' (MA). The
protean Uma Sarasvati echoes Ellison's indefinable Rinehart. 'I yam what I
am!' insists the Invisible Man;375 'I yam what I yam an' that's what I yam,' says
Moor (MLS, p.427). Even Aurora's paintings reinforce the association: 'The
372'Christopher Columbus and Queen Isabella of Spain Consummate Their Relationship
(Santa Fe, AD 1492)', in East, West, p.1'16.




Moor had entered the invisible world, the world of ghosts, of people who did
not exist, and Aurora followed him into it, forcing it into visibility by the
strength of her artistic will' (MLS, p.303).
The expression in Ellison's work of the Black experience in the United
States serves as an example in The Moor's Last Sigh of the imagination's
capacity for renewal and transformation: Isabella expels the Moors, but
sponsors Columbus's discovery of the NewWorld; the NewWorld becomes a
slave state, but the slaves' descendents produce Black American literature.
Neither the expulsions nor slavery are in any way redeemed, or their horror
diminished, by this. But what Rushdie suggests cannot be forgotten is
historical contingency and the possibility of change. The historicity of the
present moment — entailing the destruction both of Aurora's art and of Moor
himself — is thrust to the forefront of Rushdie's writing. The possibility that
Moor might awaken, 'renewed and joyful, into a better time', remains as a
reminder to us too that we need not surrender the imagination to the
condition of postmodernity, but that the latter will pass as surely as Isabella's
reign. Grasping the postmodern present as history, The Moor's Last Sigh
accepts the contingency of imaginative expression, while simultaneously
implying the need to imagine a time when narratives might be made grand
once more. 'A sigh,' says Moor, 'isn't just a sigh. We inhale the world and
breathe out meaning. While we can. While we can' (MLS, p.54).
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Chapter Five
The Inadequacy of the Postmodern
This final chapter will re-examine some of the theoretical points first
discussed in Chapter One, focusing particularly on the extent to which the
theoretical model of postmodernism proposed by Fredric Jameson might be
revised in light of the preceding literary analyses of Chapters Two to Four.
The logic of Jameson's position, at least in theoretical terms, would seem to
suggest the impossibility of a critical postmodern culture; and yet, in contrast
to Terry Eagleton, Jameson has nonetheless stressed the necessity for Marxist
critique to attempt to identify precisely such a moment in postmodernism.
The inconsistencies into which these dual arguments have led Jameson will be
sketched out briefly below, while the implications that the persistence of a
dialectic of critique and ideological complicity identified in the postmodern
fiction thus far discussed might have for his theoretical model is taken as the
basis for a reworking of that model. Since the preceding literary-critical
analyses have attempted to show at work in postmodern fiction precisely the
internal dialectic that Jameson, too, perceives in texts such as E.L. Doctorow's,
but can never quite reconcile with his theoretical or conceptual understanding
of the postmodern, this chapter will argue that such a reconciliation is
unnecessary and that Jameson's continuing vexation with regard to the
problem is rather the product of his inconsistent characterization of
individual texts' relation to a cultural sphere grasped in theoretical or
conceptual terms.
A conceptual understanding of postmodernism is, by the logic of a
post-Adorno Western Marxism, inherently inadequate. The critique of
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conceptual reason that Adorno develops in Dialectic of Enlightenment (with
Horkheimer) and later in Negative Dialectics must also be applied to his own
conceptual construction of the culture industry, and to Jameson's lengthy
discussions of 'the concept of the postmodern'.
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer address the
relation of Enlightenment's conceptual rationality to the historical extension
of capitalist reification and rationalization.376 'Just as the first categories,' they
write,
represented the organized tribe and its power over the
individual, so the whole logical order, dependency, connection,
progression, and union of concepts is grounded in the
corresponding conditions of social reality — that is, of the
division of labor.377
What is being suggested here, then, is a form of reproduction, whereby
conceptual reason cognitively reproduces some of the features of the capitalist
mode of production. Adorno and Horkheimer claim of course, quite
infamously, that the specific feature of capitalist production to be reproduced
by Enlightenment rationality is that of domination. They do this by suggesting
that instrumental reason, the 'means-ends rationality' of which Peter Burger
depicts the art of the avant-garde as so critical, has been taken as reason per se.
The development of a concept allows for the absorption of a whole host of
particulars into a general definition or category, thereby reenacting, for
Adorno and Horkheimer, the domination under monetary, exchange value of
objects' intrinsic and heterogenous use values in the process of capitalist
commodification 378
376We can see, therefore, the continuity of this strand ofWestern Marxist critique from
Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness, where he asserts: "Modern critical philosophy
springs from the reified structure of consciousness' (pp.110-111).
377Adorno & Horkheimer, p.21.
378For a lengthier and more thorough discussion of this aspect of Adorno's thought, see
Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso,
1990), pp.22-24.
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It is this that Adorno terms 'identity thinking', the suggestion that
particulars can be held to be identical by the imposition of a general, abstract
concept. In contrast to this, Adorno suggests that dialectical thinking must
attempt to grasp the 'non-identical', that which escapes the identity, the
homogenizing domination, of the concept. As Fredric Jameson writes in Late
Marxism: Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic:
If the concept is grasped as 'the same', as what makes things the
same as well as inscribing a sameness -- a return of recognizable
entities -- on the psyche, then the struggle of thought (at least at
a certain moment of its history) has to undermine that logic of
recurrence and of sameness in order to break through to
everything sameness excludes: I put it this way in order to be
able to describe this last — the 'non-identical' — both in terms of
otherness and of novelty.379
Only, for Adorno, the determinate negation of negative dialectics, through the
simultaneous critique and application of conceptual thought, can give
expression to that which the concept would dominate. It is necessary,
therefore, to bear in mind that whenever Adorno would seem to have
defined phenomena conceptually, as he does the culture industry, there is
already an implicit acknowledgement of guilty inadequacy. In other words,
Adorno's thought is predicated upon its very failure ever to grasp its object
wholly, a failure which it both laments and simultaneously acknowledges as a
critical force:
If negative dialectics calls for the self-reflection of thinking, the
tangible implication is that if thinking is to be true — if it is to be
true today, in any case -- it must also be a thinking against
itself. If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes
the concept, it is from the outset in the nature of the musical
accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the
screams of its victims.380
379predric Jameson, LateMarxism, p.17.
380Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p.365.
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Without this attempt to identify the non-identical, that which 'eludes
the concept', thought becomes, for Adorno, a mere ideological tool of the
marketplace. However, it would be equally inaccurate to suggest that
Adorno attempts to evade that fate completely: 'No theory today,' he writes,
'escapes the marketplace.'381 Adorno is primarily interested, as is apparent
from the opening essay of Prisms, in the force of immanent critique - a critique
which operates, to a large extent, from within the boundaries and limitations
of its object. In this way, Adorno hopes to mimic in his thought what he
interprets as the historical truthfulness (the 'truth-content') of modernist
artworks (see above, Chapter One). As Jiirgen Habermas writes, Adorno does
not give up entirely on Enlightenment thinking, but rather develops, in the
spirit of a performative contradiction, the critique of reason from the critical,
rational structures of Enlightenment thought itself. This contradiction then
becomes 'the organizational form of indirect communication':
Identity thinking turned against itself becomes pressed into
continual self-denial and allows the wounds it inflicts on itself
and its objects to be seen.382
The attempt to grasp social or cultural phenomena conceptually may
also be seen as the attempt to grasp them in their totality. It is here that that
strand of postmodern, anti-Enlightenment thought which is most obviously
predicated on an aversion to the category of totality -- a position perhaps
most easily recognizable in Lyotard's 'war on totality' — must be distinguished
from the more ambivalent structures of Adorno's negative dialectics. For
although Adorno is clearly suspicious of the expression of domination which
he associates with Enlightenment thinking — witness, for example, his famous
inversion of Hegel: 'The whole is the false' — he nonetheless refuses to
381 Ibid, p.4.
382Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity, pp.185-186.
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abandon the notion of a totality. Thus, Jameson points to the significance of
the following passage from Negative Dialectics:
What is differentiated will appear divergent, dissonant, negative
just as long as consciousness is driven by its own formation
towards unity; just as long as it measures what is not identical
with itself against its own claim for totality. It is this which
dialectics exhibits to consciousness as a contradiction.383
Here, argues Jameson, Adorno's dialectical thinking challenges us to retain
some necessary sense of totality as an acknowledgement of the desire to grasp
and to understand a whole, while also suggesting
that the drive towards totality (Lukacs's Totalitatsintention) may
have something illicit about it, expressing the idealism and the
imperialism of the concept, which seeks voraciously to draw
everything into its own field of domination and security.384
Both concept and totality must therefore be subjected to a rigorous critique,
while nonetheless remaining necessary and invaluable analytic tools.
Despite, then, exerting a clear influence on the work of postmodern
philosophers such as Lyotard,385 this aspect ofWestern Marxist thought, as it
develops in the writings of Adorno and is reinterpreted in Jameson's work,
does not lead to the writing of what the latter has characterized as the
'provisional, fragmentary, self-consuming conceptual performances
celebrated by properly postmodern philosophy.'386 The logic of Adorno's
position in Negative Dialectics does not sanction philosophical free play. It
does, however, suggest the need both to revise what have hitherto been seen
as Adorno's definitive critical judgements on the culture industry, and to re¬
examine some of the inconsistencies of Jameson's analyses of postmodernism.
383This translation, which I found more fluent than the standard one by E.B. Ashton, is
Jameson's, to be found in Late Marxism, p.26; a less attractive version is in Adorno's Negative
Dialectics, pp.5-6.
384Jameson, LateMarxism, p.26.
385For a discussion of the indebtedness of Lyotard to the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory,
see Thomas Docherty, 'Postmodernism: An Introduction', in Thomas Docherty, ed.,
Postmodernism: A Reader (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1993), pp.5-14.
386Jameson, LateMarxism, p.27.
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Here, then, it is worth returning to one of the questions left open at the
conclusion of Chapter One: namely, why does Jameson insist on denying the
historicity of the postmodern when he is happy to identify some remnant of
historical memory in certain examples of postmodern culture (such as the
novels of Doctorow)? In part, of course, this question has already been
answered: Jameson is quite explicit that what he intends to delineate is the
contours of a postmodernism which is to be understood as a cultural
dominant, a cultural situation to which specific texts (or 'cultural
commodities') are a response (see above, Chapter One). However, the
discrepancies between the features of Jameson's 'concept of the postmodern'
and the analyses he offers of various cultural texts have, as he recognizes,
interesting implications for the validity and adequacy of that conceptual
construction. In 'The Existence of Italy', an essay whose title is an explicit
allusion to Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the culture industry, he
acknowledges that there is a notable degree of incompatibility between his
theoretical description of the postmodern and his interpretations of examples
of postmodern culture. This leads him to the following speculations:
Is this then to say that even within the extraordinary eclipse of
historicity in the postmodern period some deeper memory of
history still deeply stirs? Or does this persistence — nostalgia for
that ultimate moment of historical time in which difference was
still present — rather betoken the incompleteness of the
postmodern process, the survival within it of remnants of the
past, which have not yet, as in some unimaginable fully realized
postmodernism, been dissolved without a trace?387
Significantly, Jameson seems here at some pains to reconcile his theoretical
understanding of the postmodern with his analyses of specific cultural
commodites. It is precisely this need to reconcile the two which seems to me
387Fredric Jameson, "The Existence of Italy', in Signatures of the Visible, p.229.
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both unneccessary and responsible for the most glaring inconsistencies of his
account.
The difficulty that Jameson has in accepting that postmodern culture
might be capable of adopting a critical stance in relation to late capitalism is a
product of what he, following Adorno's critique of the culture industry, posits
as the dissolution in postmodernism of the critical distance of the aesthetic to
the socio-economic. This (as we saw in Chapter One) is among the principal
distinctions that Jameson draws between modernism and postmodernism;
moreover, it seems to block off completely any possibility of the condition of
postmodernity being subject to cultural critique:
No theory of cultural politics current on the Left today has been
able to do without one notion or another of a certain minimal
aesthetic distance, of the possibility of the positioning of the
cultural act outside the massive Being of capital, which then
serves as an Archimedean point from which to assault this last.
What the burden of our preceding demonstration suggests,
however, is that distance in general (including 'critical distance'
in particular) has very precisely been abolished in the new space
of postmodernism.388
It would appear from this characterization that a critical postmodernism is, by
definition, impossible. The loss of art's autonomy, outlined in Chapter One,
has also meant the dissolution of its critical distance from the socio-economic.
This leaves the aesthetic sphere (and, it would seem, all contemporary
cultural production) fully complicit with the economic forces of late
capitalism. Yet, still Jameson insists on the critical potential of certain texts.
The last three chapters of this thesis, too, have sought to identify elements of
critique in the novels of Amis, DeLillo and Rushdie.
Discussing Adorno's denunciation of the culture industry, Andreas
Huyssen points to the dangers which might result from the wholesale
adoption of Adorno's critical perspective: 'I am not denying,' he writes,
388Jameson, Postmodernism, p.48.
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that the increasing commodification of culture and its effects in
all cultural products are pervasive. What I would deny is the
implied notion that function and use are totally determined by
corporate intentions, and that exchange value has totally
supplanted use value. The double danger of Adorno's theory is
that the specificity of cultural products is wiped out and that the
consumer is imagined in a state of passive regression.389
Jameson seems continually aware of these problems; his theory, after all, is an
explicit response to the Frankfurt School's writings on the culture industry.390
Nonetheless, he appears, time and again (and despite the frequent, perhaps
repetitive, invocations of Doctorow), to hedge his bets, to prefer speculations
on 'some as yet unimaginable' new form of political postmodernism to the
identification of its present critical potential. As we have already seen, he is
even willing to suggest that such a potential might betoken less the
persistence of the cultural expression of dialectical conflict than the present
incompleteness of the postmodern process itself. What, though, if this
process, as Jameson describes it, can never be complete?
Huyssen takes something like this possibility as the basis for his
critique of Adorno:
While Adorno recognized that there were limitations to the
reification of human subjects through the culture industry
which made resistance thinkable at the level of the subject, he
never asked himself whether perhaps such limitations could be
located in the mass cultural commodities themselves. Such
limits do indeed become evident when one begins to analyze in
detail the signifying strategies of specific cultural commodities
and the mesh of gratification, displacement and production of
desires which are invariably put in play in their production and
consumption.391
389Huyssen, p.22.
390Note, in this respect, the continuity of Jameson's thought from the essay 'Reification and
Utopia in Mass Culture' (1979) to the book-length study Postmodernism (1991). See also




What I would like to stress here is Huyssen's identification of the need to
analyze specific cultural commodities. It is the particularity of the individual
postmodern text when viewed in relation to the theoretical model of
postmodernism that principally interests me. Moreover, it is perhaps here
that the critical distance, whose necessity and absence Jameson notes in his
discussion of the postmodern, might be situated.
'Ostensibly working on art works,' writes Adorno, 'the artist also works
on art ~ proof again of the fact that art and works of art are not
coterminous.'392 The 'art' to which Adorno here refers can only be grasped
conceptually, as an aeshetic sphere in which works of art are produced. The
need to identify the non-identical in conceptual thought, which we have
already seen Adorno stress in Negative Dialectics, might, then, be seen to
suggest a similar requirement to identify those points of conflict between an
'art' or aeshetic sphere thought theoretically and specific works of art — that is
to say, the identification of those features of individual texts which elude the
domination of the cultural dominant. It is worth acknowledging that the
work of art is itself engaged in a dialectical and thoroughly mediated
relationship with the aesthetic or cultural sphere in which it is produced. The
critical distance that modernist art had previously retained, but which has
been renounced by the culture of postmodernity, might then be relocated in
that same conflictual relation of the individual text to the cultural dominant of
postmodernism. This would allow the force of Jameson's critique of
postmodernism's ideological function to remain undiminished, while
accounting for texts' retention of critical potential in a manner consistent with
the critical theory of Western Marxism. We need not, therefore, speculate
with Jameson on 'some as yet unimaginable new mode' of cultural
392Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p.261.
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representation; rather, we should analyse the extent to which texts such as
White Noise or The Satanic Verses already offer both representation and critique
of the complicity of that cultural realm to which they owe their production
with the social exploitation and domination that they take as their subject.
This is a complicity in which the individual text of course shares, but with
which it cannot wholly be identified.
Again, it is possible to see in Jameson's writings the suggestion of a
similar method of recuperation — for example, in his discussions of what he
calls Doctorow's 'homeopathic' treatment of postmodernism. In Late Marxism
he even goes as far as to address directly the distinction Adorno draws
between art and artworks, claiming that what is implicit in Adorno's
formulation is the self-consciousness of art's ideological function:
. .. the sheer guilt of Art itself in a class society, art as luxury or
class privilege, a ground bass that resonates throughout all of
Adorno's aesthetic reflections without a break, even where its
vibration has become a virtual second nature in our sensorium,
so that from time to time we no longer hear it consciously. This
culpability irreperably associated with all artistic activity is,
then, the deeper motive for the radical separation, in Adorno,
between Art in general and the individual works: for what these
last do, what they 'work on' in the artistic process, is to engage
this universal sense of guilt, to address it with lacerating acuity,
to bring it to consciousness in the form of an unresolvaable
contradiction. The individual works of art can never resolve
that contradiction, but they can recover a certain authenticity by
including it as content and raw meterial, as what the individual
work of art must always confront anew, in all its virulence.393
If postmodernism, as the cultural logic of late capitalism, cannot be held to
maintain a critical distance from the social and economic formations of the
latter, a contemporary critical distance of the aesthetic can perhaps only be
situated between the individual postmodern text and the cultural dominant
that is postmodernism. The interpenetration of the economic and the
393Jameson, LateMarxism, p.130.
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aesthetic in postmodernity means that when an individual text 'works on' the
situation of art, it is working on the situation of late capitalism too.
Jay Bernstein argues that it was by virtue of its mutilation, by its
separation from ethics (religion) and truth (science), that the art of modernity
was able to express a 'second-order truth' about the alienation both of itself
and of those other, newly-autonomous spheres:
Because only art "suffers" its alienation, because art discovers its
autonomous vocation to be unstable and incapable of being
sustained, because art must continually conceive of its
autonomy as a burden it must both embrace and escape from, in
all this art comes to speak the truth — in a "language" that is not
that of truth-only cognition — about the fate of truth and art in
modernity. Art's exclusion from first-order cognition and moral
judgement is, then, a condition of its ability to register (in a
speaking silence) a second-order truth about first-order truth.394
For the culture of postmodernity, though, alienation is a thing of the past,
perhaps to be invoked nostalgically by images of Parisian cafes and a painting
by Edvard Munch. The aesthetic need no longer mourn its historical
mutilation, since the wholesome state of its youth has been restored with a
little cosmetic surgery. Perhaps, though, those artworks which offer critical
reflection on the cultural dominant can express a similar historical truth-
content, reflecting a critical self-consciousness grasped only in the nick of
time, in the final instance, in willful defiance of the condition of
postmodernity -- as if Hansel and Gretel were to insist that, although
gingerbread houses are all very well and good, this particular one at this
particular time tastes best when eating an escape route.
394Bernstein, The Fate ofArt, p.5.
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